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In 1905, when a member of the Fifty-eighth Congress, the
writer prepared and introduced several bills -relating to the
public welfare, and in the support of which he was impelled,
a a matter of public duty, to enter upon a protracted study
of the supervi ory powers of the Federal Government. One
bill provided for the creation of a Department of Public
Health, wherein all the existing but scattered health agencies
were to be con olidated and co-ordinated, while the jurisdiction of uch a department was enlarged to meet the
changed condition brt>ught about by the great increase in
population and the lack of any effective control of water
pollution or any sufficient system of quarantine, resulting
in the lo s, annually, of hundreds of thousands of lives.
The utter remissness of the Government in studying the
disease of man or in preventing the inception and spread
of those of a contagious character has become a tragedy,
pitiful as ii i cruel; and emphasized by the liberality ·a nd
the great care of the Government in its investigations and H.s
regulation directed towards the preservation of plant and
animal life.
The commercial activity of the Government has gradually
placed wealth above that of the health of its citizens.
Moreover, the people themselves have become so callom
to sickness and death, from common and easily preventable
infectiou diseases, that it would seem only the advent of
so~e virulent plague, costing perhaps millions of lives,
will awaken them to the necessity of National action in a
matter of National concern.
Infectious diseases and epidemics ignore State lines and
can only be controlled by a quarantine jurisdiction co(S)
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extensive with the source and the distribution of such communicable diseases.
This health bill, besid~s .providiµg for more extensive investigations and a greater efficiency in the present service,
recognized international and interstate quarantine as a sovereign function. existing apart fro~ the commercial jurisdiction ~f Congress·, while preserving absolutely the rights
of the St~tes in all matters of domestic concern.
Two other bills created what might be called an arbitratorial supervision in the settlement of "controversies between
the ' States," over water pollution, fisheries, irrigation, and
other beneficial uses in interstate and international waters;
and which 'tb.e States in their individual or collective capacity were unable to adjust or protect-a Federal jurisdiction suggested in some recent decisions of the Supreme
Court.
Practically all o f ~ bills were objected to on one general ground, viz., that y reason of the alleged absence of any
ge~eral police jurisdiction in the Federal Government any
regulation· of public health or the protection of utilitarian
uses in such waters were beyond the power of Congress to
enact.
The examination of these questions led to many others,
some m~re fundamental and others collateral in character,
with the ·result that the investigation has covered a scope
much beyond the writer's original intention. ·
In 1906 a New York magazine* printed as a supplement
a brief of the writer's entitled "The Existence and Extent of
National Police Power," and this has subsequently been used
as a basis ·of many additions.
The protective tariff and executive tariff agreements were
incidentally considered in the general investigation, but are
now printed separately, with some additions, because of their
relevancy to the present consideration of the same in Con-
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gress. Whether of any value or not is a matter for others
to determine.
But upon the question of the existence and the importance
of National police power, the writer feels less hesitation in
sugge ting a favorable consideration, since such a power i!
not only essential in the administrative affairs of the Central
Government and whatever falls within its exclusive jurisdiction, but must become eventually (1) the principal rnean-s
of preserving the intemal police power of the States from
the encroach.mients of the now indefinable supervimon of
Oongres and ( 2) the mean of harmonizing conflicting interests between the States, by enforcing many forms of
comity, which the States, by reason of possessing no extra~
territorial juri diction whatsoever, are unable to regulate or
properly maintain.
The nece ary condensation demanded, when thus incorporating the ubject of police power in the present discussion
of the protective tariff, deprives the author of a review and
analysis of the hundreds of existing police statutes of Congress, but he hopes that the nec~ssity for such a supervisory
jurisdiction in all matters subject to Congressional regulation and control, may have been made reasonably plain.
The writer is painfully aware of the fact that· the proposition
of National police power is in conflict with popular and
professional opinion, but that, in reality, suggests a generous consideration of the argument rather than a mere
denial of the same based upon strength in numbers. If
it pos esses any merit, it is not because of any originality,
but rather because the writer believes a similar investigation
of the principles involved would lead any one of ordinary
capacity to reach the same conclusion. Were this not the
case, it would argue against the soundness of such a proposition.

wASHINGTON, D. c.,
Marck 4, 1911.

PART I,

The Protective Tariff, When Constitutionally Con·
sidered, is a Regulation of Commerce with Foreign
Nations. Why All Regulations of Commerce, Federal or State, Are Police Regulations.
In the treatment of the various subjects included in the
treatise relating to the supervisory powers of the F ederal
government the writer began, (Part I), with the consideration of~"The existence and the extent of National police
power" ; and in (Part II) onsidered "The character and
extent of the Federal jurisdiction over interstate and foreign commerce ;"-wherein it was contended that all regulations of commerce, whether by the Federal or State governments, were police regulations, and hence that Congress,
like the legislatures of the States, possessed no arbitrary
power in the supervision of commerce, but that, on the contrary, every such regulation must be reasonable and, therefore, subject to judicial review. In considering and comparing the many acts of Congress with those of the States,
it was pointed out that every commercial regulation, being
police in character, must be for the public welfare, and that,
in reality, Congress had heretofore been controlled by such
a limitation, even though (under judicial assent) it inclined vaguely to the idea that the power to regulate commerce between the States or foreign nations, being excluive in character, gave it a power more far-reaching and arbitrary than that posse ed by the States in the regulation
of internal commerce. And this notion, as will appear later,
was based . upon the assumption that the enwmemted pCYWer
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce was greater and
(7)
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more sovereign than the reserved power of the States to regulate domestic commerce. As police power is that part of
the penal jurisdiction possessed by all governments, dominant and inferior, in tlie protection of the public welfare, it
ought, therefore, to be plain that in whatever direction Congress. has an exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, it possesses
all th·e regulatory powers necessary for the maintenance of
its authority thereover.
Consequently, when Congress passed an act driving lotteries out of interstate commerce, because demoralizing to
the moral and financial interests of the people of the United
States, this police measure was justified as a regulation of
commerce in behalf of the public welfare; and when it
barred impure food and drugs, and required the inspection of
meat products and the licensing of vendors of toxins and
virus, it acted in behalf of the public health; and when h
enacted the Sherman and the Elkins Acts and created the
Interstate Commerce Commission, Congress aimed at the
prevention of monopolies, the restraint of trade, unfair discrimination, and the charging of excessive rates of transportation, thus conserving the economic and business welfare
of the country in so far as commercial intercourse was concerned.
In much the ~me way Congress has .regulated commerce
with foreign nations, by excluding all things harmful to
the general welfare of the country or by so regulating their
admission as to protect the public interests, whether relating
to health, morals, or the agrioultural and industrial welfare
of the nation.
But another method of "regulating commerce with foreign nations," whenever it becomes harmful to the economic
welfare, is to be found in those tariff regulations which purposely aim to foster domestic industry by excluding or restricting the entry of foreign imports entering into destructive competition with home products.
In .order to protect certain industries from competing
1'
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European war~, produced by low-priced, skilled labor and
ent to this country by wealthy, well-organized and experienced manufacturers, naturally intent on discouraging or
breaking down local enterpri es, Congress has imposed, from
time to time, a o-called duty sufficiently high t0 either exclude foreign compe_titors or at least equalize the difference
in the co t of production, thu putting the domestic
producer on an equality with his foreign rival. It was intended not only to be a handicap upon those alien intBrests
, eriously imperilling dome ti trade, but for the creation of
a_home market and the retention of capital that would otherwi e be ab orbed by such foreign commerce.
Had any of these Federal statutes original'1y read : "An
Act t-0 regulate, by revenue imposts, the entry of foreign
goods capable of production in the United States," or "An
Act to protect local industries and wage-earners' from foreign competition by customs duties," it is quite probable
the Federal judiciary would have declared that, under the
revenue, power of the Constitution, no implied authority
was given Congress to convert revenue duties into trade
barriers or to so adjust the respective cost of production as
t-0 directly protect and foster home industries by a system of
revenue discrimination.
Although the legality and the advantages of the protective system have ooen matters of continuous controversy
from the beginning of the Government, it mu t be noted
that every legi lative effort to put into effect this economic
doctrine has been associated primarily with revenue bills
pas ed under the constitutional authority given Congress
"to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." A
prote tive tariff, strange as it may seem, has never been
regarded con titutionally, as a. regulation of foreign. commerce. And this, doubtless, becau e the growth of the prote tive y tern wa a gradual and illy defined one, since most
of the original advantages given the home producer was an
incidental protection arising out of the levying of duti~

2-S
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upon various imports, some of which happened to be also
manufactured or produced in this country. As the pressure
increased for the recognition of a protective tariff, as a governmental policy, the advocates thereof still continued to
depend upon the revenue jurisdiction of Congress as the
ostensible medium for favoring the industrial welfare. At
that period the extensive power given Congress to "regulate
commerce with foreign nations" had been wholly dormant,
o far as regulating the entry of foreign articles or products
in any way harmful to the public welfare, and, therefore, the
broad and extensive character of this commercial jurisdiction
over foreign intercourse was not understood until a few year:
ago, when Congress began to exetcise it more and more in ·
many regulations imposed upon-interstate commerce. Thi
power to supervise interstate commerce now covers ev~ry
form of regulation lying between the p1·omotion of commerce-ars instanced by the hundreds of millions spent in
furthering navigation-to the pmhibition of commerce-as
may be seen in the ban placed upon the transportation of
adulterated foods and drugs, the sale of lottery tickets, or
the conduct of trade in violation of the Sherman law, etc.
The right of a nation to preserve its industrial interests
from any destructive influence in foreign intercourse, is
usually. an unlimited one of sovereignty. But flS the extent
and limit of national sovereignty of the United States is
upposed to be determined by the powers enumerated in the
written Constitution, this method of industrial protection
has been directly predicated upon the revenue power of
Congress to tax foreign importations, instead of openly prorlaiming it to be a "regulation of commerce with foreign
nations" -and, as such, designed specifically for the protection of the commercial welfare by imposts levied for that
purpose, under the authority given in the Constituti?n.
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Taxation May be for the Regul,a,tion of Biwiness and Not for
Revenue.
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When Congre purposely excludes, or, ad~its, subject to
a counterbalancing ta~, certain foreign wares, it regulates
commerce in behalf of the public welfare just as plainly M
when it bar skilled contract labor, adulterated goods, obcene matter or the Mongolian race; and when thus protect~
ing labor and home industrie from harmful influences, it i
for the a.me reason that influence a State ( under its police
power) in guarding its industries and wage-earners from the
unfair and cru hing competition of convict labor.
For urely no one will contend that when a State prohibits
the ale of convict-made goods or restricts prison-made we.res
to article not competing with local industries that uch
measure are legal because regulations of local commerce and
for that rea on alone; for no State can legally prohibit or
re trict the ale or manufacture of any article, except as a
police regulation, and then only in the unquestioned betterment of the public welfare, and any interdiction upon internal trade would otherwise be void.
The legal ban ometime placed upon the product of
penal in titution i not due to any assumed inferiority of
the article or to any controlling prejudice upon the part of
the con umer , since the ole and only rea on given for su taining the con titutionality of uch law i an economic one
viz. , that free labor and manufacturing plants, burdened
with local taxation and higher co t of production, are often
unable to ucc fully compete with prison-made wares.
How, then, in legal principle, doe the protective tariff cliffer from uch a regulation when the latter y tern i likewi e based wholly upon an unfair economic advantage of
the alien producer , and not upon any alleged inferiority
of the foreign ware ?
By way of analogy it may also be mentioned that a State,
under its police power, can restrict a harmful busine by a
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high license tax, as in the case of intoxicants, or it may,
under the same power, pass a prohibitory law against the
manufacture and sale of the same, another instance of where
the regulation of commerce may find expression ~ither in a
restrictive tax or a direct prohibitory law.
The custom, therefore, of treating a protective tariff duty,
designed to restrict or exclude foreign competition, as an
ordinary exercise of the revenue power is as uncandid as
it is unnecessary. Yet it has an explanation. Originally
many of the best constitutionat lawyers were of the opinion
that a tariff duty could not be legally imposed for the primary purpose of excluding competitive articles, or, in case
they were admitted, that the duty could be so adjusted as to
counterbalance the cost of foreign production; and hence,
with the doctrine of protection seriously involved in doubt,
by reason of it being unnecessarily based upon the so-called
revenue power, the protective tariff laws have never contained
in their context any indication of the real purposes sought.
And what may be of equal surprise to some students of
political economy there has never been a decision by any of
the Federal courts upholding, in principle, the legality of the
protective tariff since the statutes were so worded that the
legislative intent did not appear upon the face thereof. And
this clearly designed effort to bar any litigant, or later the
judiciary, in testing and passing upon the legality of a protective tariff act, has afforded the opponents of this system
perhaps the most specious argument against the legality or
justice of such laws.
It has already been pointed out that the National Government, in the regulation of foreign commerce may-under its
police power- exclude the importation of unwholesome,
adulterated or misbranded goods, the entry of articles harmful to the moral welfare or the admission of birds, animals,
insects, and plants injurious to the interests of agriculture,
since these exclusion laws come within the authority of Congress "tp regulate foreign commerce," and are distinctively
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of a police character. But in the case of foreign articles not
in themselves injuriou to the health or morals of our citizens
and harmful only by reason of their cheap production, we
have the origin of the protective duty, and the reason uch
injurious competition i not met by direct prohibition is becau e it has been con idered the better part of wisdom to erect
a tax barrier high enough only to insure a fair 'P'rofit to the
home 'JYroducer, and thereby avoid the possible exaction of

excessive profits were such competitive products wholly and
permanently excluded by a prohibitory aet.
Part I of the original brief, as tated before, deals exlusively with the character of the police power posse ed
by the National Government. It i , of course, out of the
que tion to incorporate into an article such as this any full
di cussion of this generally misunderstood power. And,
upon the other hand, it i difficult to so condense the same as
to pre.sent the subject effectively .
ide from a general classification of National police
power now submitted, there are quoted below certain extracts relating particularly to the police character of the
Federal legislation regulating commerce ; and thi becau e
the joint proposition: that the protective tariff is (1) a regulation of foreign commerce, and ( 2) that every such regulation is police in character, invites proof, inversely, that the _
protective tariff is a police regulation. A proof that is certainly not required in the case of a State's regulation of convict labor-for it stands admitted as a police regulation for
the protection of domestic commerce against unfair competitive conditions-exactly the same economic conditions which
may, at times, require the exercise of the Federal jurisdiction
in the regulation of foreign commerce.
The ummary of National police power, now presented,
wa written everal years ago, and has been re-arranged
largely in reference to the police character of all commercial
regulations.
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THE EXISTENCE AND EXTENT OF NATIONAL POLICE PowEB.

So clearly established and openly exercised is the Government's
police jurisdiction over all Federal territory coming under the exclusive control of Congress, and so equally apparent is the same
jurisdiction in the performance of those duties directly associated
with its purely admfnistrative functions, that one need only call attention to the character of existing laws and methods of enforcement
to clearly -establish these facts.
The real diffculty, if any, arises in determining the exact legal
character of Federal police regulations over foreign and interstate
intercourse, and in defining the extent of such regulations.
In classifying the very diverse police jurisdiction of the li'ederal
Government the same may be divided into several elementary classes,
viz., those covering the jurisdiction over:
1. Federal territory, (a) territorial or insulat, ( b) within the
States.
2. Federal administrative affairs, (a) legislative, ( b) judicial, ( c)
executive.
3. Indian tribes.
4. Foreign intercourse, (a) commercial, ( b) non-commercial.
t>. Subjects of the United States on high seas, and
6. Interstate intercourse, (a) commercial, ( b) non-commercial.
The first of these great divisions covers a most extensive and exclusive police jurisdiction, including the District of Columbia, Alaska,
Yellowstone National Park, the Panama Canal Zone, the Island of
Guam, the Tutuila group of the Samoan Islands, and maritime, naval,
cable, and coaling stations; it likewise includes an exclusive or concurrent police jurisdiction over Arizona, New Mexico, Hawaii, Porto
Rico, and the Philippine Islands, and over the public domain dedicated to particular uses, such as forest reserves, reclamation project'3,
dikes and dams connected with navigation, national parks, as well as
over Federal buildings and grounds, such as quarantine stations,
marine hospitals, military and light-house reservations, arsenals,
forts, naval and soldiers' homes, life-saving stations, military and
naval academies, post-offices, customs-houses and court buildings,
national cemeteries, experimental and weather bureau stations, etc.
Over this diversified area, within and without the States, the poHce
jurisdiction is intrafederal, interfederal, intrastate, interstate, and
international. While, under the other five branches come many
forms of regulations covered by maritime, treaty, and international
law, as well as a police jurisdiction over a half a million of Indians
cattered throughout the States and Territories, and over every citizen of the United States, independent of his residence, so long as he
is within any specified jurisdiction of the United States.
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This police jurisdiction of Congress--a. , for instance, over the District of olumbia or Alaska-is, in kind, precisely that possessed by
the States, and the hundreds of police regulations relating to public
health, public morals, restraint of trade, and the indu trial and social
welfare generally find their ounterpart in State legislation. Again,
tn the multitude of police regulation safeguarding the operations of
the entral Government, in its legislative and judicial branches, its
po tal service, revenue service, coinage and currency, Army and
Navy, Federal corporations, quarantine upervi ion, ·a nd in those preserving the well-being of the variou Executive Department , covering the regulation of thousands of employee , or, the public in its
dealing therewith, we can find their duplicate in the various police
regulations of the States.
That the Government, therefore, does po ess an extensive police
power an no longer be denied; but those who begrudgingly admit it
ontend that this power is limited to Federal territory or to some
administrative function of the Government, and that it does not e(l)tend over foreign or interstate intercourse, commercial or otherwise.
But when the admi ion i made that national police power may
exist within a sphere where the Constitution has given ongress "an
exclusive jurisdiction," then this conce sion admits all that the
writer is at this point contending for- ince the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce is admitte~.

•
WHY POLICE

•
POWER

•
WAS

•
SUPPOSED

•
TO BE

*

•

RESERVED

•
EXCLUSIVELY

TO THE STATES.

The generally-accepted doctrine that poll e power is reserved exclusively to the tates is based upon an old misapprehension regarding the purposes for which this power is invoked in all legislative
spheres.
Police power, it mu t be remembered, is only that part of the penal
law which deals particularly with offense derogatory to the public
welfare, in contradi tin tion to tho e gros er offenses affecting the
Individual right of man. It matters not whether a law be enacted
by Congress or a State legislature regulating pure food and drugs,
meat in pe tion, safety appliance , hours of labor, water pollution, the
sale of lottery ticket , the tran mi ion of obscene matter, political
•ontribution by orporations, trade monopolies, rates of transportation, or the regulation of epidemic diseases by quarantine-for one
and all are poli e regulation , whether connected with commerce or
not. Such a penal juri di tion ne essarily exi ts within the legislative phere of either class of sovereign , since each must possess all
the authority nece ary for enacting or maintaining any supervisory
Tegulatlons of the above character.
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Such police jurisdiction is not, therefore, in derogation of the rights
of the States, since this power is distinct a,nd co-operative. The
failure ·of Congress to recognize the fact tbat most of its recent supervisory legislation is police in character, and as such coming within
its jurisdiction when directed toward matters in which it concededly
has an exclusve or· concurrent power of regulation, constitutes one of
the present difficulties in properly presenting the supervisory powers
ot the Federal Government.
There are three impressions regarding police power that seem wellnigh universal: (1) that police power originally was reserved exclusively to the States; (2) that because it was not specUlca·lly
enumerated in the Federal Constitution it cannot be exercised by
Congress, and (3) that to the extent Congress attempts to exercise it
just to that extent it must encroach upon the police powers of the
States.
ow, there is a vast difference, in legal principle, between a jurisdiction that is exclusive withi~ a given sphere and a jurisdiction
which excludes its exercise in any otlier sphere.
t,Jndoubtedly, there was reserved, by implication, to the States an
exclusive police jurisdiction over all matters concerning the internal
welfare of their inhabitants, and no power possessed by the States in
its aggregate benefits exceeds this in value. But the reason why
po.lice power, so called, is not enumerated in the Federal Constitution
ls because it does not exist as a concrete and separate function, but
ls in reality only an indivisible part of the criminal jurisdiction incident to legislative sovereignty, dominant or inferior. The most important acts of Congress, whether regulating international quarantine
or monopolies in interstate commerce, are the same, in kind, as the
councilmanlc ordinances of any small town regulating local sanitary
conditions or the licensing of street vendors in local trade.
Police power in American jurisprudence only received such a
generic title about the year 1845-as this form of supervision grew
up in the protection of the public welfare.
There ls no better indication that police power is a.n essential element of every legislative body than by asking: In what form could
police power have been specifically enumerated in the Constitution?
Any amendment to the Constitution giving the Federal Government
police power within the scope of its general legislative authority
would only be declaratory and of no affirmative value, unless the
time has come when it is necessary to have constitutional amendments for the sole purpose of overcoming a prevailing misconception
regarding a legally existing Federal power.
That, therefore, such a supervisory jurisdiction can harmoniously
exist in separate legislative spheres ought to be perfectly plain. Yet
the friction and endless controversy over the so-called tw111gbt zone

is aln

Feder
reguli
of int
inste~
conf u

AL
Wl

inter
to th
f rom
t er eE
for :
popl
inte1
port
inte
lati<
clus
tho~
the
r es1
fon

sho
u nc
nes
I

dor
not
saf
vis
ex,
PO'
St:
SU-

gr
re
le:

a1

17
ls almost wholly due to calling most of the supervisory powers of the
Federal Government "regulations of interstate commerce," and similar
regulations of domestic commerce by the States "police" regulations
of intra-state commerce. Thi effort to differentiate the same power
instead of confining it to different spheres account for most of the
confusion and most of the conflicts in Federal and State jurisdiction.
ALL REGULATIONS OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL OB STATE, ABE POLICE

REGULATIONS.

When the States were isolated, sparsely settled, and the business
interests largely local, it is not strange that ,all regulations relating
to the public health, public morals, and internal trade should emanate
from governments specially charged with the protection of these interests. And, again, there existing no apparent necessity or demand
for Federal legislation upon such questions, since practically all the
populated area was within the States, and the limited character of
interstate intercourse did not require any regulation over the transportation of foods, drugs, live stock, or the instrumentalities • of
interstate commerce, it, therefore, came to pass that all police regulations relating to the public welfare were regarded as belonging exclusively to the States, and for many years it constituted one of
those numerous rights accorded each Commonwealth, regardless of
the fact that in the future it might become necessary to divide such
responsibillty between the States and the Nation, so that while the
former ,Youlcl r gulate their local affairs t h
ational Government
should exercise a like supervisory jurisdictlon over all territory
under its exclusive control and over all persons, property, and business subjected to a Federal regulation by the Constitution.
Each State has the right, under its reserved powers, to regulate its
domestic or internal commerce in every reasonable way it may see flt,
not only for the protection of public health, but public morals, physical
safety, or the economic welfare of its inhabitants, but all such supervision must, without ea:ception, be judicially sustainable as a proper
exercise of i ts police power ov er such commerce.

The ational Government, under its enumerated constitutional
power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
States," has precisely the same right to regu,late the commerce th1ts
submitted to its ea:clusiv e jurisdiction.
In other words, in the enumerated power to regulate commerce
granted Congre by the Constitution and in the i rnpliea power to
regulate internal commerce accorded to the States there ea:i sts no
legal distinction in the methoas ernployed in etrecting such regulation.

The regulation of commerce by Congress should not be regarded as
arbitrarv .one and beyond, therefore, judicial review, but should

t1n
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be controlled by ea,actly the same limitations as are imposed upon the
States in the'i-r control of domesUo commerce.

True, commerce may be promoted by opening, freeing, or improving
the various channels of trade, be they artificial or natural, just as
public health may be promoted by the expenditure of public money
t.or the furtherance of medical knowledge or sanitary science, and
without necessarily involving, in either case, the exercise of police
power ; but in all those commercial regulations embracing, as they
must, the exercise of police power, the existence thereof constitutes
the sole and only foundation upon which any governmental agency
can predicate its legal right to supervise or regulate commerce. For
the privilege of carrying on commerce is an inherent one, and in the
restriction or curtailment of which ( or any other form of intercourse)
there must exist not only some public necessity, but a penal jurisdiction that can be invoked for punishing those who refuse to submit to
the restrictions or prohibitions demanded by the public welfare.
Until Congress and the Federal courts recognize the fact that all
regulations of commerce, be they State or Federal, are police regulations, without exception or qualification, it will be difficult to properly
present the extent and character of the· police jurisdiction possessed ·
by the Government.
.And until the legal profession realize that a Federal police jurisdiction over interstate and foreign commerce is a restriction upon the
otherwise arbitrary commercial power of Congress, and not, therefore,
an a<laitional grant of power, will it be possible to remove the prejudice against the same.
JUBIBDICTION OF THE HOUSE CoM·MITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
0oMMEBCE IS POLICE IN CHARACTER.

It there is one position that most of the members of the above
committee have insisted upon it is that Congress possesses no general
pollce power, and that the jurisdiction of their committee is based
entirely upon the right of Congress to regulate commerce between
the States and foreign nations, irrespective of police power. The
position of the writer, upon the other hand, is that this particular
committee possesses no jurisdiction whatever that is not wholly and
unqualifiedly police in character, though necessarily associated with
the control, in some form or other, of commerce or commercial intercourse requiring a supervision for the protection of the public welfare. Yet this radical and apparently unreconcilable difference is
easily explained-if what has already been said does not do so.
Thit:1 committee, while it may never have conceded it, has never
publicly contended, so far as the writer is aware, that Congress had
the unlimited power to regulate absolutely as it saw flt all torms of
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interstate and foreign commerce. It is admitted that Congres11 may
prohibit the shipment between the States of impure food and drugs,
but will any one assert that it can prohibit the shipment of wheat,
oal, oil, salt, iron ore, timber, or any other such article or product
unle s it can be shown that the trade therein is injurious to the
public welfare? It may require the preliminary inspection of meat
products before shipment, but it cannot arbitrarily prohibit the intertate hipment of all meats ; lt may require safety appliances on the
cars of interstate carriers, but cannot prevent the passage from State
to tate of such vehicle arbitrarily; it can bar lottery tickets from
the channel of interstate commerce, but it cannot exclude Government bonds and other like ecurities; it can strike down contracts
that unrea onably restrain inter tate commerce, but it cannot wilfully abrogate all contracts becau e connected with such commerce.
In the same way Congress may upervise the entry of all harmful
foreign articles, but it cannot deliberately exclude those that are not
in any way harmful. The exclusion of opium or lottery tickets can
be directly prohibited in foreign commerce because injurious to public
ruorals ; and. again, those foreign articles entering into unfair competition with home industries can be controlled by prohibitory or
restrictive duties, but Congress possesses no power either _by direct
a t or by a prohibitory duty to exclude ivory, diamonds, spices, and
like articles because in no way injurious to the health, morals, or
industrial interests of the country.
The regulations suggested that are legal are legal becau e of their
poli e character, and those that are not because of the contrary.
Thi committee, composed of many of the ablest members of Congress, while it may have at times attempted to regulate certain noncommercial intercours~like quarantine, the pollution of interstate
streams, etc.- has, as a rule, adhered to all those limits which a
police juri diction over commerce prescribes.
THE SHERMAN ACT-A POLICE REGULATION OF COMMERCE.

The trouble in con truing the Sherman Act arises largely from the
continued failure of the courts to recognize and declare that all the
regulations of interstate commerce covered by this act are police in
character. Monopoly and combinations in restraint of trade were
originally common-law offenses in the States, although now largely
regulated by statutory provisions. In its controlling effect the Sherman Act must always be reasonable in its regulation of commerce or
<.'Ommerclal intercourse, or otherwise it would be void. Congresi,
cannot legally enact, just as ·a State cannot, any improper regulation
of commerce, since police power must be reasonably exercised. Any
contention, therefore, that certain sections In the Sherman Act, when.
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construed literally, would injure tbe commercial welfare of the
country, only goes to show how prevalent is the notion that Congress
possesses an arbitrary power in regulating commerce, to the exclusion even of judicial review.
If Congress possesses the power, as it admittedly does under the
Constitution, of preventing any unreasonable interference with the
freedom or safety of interstate commerce, it is _c ertainly rather ludicrous to contend that the very legislative body authorized to protect
commerce can by any arbitrary edict injure or destroy the same.
When an old hunter on the Eastern Shore of Virginia was asked if
the people of his vicinity observed the game laws he said: "Oh, yes,
every one except the game warden, and, of course, he can't arrest
himself."
The Sherman Act was a police statute designed to meet and regulate modern business conditions. And if at any time the selfishness
or rapacity of concentrated wealth or the cunning endeavor of unscrupulous men resulted in the monopolizing or the corruption of
commercial intercourse between the States, Congress intended that
such evil practices should be severely punished and the freedom of
proper commercial intercourse maintained. The construction of this
act depends more on the application of the evidence rather than of
the law. In its restraints upon the freedom of commercial intercourse
it must be liberally construed, and in the infliction of penalties it
must be strictly construed.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF POLICE REGULATIONS.
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It would seem that a different rule should obtain with the Federal

courts in passing upon the reasonableness of a State police statute
than in the case of a Federal statute.
Local police regulations are often of an ethical character, depending upon the moral standards of a particular section or upon business
conditions or racial characteristics, which may justify one method of
protecting the public welfare in one State that would be unsuitable
in another.
Again, each State is the guardian of its internal welfare, and,
unless trespassing upon the rights of non-residents or acting in ciear
disregard of the rights of property or of the inherent rights of citizenhip, should be permitted to have the kind of government that it
people demand or are willing to endure, for in either case they are
the beneficiaries or the victims of their own rule.
In the "Granger cases" the Federal court at first allowed the West·e rn States to determine absolutely the "reasonable" character of
railroad rates, and, consequently, what constituted, ln their judg-
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ment, a "confi catory" rate; but the court later held, in effect, that
it had wrongfully withdrawn all control over the reasonableness of
such police regulation and accordingly reversed itself. In the "hours
of labor" cases it decided that certain State regulations, in so-called
dangerous o cupation , were unreasonable, · when perhaps it would
have been better to have left the que tion of the e social conditions
to the State, which, through it courts and its own people, migllt
settle the rights and wrong of their domestic regulations without a
re ort to the Federal courts.
But in the ca e of police regulation ·, by Congre , it i the duty of
the Supreme Court to see that all such regulations, in their effect
upon public interests generally, or upon the individual in particular,
should be reasonable. This court should have the ame right to review the commercial or non- omrnercial police regulations of Congress
as the State courts posse over such local regulations.
The protection of hone t commerce between the State is the duty
of Congre s, and it bas the power to pas any kind of a law that
would prohibit the frattdulent sale of oleomargarine in interstate
commerce, but if it undertake., by ubterfuge, to discriminate in
favor of butter as against oleomargarine as oo article of commerce
It Is as much the duty of the Federal court to declare such a regulation illegal as it was when it held that the o tensible use of the sanitary power of certain States, requiring the inspection of imported
cattle "on hoof," were mea ures designed to protect local interests
from outside competition and, therefore, not a bona fide exercise of
their police power.
Free trade exists between the States, and any police regulation by
ongress or the State intended primarily to guard the interests of
any State from interstate competition is illegal-just as precisely a
lmllar regulation of Congre s discriminating in favor of the commerce of the United States and against that of foreign competitors
ls legal-because Congress possesses the right to protect the industrial interests of the nation from foreign competition, where it bas
no right to protect the interests of one State, or the products of one
cla s of people, from the competitive commerce of other States, either
in the same article or others of a kind tending to disturb the value
of such products.
In the instances cited the varying positions of the court should
indicate the importance of fixing upon a definite method of judicial
review, or otherwise the conflicts between the States themselves or
between the tates and the Federal Government in matters of police
regulation become hopelessly involved.
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The Tar~ff Question Should be One of Policy and Not of
Authority.

Therefore, it ought to be plain that Congress may, if it
ees fit, regulate--even to the extent of exclusion-any foreign article harmful to our commercial welfare by the imposition of a protective duty; for in either case it is a regulation of commerce, and there should be no legal distinction
betweerl an act which directly prohibits, say, the importation
of tin plate, and an act which imposes an ad valorem duty
ufficiently high to exclude tin plate. Both acts aim at the
protectioI\ of the same industry; both acts are a regulation
of commerce with foreign nations; both acts are police
regulations, when tested. constitutionally; both acts simply
represent different methods of regulating the entry or exclusion of foreign products in the furtherance of the public
welfare; while neither act involves the exercise of any arbitrary power on the part of Congress, but, on the contrary,
limits the exercise of the power to regulate commerce by
reasonable limitattons.
·
To those who sincerely believe in the legality and benefits
of such a policy, the writer's interpretation of the power of
Con'gress in relation thereto should only be regarded as an
earnest· effort to put such an economic doctrine on a logical
and legally maintainable basis; while with those who have
heretofore denied the .constitutionality but admitted its benefits, or have rejected both the right and the policy, the proposition has the merits of doing away with the unfortunate
view that material benefits, however great, may ever warrant the disregarding of the organic law.
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A Subsequent Consideration of the Protective Tari.11'.
More than three years after the above was published, the
Congre of the United State was assembled in extra ession
to con ider the enactment of a new tariff law. And during
the protracted debate upon the Payne-Aldrich bill Senator
Rayner, one of the leading constitutional lawyers of his
party, in di cu sing the pending bill, in the Senate, spoke
in part as follow , under the date of May 31, 1909:
"I have never believed and never will, so long as
I maintain my faculties of reasoning, that Congress
has awy right under the taxing power to lay prohibitive duties. Let me tell you, the Supreme Court has
never decided thi que tion, and the be t text-writer.s
and commentators are again t it. I maintain the
propo ition that if thi act were to declare upon its
face that any of the dutie which it impo es are prohibitive and that they are levied with that intent, the
a t would be unconstitutional pro tanto. I assert
without fear of ucce ful contradiction that if the act
. how. that we are imposing duties that we do not intend to receive and providing for revenue that we do
not intend to collect and if that purpose wa manife t upon the face of the legi lation, such an enactment would be uncon titutional.
"I admit that if a duty for revenue i laid, even
if it affords protection, while it might be against
public policy and the traditions of my party it is a
v_alid_ exe~cise of constitutional power. My proposition 1 th1 : When you show that the duty is levied
not for the pwrpose of revenue, but for the pwrpose
of abso lutely preventing itmJportations, then wnder
the taxing powe1· you are beyond t;he jwriisdiction of
the Constitution. Do not tell me that I am reviving
an ob olete doctrine, because I tell you that the point
I am now making has never yet been pre ented to
the otuts, and the court have always avoided deriding it, becau. e the legi lation before them has
always concealed the intent of the law-making
power."
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Senator Rayner therefore says, in effect, to those supporters of the protective tariff system: You can exclude foreign competitive products under the power to regulate commerce, but it must not be through the medium of any tax
or impo t, but only by direct words of prohibition.
It is just here that the error arises, for the speaker attempts to improperly limit the u.se of the power granted
Congress. to regulate foreign commerce by restricting the
means by which such a regulation may be effected. Public
revenues, generally speaking, are collected by some form of
taxation-but all taxation is not necessarily for revenue only.
To u e the revenue power of a government for an object foreign to its purpose is illegal, but to impose taxation where
the real object is not revenue, but for the purpose of prohibiting, restricting or limiting a dangerous or injurious
commerce, is a supervisory right distinctly recognized as ex-·
isting in all governments au~horized to regulate commercial
intercourse. The high-license liquor laws of many States,
both in their text and declared purpose, frequently indicate a legislative intention to restrict the traffic in intoxicating liquors, entirely independent of what the effect of such
a restriction may have upon the revenue from such licenses.
Yet this does not_render such a tax regulation of domestic
commerce illegal, even though, under such acts, the businesa
is greatly restricted and the income materially lessened.
By a parity of reasoning, if a State possesses the right to
prohibit or re ~rict the ale of convict-made goods, under it.a
police power, it hould possess the same right, under the
same power, to so tax the products of penal institutjons as to
equalize the difference in the cost of production .
Another, and perhaps better, example than any hitherto
cited, of a protective tax imposed for purposes· in no wise
connected with revenue, is the right of the General Government to prohibit or restrict the entry of undesirable immigrants by a per capita tax.

h1
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Under the Constitution Congress has the broad power to
regulate the admission of any alien or any alien race deemed
harmful to the welf~e of the country (Article I, Sec. 9).
By means of this supervisory police power it may exclude
the ignorant, the immoral, the indigent, and the criminal,
or, it may for the safety of the wage-earner bar out entirely
those who would come to this country under a contract of
a domestic employer of labor.
In the first class of cases the exclusion is based upon the
personal character of the immigrant, and in the other upon
the possible injury to the industrial classes. As in the case
of foreign commodities, the exclusion may be due to the
deleterious character thereof, or, upon the other hand, to
the effect that otherwise unobjectionable commodities may
have upon the value of those produced in this country.
A tax therefore--say-of $1,000 may be imposed upon
every Mongolian seeking entry to the United States, for the
direct purpose of excluding the so-called cooley laborer and
yet allowing the entry of Chinese merchants and the like.
In the same way a smaller tax might be levied upon all
immigrants in order to restrict their numbers or to exclude
the indigent and worthless. Yet in neither case has SU,Ch a
'r egulation of foreign immigration any intention~! connection with the raising of reve1VUe-for the tax imposed is
wholly for a different purpose. A protective tariff tax is
precisely similar in its motive and involves the exercise of
a commercial jurisdiction that has nothing to do with the
revenue power of Congress.
Now, it cannot be denied that Congress possesses the power
to exclude or restric~ the entry of foreign importations injurious to public welfare; but, in the Constitution, where i,
there any limitation upon Congress in its method8 of regu,.
lationf The mere fact that ~ere is a clause of the Constitution which authorizes Congress to raise rev~nues by taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises, does not in any way control or
limit the power of Congress under another distinct provision
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mum ciause. While the writer cannot concede either the
legality or the policy of conferring upon the Executive
Branch of the Government the authority to thus "regulate
commerce with foreign nations," however much such authority can be lawfully delegated to any agents or commission of
the legislative branch, it may be less objectionable, in policy,
than the Executive undertaking to negotiate, without any
authority, reciprocal commercial treaties under the guise of
trade agreemen~; a subject that is fully considered in Part
II of the accompanying pamphlet.
Why a Protective Ta."C is Preferable to a Prohibitive Act.

If it costs England $20 to manufacture and deliver at our
ports of entry a ton of steel rails, and it costs our home manufacturers $25 to produce a ton, then it must be plain that
England would take our trade therein, and with the subsequent dismantlement of our steel-rail plants could later demand and receive a price exceeding that at which our domestic manufacturers could have originally supplied us.
Now, could not Congress, under its specified power "to
regulate commerce with foreign nations," exclude foreign
rails because destructive to our industrial welfare? But
the rig ht to ~xC'lude does not neces.sarily depend upon the
form of the exclu.sion, but rather upon the fact as to whether
the result obtained is within the power of Congress--be it
for the promotion of public health, public morals, or the industrial safety of the people.
But in the case of steel rails the reason their exclusion is
not prohibited by a specific act of Congress is an eminently
practical one; for the only purpose of the protective tariff,
in the minds of its· disinterested supporters, is to equalize the
difference in foreign wages and materials and allow a reasonable profit to the home manufacturers, thus diversifying our
industries, giving employment to labor, increasing the consuming classes, and keeping our capital at home; but if the
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act were a prohibitive one, in terms, which Senator Raynel'
a: ume to be legal, even though opposing it in policy, then
the danger of the dome tic manufacturers combining or
otherwi e exa ting an exce ive profit would be a po ibility,if
not a probability, with all foreign competition in such steel
products expressly barred under all conditions of the home
market.
Now, by imposing a duty of $10 per ton on steel rails the
competitive condi tion s are exactly reversed, for foreign rails
would co t $30 at our ports and we would have a lead over
the foreign manufacturers of $5 per ton, and if satisfied with
a fair profit could hold the market against foreign competition, and if not satisfied and a sum was asked in excess of
$30 per ton, then the foreign producer could come in and
by competition prevent a monopoly or unfair prices. Yet,
if we assume that the $10 ,duty may be a prohibitive one
and not for revenue at all, or one which, while admitting
the foreign product, equalizes the cost of production, why is
not thi law a legal regulation of foreign commerce?
If, as generally admitted , you can have a tariff for revenue
only UJith incidental protecti on, then why can you not have
a tariff fo 1· protection with incidental 1·evenue.t For the
revenue power and the power to regulate commerce are, primarily, for different purposes, and yet each may, incidentally, include the other, and neither thereby be rendered uncon ti utional.
Therefore, whether the trade barrier is a statute containing prohibitory words or a financial barrier, created by an
impost, it is immaterial upon the question of legality, for
either mode is a regulation of foreign commerce; and in
favor of the latter method is the fact that when such a financial barrier serves its contemplated purpose and the beneficiaries thereof should thereafter attempt to exact exce&5ive
profits, then, automatically, foreign competition flows in
and over this barrier-a beneficial result that is impossible,
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where the entry of the foreign article is prohibited in express terms.
That the tariff system, thus justified, is a regulation of
foreign commerce, authorized by the Constitution, ought
to be .Plain; and as the means by which police power may be
enforced is determined by the purposes and results of its
exercise and not by its form, it matters not, as in the case of
adequately protecting the domestic market from harmful
alien competition, that it is better effected by a prohibitive
or restrictive duty ,t han by any expre&-3 inhibition placed
upon such foreign articles.
The Protective Tariff a Matter of Governmental PoliqJ and
Not of Consti tutional Authority.

In about every nation, except the United States, the question of imposing protective duties upon competitive foreign
products is free from controversies regarding the constitutional right to exclude or restrict the entry of such articles,
and consequently the question of free trade or protection is
a policy that must be determined· according to the judgment
of each nation.
Great Britain, beginning with protection, finally advocated free trade when its foreign markets largely exceeded
home consumption and when its vast merchant marine gave
it a powerful advantage in successfully maintaining such a
policy; but as the United States, Germany, and Japan now
begin to threaten certain British industries that are largely
dependent upon a local market, the propriety of protecting
these by tariff duties has become an acute subject of debate
in most of the recent parliamentary elections.
·
If the time comes when practically all the people of the
United States take the view that the question of free trade,
tariff for revenue only, or protection is a matter of policy
and to be decided according to the best interests of the en-
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tire country, the difficulties in the way of getting a sensible
settlement of the subject will be much improved, for then
the study of the question will be purely an economic one
and not embarrassed by the well-meant but vigorously expressed views of the minority that the protective tariff is robbery because they have been taught to believe it to be predicated upon an illegal exercise of the taxing power of the
Federal Government.
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APPENDIX.

In the preceding pages only the legal character of the
protective tariff has been considered and the possible advantages of such a system have been omitted.
But as the legality of any alleged power often depends, in
a practical sense, upon the proof of its usefulness or necesity, there is now submitted one phase of the question which
eems to invite a brief considera~ion.
The rather effective criticism against the continuance of
the present tariff system is based upon the assumption that,
as the system was originally introduced for the protection of
"infant industries," it is a breach of faith to continue such a
. ystem after such industries have become powerful and diver ified. This objection is best challenged by showing that
the continuance of this system now rests upon other grounds.
If weakness must be guarded against, so must unexemplified
prosperity be protected, for in either case the incentive to
attack may be the same.
In Parts II and III of the companion pamphlet, relating
to the legality and policy of Executive tariff agreement and
commercial treaties, there are considered other features of
the protective tariff, omitted now in order to avoid unnecessary duplication.
If primitive conditions originally j11,stified a protective

tariff, then higher standards of economic life may now justify its continuance.

Originally the necessity for protective duties was based
upon the primitive conditions existing in a new and sparsely
settled country. The distance of raw materials from the
manufacturing centers, the crude and slow method of trans{33_.
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portation, ~he absence of capital and skilled labor, the scattered and unstable conditions of the home market, were
some of the causes operating against successful competition
with the products of the older and more advanced nations.
Practically all of these obs~les have been overcome, and for
that reason the movement for free trade or reduced tariffs
heeri' ·given a fresh impetus by those who have ignored
new con'.ditions.·
If the primitive conditions formerly justified a protective
tariff; 'the present higher· standards of living, of remuneration and of private and public expenditures now compel the
c6ntinuance of trade barriers for reasons just as obvious,
even though some duties may be dispensed with or materially
lowered.
. ·The cost of production, which, of course, always determines the question of withstanding foreign competition, is
j'ust as much affected by high wages and reduced hours of
labor as the former cost was regulated by pioneer conditions.
· But the higher rates of compensation extend to all classes,
from the common laborer to the skilled artisan, from the
clerk to the business man, to the scientjst, the writer, to the
teacher, doctor, · lawyer, to those in public life, and to every
one who labors with his hands or his brain for a living.
._.. :'l'o ·such condi~ons must be added the high standards of
governmental administration in this country, from . the village to the metropolis, from the State to the Nation, involving -an annual expenditure of a thousand of million of dollars by the Central Governm·en~ for internal improvements,
war pensions, c~eap and rapid mail service, the promotion
and · p·rotection of agricultural industries, the safeguarding
of ·commerce, the building of a great interoceanic canal and
other waterway improvements, the efficient maintenance of
t~e .~~e great Departments of the Government, followed by
equally liberal expenditures of the States, cities and counties
in . the suppo~ of schools, .colleges, libraries, hospitals, asyIums, pe:n,af institutions, parks, in the protection of public
heal.th, in police service, or in the making of internal improvemen~.
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When a single city, like New York, expends each year
thirty- ix millions of dollars for education alone or devotes
one hundred and fifty millions of dollars for an additional
source of water supply; when the Federal Government,
nearly fifty years after the civil war, disburses one hundred
and fifty millions of dollars in pensions each year, or, · for
the benefit of the rural population, suffers an annual deficit"
of ~irty millions of dollars over receipts, in maintaining a
system of rural free delivery; when common carriers expend
more for improvements and extensions in a single year than
all the railway systems of the world; when the American
public sp~nds more for science, art, literature, recreation,
travel and in philanthropic endeavor than all the countries
combined, and when we favor in the individual the same
disposition to get the best out of life commensurate with his
mean , it is i.dle to talk about meeting the poverty-stricken
nations of the world upon an equal footing. Public expenditures must be met by taxation, while private expenditures
must depend .upon earnings, and tpus each source of income
enters into the cost of production and determines largely the
character of our economic life.
The home market of the United States now absorbs, at a
fair remuneration, more than ninety-five per cent of our
total production, and to suggest getting after "the markets
of the world" and to ignore the fact that the producers of
the world will get after us, would be short-sighted policy.
The United States today occupies a plane that cannot be
compared wi~h any other country, and the breaking down
of the tariff barrier means its submersion by the great current of foreign trade that must surely follow such a breach .
Either we must come down to the exact level of the selling
prices in foreign markets in order to compete witp countries
producing the same articles or we must be content with the
present state of commercial prosperity now existing in this
country.
We can, however, have a great and most lucratj.ve foreign
market for articles grown or produced in this country that
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are indigenous in character, like cotton, certain kinds of
fruit and grain, or minerals; we can find a fair market for
surplus productions, and frequently, by reason of producing
in large quantities or through the use of modern machinery
or from some special advantages which overcome the ordinary cost of production, we can develop a permanent and
profitable market in many manufactured articles. But if
such a market exists we can find it; and, if not, it is unne~
essary and dangerous to open the door inward when we can
find an exit for foreign trade whenever the condition
favor it.
Just as this country could not maintain its credit and its
commerce with a debased currency as the medium of exchange, so, for the same economic reason, we cannot maintain a higher scale of remunera~ion and of expenditures•with
the general trade conditions of the world against us.
A remunerative home market would be the certain cause
of its own destruction if its centripetal force is permitted to
attract the cheaper productions of alien competitors.
Man has exactly the same right to erect barriers in the
protection of his nation from the inroads of any destructive
influence, be it disease, undesirable immigrants or the products of cheap labor, as he has the right to regulate the influences and manifestations of nature by building dykes for
the redemption of lands rendered valueless through continual overflow.
And unde_r the Constitution of the United States the regulation of any form of unsafe or undesirable foreign commerce is made one of the chief functions of Congress, and
for years has been exercised and will continue to be exercised so long as the people of this country deem it to be anvantageous ~o the public welfare.
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PARTS Il AND Ill.

THE ILLEfiALITY AND THE IIPOLICY OF TARIFF
TREATIES
AND

EXECUTIVE TRADE AtiREEIENTS

lore Publicity Needed in the Negotiation and
Ratification of Treaties

lie lost-Favored-Nation and the Maximum and , Minimum Clauses
lmpairmeats of the Commercial Jurisdiction of Congres.,

NOTE. -Part I of prior pamphlet relates to the
constitutionality of the Protective Tariff · ayatem,
and the character of National police power.

BY GEORGE SHIRAS, 3rd
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PA.BT II.

THE STATUS
OF

TARIFF TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE RECIPR~
CAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.

Introductory.
About a year ago the writer finished, as he supposed, a
paper covering "The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty~laking Power." Shortly thereafter Congressman Foss, of
:Via achu etts, began a vigorou campaign in favor of a recipro ·nl tariff treaty with Canada.
Thereupon the writer reached t~ie conclusion that treaties
of thi · character, by reason of infringing upon the revenue
and commercial jurisdiction of Congress, were unconstitutional unle ratified by separate legislation. Th~e views
were written out and given to everal Congressmen for the
purpo e of obtaining their respective opinions thereon, and
it then developed, after some research, that the House had
demanded, during its session of 1892, when the Cuban reciprocity treaty wa under con ideration, that it have the right
to confirm uch a treaty because of its duty to originat
revenue measure . In this demand of the House, however,
it re erved no right to ratify such treaties whenever they involved "a regulation of commerce with foreign nations."
Believing possibly that it might be worth while to preserve
the result of this investigation, the writer's views. were put
in galley-proof form and copies again given to the members
(S)

4
of Congress previously consulted. At a later period, President Taft somewhat unexpectedly gave notice of his intention to negotiate a reciprocal commercial treaty with Canada,
and which he subsequently agreed should be submitted to the
lower House of Congress, as well as the Senate, for approval. In the course of time these negotiations were called
'a reciprocal trade agreement," although prepared under the
secrecy customary in a negotiation of treaties. In view of
the .fact .that this compact was to be ratified by the Ho.use, it
seemed to come within the compliance of the law; but when
President Taft sent his message to Congress, the last week in
January, 1911, detailing thB result of the negotiations, and
asking that Congress promptly ratify this comrpact, it thereupon occurred to the writer that he had previously erred in
bis. views reg~rding vaj.idating of such tariff legislation
(be it a treaty or otherwise) by any purely affirmative action
of Congress. And in order that these modifications may be
1rn_:,re clearly understood, there is reprinted in full the
writer's original views (A) , followed by those conclusions
induced by a,later consideration of the subject (B)

A.

Are Treaty Agreements Constitutional Which Ignore
·or Supersede the Revenue Power of Congress or its
Regulation of Commerce with Foreign Nations 1
(Published originally June 1, 1910.)

'In

view of the fact that Congress has, of late years, undertaken ·to fully exercise its exclusi:ve regulatory power over
many forms of interstate and foreign commerce, it may be
pertinent to enquire whether a jurisdiction constitutionally
vested in both Houses of Congress can, un_der any, ci_rcum·tances, be legally· exercised by the_. upper branch alone, i~
co-~peration with the Chief Executive, under an alleged
eietcise of the ·treaty-making power. .
.
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For ·a number of
there has been a general advocacy
of entering into reciprocal trade agreements with foreign
uation · by a special treaty, just as in the past such commercial ag1'eements have been made under general treaties with
foi· ign nations.
The treaty-making power, as enumerated in the Constitution , is as follows:

"ART. 1, SEC. 2. The President * * * shall
have power, by and with the consent of the Senate,
to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur."
Like mot of the powers and functions granted the general
Government, the authority to make treaties is broad and
general in it term , and without any att~mpted definement
of thi power, or any expre s limitation as to its scope, in the
section referred to.
But aside from any curtailment of this power, in other
part of the Constitution, it should be accepted as a rule of
eon titutional construction, applicable to the treaty-making
power of every overeign, that such compacts should be germane to a power of this character.
For it is not likely any one will contend that the President of the United States, with the concurrence of the
~ mite an, under the guise of negotiating a treaty, undertake to effect agreements with other nations that do not inYolve ubjects of mutual interest requiring joint action.
Therefore, such agreements are necessarily limited ( 1) to
pnrpo. e incapable of effectuation otherwise, and ( 2) which,
under the organic law of each sovereign, are not excluded
from being made a part of treaty regulations.
hould the President, with the consent of the Senate,
undertake to prevent the manufacture and sale of intoxirants throughout the United States by a treaty compact with
Great Britain, stipulating a similar prohibition in Canada:
it would not, of course, be a constitutional exercise of this

The Constitution provides that:
"No tax or duty ~all be laid on articles exported
from any State." Art. 1, Sec. 9.
Will any one contend that under a treaty it is legal to tax
such exports, and, if not, is not this an admission that no
treaty can, on the other hand, regulate foreign commerce or
the revenue power of Congress in the matter of imports? To
hold otherwise would be to invest foreign governments with
an equal or dominating voice in matters supposed to be exclusively controlled by Congress, and at the same time invert
the relative position of the two Houses of Congress.
The power granted Congress to regulate immigration and
provide uniform rules of naturalization, now so important
to the social and industrial welfare of the Nation, could,
with equal justification, be superseded by treaty agreement8
authorizing the admission of undesirable alien races or the
enforced naturalization of such immigrants by the Federal
courts.
The general treaty entered into with Japan, in 1899, and
which is now about to expire by limitation of time, regulates,
among other things, tax exemptions, impost duties, export
duties, transit dues, port regulations, coasting trade, and
trade-marks-all subjects committ-ed, under the Constitution,
to Congress in the exercise of its exclusive authority "to regulate commerce with foreign nations," or, under itB revenue
power, to tax foreign trade.
While reciprocal trade agreements with foreign nations
are doubtless becoming essential to our commercial welfare,
such compacts, after preliminary negotiations by the Executive, should be incorporated into law by the joip.t act of both
Houses of Congress before being proclaimed by the President.
A treaty, for instance, with Great Britain, stipulating that
the importation of pulpwood from Canada should be relie~ed
of. the existing duty heretofore imposed thereon by Congress,
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ought to have the sanction of that body, or otherwise such
methods make possible the destruct~on of all revenues from
imports, if carried out on the same lines.
It was not until the treaty of commercial reciprocity with
Cuba was entered into on December 11, 1902, that Congress,
or at least the lower House thereof, began to appreciate the
manner in which former treaties had impaired the exclusive
legislative jurisdiction over commerce and revenue.
The Cuban treaty undertook to lower the existing tariff
duties on all imports. As a result of this Congress insisted,
for the first time, on authorizing a treaty revision of tariff
duties by a separate act.
And it is worthy of comment that the -lower House, thus
temporarily aroused to the dangers growing out of commer- ·
cial treaties promulgated without its assent, incorporated the
following provision in the act referred to:
"And provided f'Urther, That nothing herein contained shall be treated or construed as an admission
on the part of the House of Representatives, that
customs duties can be changed otherwise than by an
act of Congress, originating in said House."

This perfectly plain declaration was, however, hidden away
in an act that few of the present members of Congress now
recall. And as the warning, therein given, only relates to
the revenue power and does not mention the equally important right of Congress to "regulate commerce with foreign
nation " the po ibility of future treaties continuing to impair the exclusive functions of Congress is still apparent.
And unless Congress becomes alive to the dangers involved
in the making of future treaties, it can be assumed that the
Executive and the Senate will continue to undertake negotiations of treaties with foreign countries in matters of commercial intercourse.
The Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 provided for the construction of an inter-oceanic ship canal by the United States.
2-V
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The power of the United States to construct and operate
canals, improve rivers and· harbors, and promote navigation
mterests generally between the States and foreign countries,
1s usually predicated upon the provision of the Constitution
authorizing Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.
In the Canal treaty referred to are many provisions properly the subject of international agreement, but among other
things it is provided:
"That the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce * * * of all nations observing
these rules, on terms of entire equality, so that {here
shall be no discrim ination against any such nation or
its citizens or S'Ubjects, in respect of conditions or
charg,es of traffic. Such conditions and charges of
traffic shall be just and equitable." (Art. IV.)
"The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the consent of
the Senate thereof." * * * (Art. V.)
The policy looking toward the neutralization of the Panama Canal need not be considered in the present discussion.
But the fact that a great project, costing upwards of half a
billion of dollars, constructed through territory now under
the exclusive sovereignty of the United States, has been put
under certain commercial restrictions by a perpetual treaty,
and if constitutional in that respect can be further amended
by the same means without the assent of Congress, presents
a question worthy of some consideration.
While it has been the policy of the Federal Government
in the construction of internal canals, like that at the outlet
of Lake Superior, or in the deepening or artificial construction of channels through boundary waters, to ·admit foreign
traffic free of tolls and oth_e r burdens, yet Congress undoubtedly has the power to regulate such foreign commerce or the
vessels conveying the same in any way it may see fit. . It was
by the exercise of such a power that the coastwise trade of
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the United States has been reserved exclusively to vessels
owned and operated by American citizens. Can it be asserted
that the Pre ident and the Senate pose the power by treaty
agreement to suspend or repeal such regulations of Congress?
In the Canal treaty we have a compact that directly under•
takes to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and in such
a way as to preclude Congre s from discriminating against
a foreign nation by any regulation of commerce which it
may eem wi e, under the circumstances, to enact. Possibly
Great Britain under its form of government can enter into
such treaties, but, under the Constitution of the United
tates, the assent of Congre should be obtained, as was the
case in the recent commercial treaty with Cuba.
Whenever it eems wise to the President of the United
tate to enter into reciprocal agreements with other nations,
which in any way materially affect the revenue, or the regu•
lation of foreign commercial intercourse, Congress should be
left in a pomtion to confirm, modify, or rejecb such parts of a
propo ·ed international compact as falls within its particular
jurisdiction.
Otherwise, if at any time the settled conviction of the
lower Hou e favored rai ing the bulk of the national iocome
by o-called indirect taxation, through duties on imports,
whether under a tariff for protection or for revenue only,
then the Senate, acting through the Chief Executive, could
readily de troy or impair the financial or economic policy
of Congress by treaty agreements exempting all or the greater
part of import from duties, thus forcing Congres , contrary
to its de ire , to meet the deficiency in revenue by a resort to
direct taxation or an increase in exci e duties.
It was never intended that the general power to make
treatie , po
ed by all nations, should, in the case of the
United State , o interfere with the enumerated jurisdiction
of Congre as to negative its authority over revenue-upon
the prompt and adequate collection of which the welfare of
the nation largely depends-or that its regukition of foreig,n

1t
commeroe could be so 3U8pended that comnnoditie, harmful
to the health, morals, or economic safety of tM nation could
be freely admitted under improvident treaties, covering long
periods of time and beyond amendment or recall.
This is the situation, in the writer's opinion, whenever
Congress submits to, or the courts allow, such an unrestricted
or ulterior use of the treaty-making power.
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B.
Are Reciprocal Tariff Agr_eements, When Made by
the President and Ratified by Congress, Either Advisable in Policy or Constitutional in Authorityl
The opinion expressed in the preceding article: that either
a treaty or executive agreement affecting the revenue or the
regulation of foreign commerce would be ( 1) legal when
ratified by Congress and (2) a satisfactory method of bringing about reciprocal commercial intercourse with foreign
nations must now be materially modified, if not wholly rejected.
If, in effecting such treaties or executive agreements, one
of the conditions suggested above would prevail, viz: "That
Congress should be left in a position to confirm, modify or
reject euch parts of a proposed international comrpaet as falls
wi,thin its particular jurisdiction" -then there might be no
good reason for any such revision of the writer's conclusions.
But if such treaties and compacts, from their very nature,
must be ratified in their entirety or wholly rejected, Congre is divested of its discretionary powers; since its formal
ratification of such international compacts involves not only
an abdication of its constitutional powers but the endorsement of a new method of executive action, which, aside from
its legality, seems wholly inadvisable in policy.
The character and extent of the President's power to make
treaties and the right to recommend to Congress "such measures as he shall deem necessary and expedient"-are most
important when determining the line between the advisory
power of the President and executive action.
The Constitution provides that the President:

"Shall have power, by and with the advice of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur."
Art. II, sec. 2.

14
And further:
" and all treaties made or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, -~hall
be the supreme law of the land."

Art. VI.
The effect of these two provisions is to vest in the President a quasi legislative power, while the reservation in the
Senate of the veto power completes the apparent reversal of
t.he functions otherwise accorded the legislative and executive
branches of the Government. In any enactment relating
to revenue or the regulation of commerce Congress acts a.nd
the President approves, while in any treaty made under the
authority of the United States, the President acts and the
Senate approves.
In the one case the President's veto can only be overturned by a two-thirds vote of Congress, while a treaty made
by the President must be sustained by two-thirds vote of the
Senate-so that the disapproval by the President of any a~t
of Congress can only be reversed, practically, by a nonpartisan vote of Congress, while his right to make a treaty
can only be authorized, practically, by a non-partisan vote
of the Senate, since, in either case, no political party is apt
to have the two-third votes necessary to ratify the action, or,
overcome the dissent, of the President. Hence a most effective and conservative check is imposed on Congress and
the Executive.
In all treaties clearly falling within the power of the
President we have no concern in the present discussion. But
with those executive compacts, which, presumably, can be
rendered constitutionally effective by the ratification of both
houses of Congress it is necessary to analyze their legal character and to judge, if possible, their subversive effect upon
the legislative branch of the Government.
While a careful examination of the existing treaties will,
in many instances, show a disregard of the legislative rights
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reserved to Congress, it seem unnecessary to further review
the same insomuch as a consideration of the pending tariff
agreement with Canada will fully indicate the general character of such infringements not already suggested in part
A of this paper.
In considering the effort to bring about a tariff agreement
between the United State and Canada, one thing should be
apparent-that the negotiation by President Taft and his
ecretary of State puts the matter in the best pog,ible
hands-for both of these officials are highly distinguished
in the law, are experienced in public affairs beyond most men
and are wholly intent upon the most conscientious and disintere ted effort to benefit the country by a reciprocal agreement which, at the present time, is apparently endorsed by a ·
majority of the people of the United States. If successful
in their aims they are entitled to the greatest credit, and if,
in any re pect, they are disappointed it only points the moral
that where wi e men are unable to succeed others should not
be permitted to attempt the exerci e of those extraordinary
powers now being brought into play by the administration.
And if it should also prove that the majority of the people
of the United States are in error-in their insistence upon
t.he approval of free trade with Canada-it may also point
the moral that popular sentiment, when suddenly appealed
to, i not always a safe guide in the interpretation of oonJitutional powers or in the correct and just analysis of complicated economic conditions.
Th · Legal . ,tatus of the Canadia.n Agreement and the

McOall Bill.
The first problem that arises, is, whether the pending international agreement is a treaty or a tariff bill. And if
neither, can it be a tariff bill in form and a treaty in fact
or vice versa-thu hybridizing two distinct and exclusive
functions-so as to produce a measure that is neither a
treaty nor a-' s~.tute?

t6
The answer probably depends upon the point of viewwhether the test applies to the compact executed by and between the representatives of the two governments or to the
McCall bill incorporating this agreement. Yet the two are
so welded together that it is difficult to say just where the
agreement ends and the proposed act begins-since the agreeIJ?.ent specifically provides that both governments shall use
their "utmost efforts" in having the revised tariff schedules
"confirmed" by Congress.
In the manner of its negotiation and in the method of
formulation, this agreement, so far as constitutional procedure goes, was in accord with the treaty-making power
possessed by the President.
When, however, the President undertook to have the
agreement ratified by Congress and not by the Senate alone,
he, for the first time, officially departed from the prescribed
methods of putting a treaty agreement into· effect. This
deviation was doubtless due to the fact that the compact
was one dealing exclusively with revenue duties and with
tariff taxes imposed for the protection of domestic industries,
and consequently coming within the original jurisdiction of
Congress and not that posse.ssed by the President in making
a treaty.
For it would not be fair to assume that the agreement took
its present form in order to prevent any interference by
Great Britain or because it was easier to get a majority in
each branch of Congress than a two-thirds confirmatory vote
in the Senate.
The negotiations between the two countries covered a
number of months, but owing tothe extreme secrecyobserved
( as customary in treaties), and with Congress and its leaders
ignorant of the changes being wrought . in the existing
chedule of the Payne-Aldrich act, the advent of the completed agreement found the country confused over the exact
nature of the proceedings; for with few exceptions, the agreement was generally spoken of as "a reciprocal commercial
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treaty.'' Just when President Taft reached the conclusion
that it was useless to try to put such an agreement in the
form of a treaty is, perhaps, no public concern ; but in his
message to Congress, explaining the negotiations, he refers
to the com.pact as "a reciprocal trade agreement," while Secretary Wil on, two weeks later, in a carefully prepared communication to the National Grange, begins the first line of
his letter with "the proposed Canadian reciprocity treaty"
and uses the word "treaty" throughout, ending his communication with the hope that "the pending reciprocity treaty"
would be ratified.
With the Cabinet itself confused over the status of the
agreement, it is not strange, as the efforts proceeds for its
adoption by Congress, that the uncertainty increases.
Considerable light, however, is thrown upon the subject
when one examines the initiatory proceedings, for it is quite
upparent that President Taft assumed he had the power to
negotiate a reciprocal tariff agreement, and exactly on the
119.Ille lines as would be followed were he formulating a
treaty.
In his special message of January 26 he says:
r

:,

"In my annual message of December 6, 1910,
I also informed you that, by my direction,
the Secretary of State had dispatched two representatives of the Department of State as special commissioners to Ottawa to confer with representatives of
the Dominion Government, that they were authorized

* * *
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to take steps to formulate a recip,rocal trade agreement, and that the Ottawa conferences thus begun
had been adjourned to be resumed in Washington.
"On the 7th of the present month two cabinet mini ter came to Washington as repre entatives of the
Dominion Government, and the conferences were
continued between them and the Secretary of State.
The result of the negotiations was that on the 21st
instant a reciproca.l trad,e agreement was reached, the
text of which i8 herewith transmitted, with accompanying correspondence and other data." * * *
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"My ~pose in making a reciFoeal trade agreement with Canada has been not only to obtain one
which would be mutually advantageous to both countries, but one which also would be truly national in
its scope." * * *
"I feel I have correctly interpreted the wish of
the American people by expressing in the arrangement now submitted to Oongress for its atpproval, their
desire for a more intimate and cordial relationship
with Canada. I therefore earnestly hope that the
measure will be ,p romptly enacted into law."

In no part of this message does the President use the word
/¥treaty," but, as will be seen, in subsequent addresses the
President frequently refers to the compact as a treaty, showing very plainly that he is unable to fix definitely upon
the character of the agreement.
The presumed right to authorize these negotiations, however, is no plainer than the direct intimation that the recently enacted tariff law of Congress was in need of amendment, and that the purpose of these negotiations was to put
such changes in the precise form the President and his
Canadian conferees thought best, leaving it to Congress to
place the agreement upon the statute books by an affinnatory
act.
Going. now to the position taken by the Canadian repreentatives, we must reach the conclusion that they regarded
the .power possessed by the President to negotiate and fix
upon thechanges in the tariff as very similar in extent to that
possessed in the making of a treaty, for in their written
stipulation, accompanying the agreement, they provide:
"3. It is agreed that the desired tariff changes shall
not take the formal shap,e of a treaty, but that the
governments of the two countries · will use their
utmost efforts to bring about such changes by concurrent legislation at Washington and Ottawa.
"4. The . governments of the two countries h<Wing
made this agreement from the conviction that, if confirmed by the necessary legislative authorities, it will
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19
benefit the people on both sides of the border line, we
may reasonably hope and expect that the arrangement, if so confirmed, will remain in operation for
a considerable period. Only this expectation on the
part of both governments would justify the time and
labor that have been employed in the maturing of
the proposed measures."

If the representatives of the Dominion of Canada were
unable to put this agreement in the form of a treaty because
requiring the assent of Great Britain, and if President Taft
likewise was lacking in authority to make the agreement a
a treaty, then the ·questions arise (1) whether he possesses
the constitutional power to make a reciprocal tariff agreement with the representatives of a foreign government, and
(2) whether such an agreement when ratified by both houses
of Congress becomes as effective in law as a treaty agreement
when approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate?
If o, then for the first time in the history of the country
the President is recognized as having two new functions-(!) the inherent right to make reciprocal tariff agreements
with foreign nations, becoming effective in law upon
the approval of both houses of Congress, or (2) a special
and qualified treaty-making power dependent upon the ratification of both branches of Congress by a majority vote.
This and this only must be the result of the proposed tariff
revision if both the right to formulate the measure is accorded the President and the right to have it approved, without change, is conceded by Congress.

20
cor
Is the MeOall Bill an Illegal Ratification of an Illegal
Executive .Agreementf
Waiving, now, the authority of the President to initiate,
conduct and conclude a tariff agreement with a foreign nation, we come to a consideration of the constitutional authority of Congress to ratify such an Executive agreement
by a so-called act.
Undoubtedly considerable unanimity exists in the cour~
that an act of a legislative body cannot be impugned for
any irregularity in its enactment arising. under the rules
or procedure of such a body, unless the infirmity appears
upon the face of the act or is clearly evidenced by the
Journal or other records of such a body.
It has even been held, for instance, that where a State
constitution requires every bill, on final passage, "shall receive a majority of the votes of the members elected," it i
not competent to institute a judicial inquiry for the purpose of going behind the vote as recorded and approved in
the legislative journal, though it may be alleged, in such
a proceeding, that a sufficient number of affirmative vote
were recorded of absent members to have given a particular bill its apparent constitutional majority. Public policy
requires that legislative acts should not be questioned, in
after years, by any proceeding impugning the accuracy of
legislative records.
If, therefore, the Canadian agreement had been quietly
assembled into a House bill and passed, without a cloture
rule there might be nothing in the record to show that
this tariff measure did not originate in the House or that
the House did not exercise its discretionary powers in the
consideration of the same.
But the President very frankly sent the agreement to
Congress and asked, in a special message, that it be approved; while the House, upon the other hand, has re-
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corded, in its debates, and otherwise, that this measure was
approved in its entirety because any amendment would de. troy •the agreement'. Hence the record plainly establishes
the fact that this tariff measure originated with the President and that it wa pa ed by the House acting as a mere
medium of ratification.
The title of the McCall bill reads: "A bill to promote
reciprocal trade relations with the Dominion of Canada, and
for other purposes."
But uppose it read: "A bill to validate an unauthorized
Tariff agreement, made by the President of the United
tate with the Dominion of Canada and to adopt said
agreement as an amendment to the Tariff act of August
5th 1909, with the ame force and effect as an amendment
heretofore made under authority of law"?
Yet uch i the purpose and the effect of the McCall bill.
Of cour e no one would offer, in good faith, such a bill;
110 Congre
would stultify itself by passing it, just as no
l'Ourt would u tain an act o clearly unconstitutional upon
it. face. But i the real de ign of the McCall bill so cloaked
by it innocent title as to deceive anyone?
The fact that thi Executive agreement, with its hul).dreds
of change in existing law, only received a nominal con~ideration in the Committee on Ways and Means, that it
pa ed the House under a cloture rule preventing the reading of the bill or any amendment thereof, is not to be
tnken as evidence that the House was wilfully derelict in
iti- dut of carefully considering the proposed changes, but
rather an admission that as the Executive agreement, like
a treaty, could not be altered in any respect without destroying the same, it would be a mere waste of time and a
mere pretense of possessing any discretionary power to have
prolonged its passage through the House.
Had the House, in the exercise of its exclusive constitutional right, prepared a reciprocal tariff bill, as it has a per-
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Any effort to blend distinct functions in order to create
a new one should be equally futile in a government of
enumerated powers.
In order that no injustice be done the President in reaching such conclusions, we may refer to his carefully prepared address before the Legislature of Springfield, Ill., on
February 11th, wherein he said · among other things the
following:
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"The Constitution provides that the President
may make treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and that the treaties when thus
made shall constitute the law of the land. · It has alwayB been a question, however, whether it was not
necessary, in order to car1·y treaties affecting tariff
and revenue mea8Wres into effect, to have action by
Congress in the form of legislation recognizing and
enforcing the treaties. Because of this doubt it was
thought wiser on behalf of both Governments not to
make a formal treaty, but to make an agreement between the Executives, by which each, exercising hris
constitutional power in his Government, should S'Ubmit the agreement in the form of a statute to be
enacted and to go into force on conditions that a
similar statute was passed by the legislature of the
other country."
Thi explanation leaves in doubt the legal character of
the power under which he could negotiate a so-called informal treaty.
If it were conceded-as it ought to be- that the President
po e e no power, either expre , implied, inherent, or
capable of legi lative ratification, to revi e the tariff or make
any hange in cu tom duties, it would greatly simplify
the pre ent ituation; but there seem to be no disposition to
rai the que tion in uch a sweeping way. Returning to
the de laration that "an agreement between the Executives''
was made by each "using his con titutional power in his
Government," there i nothing in substantiation of the
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proposition that the Constitution confers the right upon the
President to enter into such a joint agreement or have the
same ratified by Congress, unless it. be a treaty, made under
authority of law, and subject to the approval of the upper
branch alone.
But in this address we ~d the President, later on, calling
the agreement a treaty, where he says:
"In other words, the great benefit of this treaty is
the profit in mutual exchange that will come in respect to the agricultural products of both."
Further on he emphasizes this position by saying:
''My own view is that no step could be taken more
in the interest of a reasonable policy of protection
than the approval of thiB treaty."
Taking, therefore, the President's position, from its inception down to the acceptance of the agreement by the
lower House, one cannot but help reaching the conclusion
that the President regarded the whole transaction as a treaty,
so far as !vis power was concerned, but out of deference to
the view that Congress would regard any change in the
tariff as an impairment of its constitutional powers he arranged the matter so as to obtain its "formal" assent to an
"informal" treaty. But the provision for a two-thirds vote
in the Senate is ignored by this plan, just as the House
ignored its legislative powers.
·
With Canada the same legal infirmity arises, for being unable to negotiate treaties, without the express concurrence of
Great Britain, the Dominion government tries to avoid this
inability by calling this joint compact al reciprocal trade
agreement. But, in order to do this, the agreement was formulated as a treaty, in so far as the negotiating power was
concerned, and must now be formally ratified by the legislative branches of each government, as would be a treaty, in
order to make· the comp11-ct effective. Thus restrictions upon
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do anything else that is expressly committed to the Execu•
tive branch of the Government.
Each Department can select subordinate agents, but
neither can transfer their powers to independent and sovereign branches of the Government.
Under the constitutional division of powers it was intended that the Legislative, Judicial and Executive Departments should always remain distinct and that neither could
confer the powers or burdens of one upon the other, any
more than one could usurp the functions of another.
Maximum and Minim111/m Clause.

In Part 1, of the prior pamphlet, the writer briefly expressed his dissent upon the right of Cortgress to confer upon
the President the discretionary power to impose the maximum or minimum tariff rates, as provided in the PayneAldrich act.
And this objection was not based, primarily, upon the
question whether or not such a right given the Executive
was a legislative one but rather upon the broad proposition
that Congress cannot transfer to another Department of the
Government any of its exclusive powers to regulate foreign
commerce, just as the Executive Department cannot legally
acquire by any declaration .of Congress, or through its acquiescence, any right whatever "to regulate commerce with
foreign nations"-the express intention of the maximum
and minimum clause--which seeks to bring about recipro
tariff duties, or to retaliate, when any country fails to make
such concessions. The purpose and the only purpose was
to give the President an effective means of regulating commerce with foreign nations and the President cannot have
imposed upon him any such burden or function, any more
than he can undertake to exercise such a power without the
assent of Congress. And this objec.tion is not technical or
in disre~ard of beneficial results, but, upon the contrary, is
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based upon the substantial ground that uch a transfer of
power is not only in violation of a fundamental divi ion of governmental functions but that there can exist
no reason whatever why Congress should not exercise the
power transferred to the President, under this clause, or why
it cannot delegate the same to its agents, or agent, whether
it be a Tariff board or a special commissioner. For if it
hasn't the latter power it certainly hasn't the former and
it may have the latter and not the former.
Hence, in the opinion of the writer, any changes attempted to be made by the President in the tariff law or
in the remission or collection of duties, are wholly uncontitutional-for if Congress could not constitutionally have
authorized the Pre ident to enter into the making of
a tariff agreement, how much tronger must be the position
that it cannot ratify indirectly what it cannot authorize directly.
Yet thi indirect method of giving the Executive an
arbitrary power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
occurred in the Dingley act, where, under section three,
the President, without consulting with Congress, may enter
into negotiations with other countries for mutual tariff conl' ion , and may even suspend absolutely the existing
dutie . This arbitrary right of amendment, involving the
revenue and the regulation of foreign commerce, is dangerou. in practice and fundamentally wrong in principle. The
power of the President to make treaties cannot be enlarged
by Congress nor can Congress give the President any new
power by parting with one of its own. Such a power it may
delegate to its own agents--but Congress does not control
the President, in this sense.
Imagine, if you can, Congress passing the following general act: "A bin delegating and transferring to the President of the United States the power of Congress to regulate
eommerce with foreign nations and authorizing him to
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enter into agreements raising, lowering, or remitting tariff
duties." Yet, practically, it has given him this power on
several occasions.
Or, upon the other hand, imagine the President, in a
message to the Senate, authorizing it to make a particular
treaty, subject to his approval. And, if it refused to do so,
~alling it back in extra session.
Yet here we have the President making a tariff bill, requesting its ratification by Congress, and, on its refusal,
·calling it back in extra session. The power heretofore given
him to regulate the tariff has evidently encouraged independent action.
If this tariff measure finally · makes the "round trip,"
from and to the Executive mansion, under what title does
it return? If a treaty it requires no Presidential approval, ·
and if an act the Constitution provides:
"Every bill which will have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the
United States; if he approves he shall sign it, but if
not he shall return it. with his objections, to that
house in which it shall have originated."
Now, granting that it comes to the President as a bill, it
would be perhaps rather a violent assumption that he might
not approve what he had created and was under a solemn
international pledge to force through Congress by the use
of his "utmost efforts" ; but if he did veto it and, under the
above Constitutional requirement, undertook to return it
"to the house in which it shall have originated:'-the Whi~
House rather seems to be the one suggested-if a little levity
may be allowed.
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AB a Matter of Public and Party Policy Should the Tariff be
Revised lYI.J an Executive Officer and Alien Oonfereesf

,Pa ing from the lack of expre s or implied authority of
the Pre ident to negotiate and formulate a reciprocal tariff
agreement with foreign countries, and that of Congress t-0
make the same legally effective by a confirmatory vote, we
may consider the subject from a le technical standpoint,
viz: The advisability, as a matter of public policy, of permitting the Executive branch of the Government to revise
<'ustom duties or change a system of tariff protection in
accordance with the personal view of the President or as
such may be influenced and changed by the wu he. or demands of foreign associates.
Thi problem naturally resolve it.self into several
branche . 1 t. The necessarily irresponsible, unresponsive,
and eclusive methods that must obtain, as a rule, in the
Executive branch, when volunteering t-0 revise, in any sub. t,antial degree, the customs or tariff laws. 2nd. The neces~arily hampered and subservient position of Congress when
u~d as a mere medium for placing such a revision upon the
statute books. 3rd. The possible effect upon the country
of a ectional tariff revision, made in part by alien conferee and in part by a branch of the Government never intended or equipped to solve such legislative problems, and
4th The rejection of party counsel, in matters of party
policy.
Considering first the disadvantages under which the President i plaeed when framing a tariff bill, affecting the interchange of trade between two great and contiguous countries, it must be apparent that he and his Secretary of State
are largely, if not wholly, dependent upon the guidance
of private experts and the more or less interested views of
the foreign commissioners. Lacking authority t-0 send for
witne~es, the means or inclination to grant extended public
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hearings or the experience necessary in determining the
extent duties should be lowered or withdrawn, it must follow that such agreements are made in camera, and by persons to whom authority is attempted to be delegated from
persons lacking original or delegated authority themselves.
Just as Representative McCall became the putative father
of his bill-so precisely must the President and the Secretary
of State have largely adopted the conclusfon of others. This
assumption is the inexorable logic of the situation-for no
one--certainly not the President-claims that the revised
tariff schedules are based upon the conclusions following
a personal familiarity with the various items embodied in
this international agreement, or with those thereby displaced. The Constitution neither inspires or requires any
such knowledge upon the part of the Executive.
Now granting that the Canadian agreement would be a
benefit to each· country, and that the vigorous dissent of a
majority of the administration's party is based upon unjust fears-no one should contend that the preparation of
a tariff bill should not be entrusted to Congress-where
many of the members have made a life study of this question and who, besides representing, as individuals, every citizen of every State, are responsible for the proper discharge
of their duties, imposed under the Constitution, or, in the
furtherance of party policies.
When the attitude of Congress is considered, its abdication of constitutional powers is a matter of greater criticism
than the usurpation of authority by the Executive-since
the latter can only prevail by assent of Congress and hence
jt becomes doubly remiss.
An examination of the House debates during the close of
the 61st Congress are worth considering and a few extracts
are quoted from the Record:
Mr. Dalzell of Pennsylvania said:
"Up to the time the President's message informed
Congress that he had entered into a trade agreement
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with Canada1 the House of Representatives, where
all bills raismg revenue must originate under the
Constitution, knew nothing at all about it. It is
afe to say that no Member of Congress had been consulted either about the project or about its details.
On January 8, two days after the message, a bill
drawn in the State Department--the bill now pending, with a material amendment--was presented in
the House."
Mr. Knapp of New York said:
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"The importance of this treaty, or, as it has been
termed, reciprocal trade compact with Canada, as it
may affect the industrial prosperity of the United
States cannot be easily overestimated. It is exceedingly unfortunate that upon a question which so
vitally affects certain of the great industries of the
country there should seem to be necessity for hasty
action. This compact, framed in private between
the representatives of the two Governments, was first
made public to the people of the United States and
Canada on January 26, 1911. That was the first
authentic information that the American Congress
or people of the United States had of the provisions
of this compact, * * * and, further, there has
been here adopted a rule prohibiting amendment or
changehand while there are some items in this com- .
pact w ich might meet my approval, the compact
must, under the rule adopted, be accepted or rejected as a whole.''
Mr. Kopp of Wisconsin said:

"The most important measure acted upon at this
ession is to be put through under cloture rules, with
no opportunity of amendment, and without even
having the bill read in this House. Just think of it,
Mr. Speaker, that the Repre entatives of the great
American people are being called upon to pass a
measure without even having it read-a measure
which vitally affects the homes and destinies of
15,000,000 farmers in this great land."

34

pretending to be friendly to it and making amendments to it which rruu8t necessarily nullify the agreement."

In connection with the candid admissions that the House
was necessarily deprived of its legislative powers, if the
compact were to stand, we may also come to the conclusion
that there were a sufficient number of votes cast in behalf
of the passage of the bill by members who favored some
changes in the agreement, but who felt impelled to vote for
it as a whole, to have changed the result had the bill been
open to amendment.
The Difference Between Adoption and 01'igination; Between
Ratification and Legislative Sovereignty.

It is no answer that the adoption of the Executive agreement by Congress can be considered the equivalent, in law,
to its inception in Congress; that to adopt is to originate;
or that the acceptance of such a measure, by incorporating
it in the form of a bill, is a compliance with the letter, if
not the spirit, of the Constitution.
This compact neither originated in Congress nor can any
formal ratification be considered a bona fide compliance
with the exclusive legislative power vested in Congress to
make revenue and tariff laws. For even the violent assumption that Congress may adopt the offspring of the Executive,
implies the authority of one acting in loco parentis. But
Congress is regarded simply as a bureau of registration; for
it may record and transcribe, but it cannot formulate, consider, amend, or in any way exercise its usual legislative
discretion. The tariff compact, made by the Executives of
two nations, m'U8t be ratified prrecisely a8 a treaty, and in the
exact language of its presentation, or otherwise Congress
cannot be permitted to consider it. Yet no Member of Con-
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gre pretends that it is a treaty; nor, upon the other hand,
can it be regarded as a bill.
The divi ion of constitutional power, and their maintenance, cannot be evaded by such sophistry ; for this course
of reasoning would nullify all the restrictions placed upon
the usurpation of authority by any of the Departments of
the Government.
The Senate, with ju t as much authority, could originate
revenue bills for the ratification of the House, as the President can make changes in the existing tariff laws, subject
to the approval of Congress, and later, to his predetermined
approval.
The Pre ident speaks of "the failure of the Senate * * *
in ratifying the reeiprroc-al agreement made with Canada."
This refers, of course, to the formal approval of an existing compac~as in the case of a treaty and nothing else.
Again the President says that "this agreement" was submitted "in 6he form of a statute" to be adopted by Congress; and further that the "approval of this treaty" was in
accord with "the policy of protection" ; and again "I regard
fh,i,s treaty, if adopted, as the beginning of new relations,"
etc. Every legal treaty is a law, but what does the President
mean by a treaty in the form of a statute?
Therefore when Congress endeavors to put such an anomalous compact on the statute books, in the precise manner
requested by the President, it abdicates every function of
a law-making body and in nowise can be considered a free
agent of the Legislative branch of the Government but
merely a convenient medium for recording the legislative
edicts of the Executive.
The combination of votes whereby the compact was
formally adopted by the lower House, without the right of
amendment, was not a combination to save the measure from
posmble changes that might not meet with the approval of
the majority-a legislative method having the sanction of
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usage and of common sense-but the only purpose of the
cloture rule was to enforce compliance with the President's
request that no changes be made in the agreement and this
constituted a clear surrender of all legislative power-since
there can be little doubt that some and probably very many
material changes would have been made in the various
tariff schedules presented-if Congress felt that it could
freely act upon its own judgmeµt.
It was the surrender of this discretion, and its exclusive
jurisdiction in the framing of tariff laws, that, in addition
to the foreign origin of the measure, made the former proceedings of Congress trebly defective.
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The Disastrous Rewults of a Separate Remon by Sched!U,leB
or in a Discrimination Against Sections and Olaases.

The writer h as no desire to gauge, in a monetary sense,
the direct effect of the proposed tariff changes upon separate
interests or upon the welfare generally. This is a subject for expert consideration; for those who are familiar
with the operation of the present tariff law and who can
accurately estimate the future effect of the Canadian agreement.
The legal character of the protective system, how it was
built up, how it has been maintained, the purposes it seeks
to accomplish, and how the same may be impaired by this
Executive method of tariff revision, are the subjects towards
which the writer has tried to limit his views ; leaving it to
those who are more competent and experienced to point out
the benefits or the disadvantages of the proposed change
from an industrial standpoint.
In the first place it must be kept in mind that the majority of the people of this country have repeatedly expressed
a desire for the existence and continuation of a protective
tariff, provided it is so adapted as to promote the public
welfare generally.
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Under thi economic system a tariff barrier, primarily uniform in it nature, has surrounded the four sides of the
•'ation. And today we have a higher standard of living,
of remuneration, and more generally distributed opportunities for advancement than in any country in the world-due largely-as the majority of the people believe-to the
pro~tion of all important industrial interests and the development and safeguarding of the home market.
The' agreement with Canada provides for the immediate
breaking down of t};ie barrier for a distance of more than
three thousand miles along our upper boundary, subjecting
the more northerly agricultural intere t to a direct competition in the same class of products, owing t-0 the similarity in climate and soil.
The int.ere ts of fifteen million of farmers are directly
or indirectly affected by the compact already executed and
now awaiting the ratification of Congre .
The great manufacturing centers, those districts producing different commodities or too remote from Canada to feel
the full or immediate effects of such competition, have naturally welcomed the idea of cheaper food products, and the
qu~tion of the loss of customs revenue is entirely ignored.
The northern farmer objects to this influx of competitive
products, but he, too, is unconcerned about the matter of
revenue-since the whole controversy really rests upon the
maintenance of a protective tariff and not over the collection of revenue. Though the cost of production does not
greatly favor Canada, it is sufficient to displace American
farm product and yet not reduce the selling price in the
retail market. Free trade, however, with Mexico, while
bankrupting the Southern farmer, would reduce prices.
The existing barrier, between Canada and the United
tates, i in the form of taxes so adjusted as to exclude
competitive articles, or place those imported on an equivalent basis in the respective cost of production. Such a tax
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(as already pointed out in Part I, of the prior pamphlet), i
one method of regulating commerce with foreign nations;
and therefore, any change brought about by the agreement,
in so far as it relates to the system of tariff protection, is an attempted regulation of commerce with foreign nations-a supervisory jurisdiction reserved exclusively to Congress, and a
different one than that relating to the raising of revenue-though both are here involved.
President Taft in one of the most brilliant, able, and
interesting messages ever sent to Congress has argued
broadly and effectively in behalf of freer trade with our
nearest and most friendly neighbor. Yet he shows most
plainly that the means he would employ consists of an agreement changing the regulations now affecting foreign commerce. The reason assigned for this action, as expressed in
the concluding sentence of the message, is, that he believes
he has "correctly interpreted the wish of the American
people." However benevolent the motive it nevertheless involves the idea that Congress was a little slow in doing its
"interpreting;'' or that it could not be trusted in making
its own laws.
In the maintenance of the protective tariff there may now
be considered the character of the co-operation necessary
for its continuance and the nature of those conditions that
are always, more or less, antagonistic to its existence.
Free trade is the natural consequence of a separate revision of the tariff by schedules, just as it is apt to come
from any so-called reciprocal agreement which is either
~ectional in character or which particularly affects any one
large class of producers. This is due to the fact that a
majority of the people, when only considering the matt~r
from an individual standpoint, are in favor of free trade
upon the products they consume. For the average manand he represents the great majority-is naturally influenced by those ideas which obtain in his struggles for in-
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dividual supremacy. He would therefore sell in the dearest
market and buy in the cheapest. It is the result of individualism, and can only be met by satisfactory proof that
the remuneration in the marketing of one's own product may be largely regulated by the remuneration received
by one's vendee.
All taxes are inherently obnoxious to all men, and as
ti,me goes on there is a rising tide against any form of taxation of which the inexperienced or misinformed do not
understand the purpo e. Starting with the majority of
the people naturally inclined against a tax levied in any
one schedule, its fate is settled if left to hasty popular
determination; but Congress, with the knowledge that a
majority of the people favor the protective system, is able
to see the shortsightedness of individual action and the cooperation of such members against any separate breaking
down of the tariff system is usually successful and usually
sustained oy popular approval.
Now the writer does not mean to contend that such a
method of co-operation is not fraught with the evils incident to compromise, or that such tariff taxes can ever be
..,cientifically and justly determined until placed in the
hand of a tariff commis ion composed of members who,
while believing in the legality of the protective tariff, are
ufficiently disinterested and capable to adjust the duties on
a basi equitable to the producer and consumer and with
a due regard for the National income. The purpose, now,
however, is to point out the prevailing method by which
the protective tariff laws are retained upon the statute books
in the face of man' inherent ho tility to taxation, or to
any re traint which, apparently, affects his individual interests.
Thi dispo ition to overlook the consequences of individualism as again t a wise co-operation is manifested in many
ways. Put to a vote the reduction of street car fares to two

40
cents and it would receive a large majority. The same
would be true if the majority could decide the increase of
wages, the decrease in rent, the cost of meat, vegetables, gas,
coal, the rates of interest, and the like. Only judicial restraint stands in the way of such thoughtless action by the
people. But if the courts did not so restrain this disposition of the individual, when voting collectively in a way
to impair the rights of others, and they were left to learn
from sad experience the disastrous results of such improveident action, matters would soon adjust themselves upon a
proper basis, since the average man is not inherently dis-honest, and, when acting unfairly to other interests, it i"
due to ignorance or a misunderstanding of those fundamental principles which regulate social and business conditions.
A tariff revision therefore that supposedly reduces the cost
of agricultural products will naturally meet with the approval of the millions of consumers residing in the cities of
the United States; while if the reduction, or free list, applies
to agricultural implements, coal, clothing, hardware, fertilizers or the like, the country districts will favor it; and
this may be extended indefinitely until the whole tariff
system goes down-with protection or revenue wholly disregarded. Yet neither of the two political parties favor this
combined result.
Any contention, therefore, that certain proposed legislation is supported by a majority of the people, when their
sentiments are hastily called into expression, or which depends upon a series of divergent views construed as a general
approval, is not necessarily a sound argument in favor of
its immediate adoption by Congress. And this applies with
peculiar force to the Canadian agreement.
The objection made by the supporters of the protective
tariff, and especially by those directly affected by free trade
with Canada, is that the proposed method of reciprocity
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differs from that advocated by Blaine, McKinley, and other
public men, in that the latter only favored the mutual and
free admission of commodities not produced in either
country. Such reciprocity only involved the question
whether, in a given case, the loss of revenue was justified
by the increa e in the export trade. In the Canadian reciprocity agreement, however, the question involves first the
removal of the protective tariff, and secondly an increase
in the export trade.
As Congressman Humphrey, of Washington, said: "At
best this bill would only open up the markets of each
country to the same class of products produced in each
country. This is not mut~al benefit; this is competition.
This is not reciprocity; this is commercial war."
The complete withdrawal of the protective tariff on all
the products of the orthern farmer and the extension of
an export trade to the manufacturer, as proposed in the
Canadian agreement, is as completely a sectional and class
piece of legislation, therefore, as can well be imagined. It
creates the issue of the city against the farm, the manufacturer again t the agriculturalist, and so clearly so as to
cely render proof necessary.
With the Administration making every effort to have its
program of revision adopted, the declaration of those in
Congress upon whom this pressure has been brought to bear
may be of interest :
Mr. Malby of New York said:
"I believe in the principle of universal protection,
but it must apply equally to all. It must apply to all
part of our common country, equally to the tiller.·
of the oil and to those engaged in manufacture.
Then the principle is safe; otherwi e it must perish,
for the people will no more endure half protection
and half free trade than our forefathers would suffer
our Nation to remain half free and half slave. It
mu t be one or ,the other, and now is the time when
that question is to be determined."
6-V
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Mr. Gardner of Massachusetts said:
"I think it safe to say that the inroads into th
protective system will not stop with this agreement
The producers of raw material in this country far
exceed in number the producers of manufacturea.
If, then, the duties are removed which protect our
producers of raw materials, where are the votes to
come from which will protect the duties on manufactures? Is it not certain that the producers of farm
products, of lumber, and of fish will join at once
with the free traders in annihilating all other duties?
Is it not obvious that men who are not protected
themselves will refuse to accord protection to others?
To depy this proposition is to disregard the plain
teachings of history."
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Senator McCumber of North Dakota said:
"Heretofore I have had some doubts about the
feasibility and even the propriety of taking up the
tariff proposition schedule by schedule or subject by
subject. When this Canadian compact becomes the
law, every doubt will have vanished. By it we are
taking up the proposition schedule by schedule. The
first schedule is the agricultural, and against it is
combined every other interest in the country, and
every article is placed on the free list. But take
up the tariff schedule by schedule and in schedule
after schedule the protective idea will be crushed
to death by the determined votes of the representatives of the outraged farming population of this
country."
. •I

Mr. Mondell of Wyoming said:
"I approached the consideration of the bill containing the· Canadian reciprocity treaty in the hope that
a thorough examination of it would present a case
which would justify IDJ giving the measure my support.
"It is therefore a matter of personal regret that
after having given the treaty such consideration as. I

have been able to do in the short time it has been
before us, I have become convinced that the duty
which I owe to the people whom I represent on this
floor compels me to oppo e and vote against the
measure."
Mr. Guernsey of Maine said:

?
l
?
l

'I am opposed to this rule which is brought in
here to make possible the forcing through without
amendment the pending bill to carry into effect the
proposed trade agreement, called by some Canadian
reciprocity. I shall vote against the rule and against
the bill. I cannot expre s in language strong enough
my opposition to this proposition to lead the American farmer to slaughter."
Mr. Sterling of Illinois said:
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"I have searched diligently for reasons to support
this measure and have failed to find them. There
are none .
"Let me tell you gentlemen on this side of the
House, who are urging this legislation, that you are
not promoting the end you seek. If you imagine
that this free-trade tendency will cease when you
get what you want you are very much mistaken.
When you expose this great protective principle to
the just charge of favoritism and class legislation you
are striking at its very existence. I know you do not
want to do that. You are protectionists. You must
be protectionists if you would maintain among
the people you represent that higher standard of
life, that better civilization, which the American
citizen enjoys and which he thinks he is entitled to .
If you pursue this selfish policy of protection for
your manufactures and free trade for farm products
you will drive the farmer into the ranks of the free
trader.''
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Mr. McCumber of North Dakota said:

"And before I get through I am going to be able
to demonstrate even to the satisfaction of the Sen-

44

·ator from Indiana that within 10 years Canada alone

('0

will be able to produce more wheat along our own
border line than we will need in the whole United
States, although we should raise not a single bushel."

rn
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Mr. Moore of Pennsylvania said:
"Much as I would like to stand with the distinguished gentlemen who advocate the enactment into
law of this reciprocity agreement with Canada, I
find myself unable to do so. With me the wisdom
of a protective-tariff system in the United States has
been a matter of conviction. I certainly cannot agree
with the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clark] in
his declaration for a continuance of treaties with
European nations, should this agreement with Canada be adopted as the entering wedge. Such a system, as I view it and as it seems to be conceded by
the Democratic leaders in this House, would mean
inevitable free trade with Great Britain, with Germany, with France, with Italy, and, by the same
token, with China and Japan.

('(

t.
fl

€

Mr. Hamilton of Michigan said:
"This proposed trade agreement with Canada must
be judged by what it proposes, wholly disassociated
from any party policy that has heretofore prevailed.
"It is not Blaine reciprocity. That policy proposed
to open our markets for what we do not ourselve
produce, in return for free foreign markets.
"This agreement proposes to open our markets to
Canada for products the like of which we do produce
to be admitted in competition with our products, and
particularly in competition with farm products."
Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee February 20.

When the so-called reciprocity measure came to the Senate, at the close of the Sixty-first Congress, it was soon manifest that only one or two Republican members favored the
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roltlpad through per on~l conviction and that those who
inclined toward its support did so rather out of regard for
iu real authoi:.
Senator Hale, chairman of the Finance Committee, m a
colloquy upon the floor of the Senate aid:

"It i . no exaggeration to say that ,a large majority
of the committee is opposed to the reciprocity agree-

ment a well as to a favorable report. While that
was the clear entiment of the committee, and I have
no doubt that it i at this moment, so much clamor
ha arisen and so many charges have been made that
the committee was to uppress consideration of the
treaty and keep it from the Senate that the feeling
of the committee was that it should be reported and
put on the calendar for action by the Senate."
Before the agreement was reported, without recommendat.ion, to the Senate everal public hearings were had and
among the prote tan ts was Aaron Jones, of Indiana, for
eight years the Ma ter of the National Grange, now the head
of hi State Grange, and the present chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Grange, who came before the
Committee in behalf of the e and other organizations of
fa1·mer . In the local press a portion of Mr. Jones' testimony
wa reported as follows:
This witne
aid that the farmers had iooen the
main support of the protective tariff policy in this
country for many :years; that without their support
no Republican President could have been elected and
that if they were now to be rewarded for their devotion to the protection system by free trade in their
products then they would cease following the Republican party.
"I cast my first vote for Abraham Lincoln,'' said
Mr. Jones, "and I have voted for every Republican
candidate for President since then. I voted for the
party because I believed in the protective tariff; but
if we are to have free trade for the fia.rmer, by the
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Eternal, we will have it for everybody before another
two years roll by.
"Has there never been any measure before Congress heretofore that has aroused the farmers and
agricultural interests as this measure has?" inquired
Senator Hale.
"None whatever," replied Mr. Jones. '~l have not
een the people in the agricultural districts so thoroughly aroused since the day Fort Sumter was fired
upon."
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At this hearing, and by memorials to Congress, it has de•
veloped that practioally every agricultural organization of
t-he northern States has objected to the ratification of the
Canadian agreement. In Massachusetts- the original hot
bed of reciprocity-the chairman of the State Grange sent
the following telegram to the Senate:
"Farmers are opposed to Canadian reciprocity
treaty. The Grange position is that the farmer:
should receive exactly the same measure of protection
as the manufacturers and that if there is any reduction of duties on farm products the tariff should be
reduced at the same time on all the manufactured
articles the farmer buys.''

In the State of New York ninety-nine out of one hundred
Granges voted against it, while every large trade and commercial body in the City of New York approved it. In Ohio,
the President's own State, the result was the same with the
farmer organizations, while the Cincinnati Chambers of
Commerce endorsed it without a dissenting voice; and so
throughout the country it has become apparent that the
division over the pending·agreement is not only one of classe
ibut likewise, in its more acute phase, a sectional one. It.
may however be noted, by way of exception, that the Chamber of Commerce of the City of New Orleans has protested
most vigorously against the justice of a measure imposing
free trade upon the northern farmer, and it is very easy to
,ee, from this, that it fears reciprocity with Mexico in the
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near future and with it the injury and, in many cases, the
complete destruction of southern agricultural interests.
That few of the manufacturers are to blame for this discriminatory attack upon the farming element is plain and
we need only cite one of many resolutions passed by manufacturing organizations, prote ting against the adoption of
this compact, namely, that of the Manufacturer ' Club, of
Philadelphia:
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Whereas the Manufacturers' Club stands now, as
in the past, for adequate protection for every American industry, whether of farm, factory, or forge, mine,
or mill; and
· Whereas the so-called reciprocity agreement or
treaty with Canada is a new plan for piecemeal tariff
revision in its most objectionable form, in that it is
accomplished in secret consultation with a foreign
country rather than by open discussion and the right
of amendment by Congress; and
Whereas the provisions of the treaty are objectionable, in that they violate the principles of protection
for the American producers in all lines of industry,
and is but the first step in that free-trade propaganda
which will, if succes ful, bring the working people
of this country to the point of distress and suffering
which we endured from 1894 to 1897, hence it is as
objectionable in its matter as in the manner of its
accomplishment."
Con idering, therefore, the division of public opinion upon
the advantages and the policy of free trade with Canada, it
ems plain that the existing differences tend towards a disruption of the tariff system, whether regarded primarily as
the mean of raising revenue or in the protection of home in-

dustries.
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'Phe P1·otective ·Tariff a Political Issue; and a Non-Partisan
Consideration of Recip1·ocal Tariff Agreements is Impracticable.

Political parties in the United States, as elsewhere, perform the greatest and most essential service; for without
them a free, responsive and responsible Government would
be largely a failure.
They further public discussion, concentrate the electors
for and against public measures, pro:vide the means of selecting duly accredited candidates, and in ·turn are accountable for misgovernment or the neglect and incompetency
of those in public office.
Any movement, however well meant, which aims to dispense with party organization or a party supremacy in the
conduct of the State and Federal governments, will break
down the responsible and orderly methods of governmental
administration. Any effort, on the other hand, which seeks
to make party management more responsive and accountable
to the voters is equally meritorious.
The following paragraph, written some years ago, suggests one of the reasons for party organization in National
affairs:

pn

"rJ.1rhe Political Aspect of Federal and State Powers.

we
lie

"It is political history, of course, that, in the past,
the two leading parties have ,been divided upon what
properly constitutes the sovereign rights of the Federal and State governments, respectively.
"In the main, both parties have been justified in
making thus a permanent political issue, since in the
proper constitutional construction of the enumerated
and implied powers of the Federal Government on
the one hand and the express or reserved powers of
the States, on the other hand, depends the proper
balancing of our governmental system. The fact
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that such a system is divided into two ili.stinct
spheres of legislative action makes it very essential to the effective expression of pul;>lic opinion
that these respective powers should be and remain
in the custodianship of two equally powerful, political parties; or otherwise the election of members to
the State legislature or to the National Congress could
never, in the absence of party declarations, be determined by the concentrated support of those voters .
favoring what they believe to be the proper course
in any legislation proposing to extend or limit Federal or State powers, respectively."

,
t

The fact that, in Congress, every member is a representative of one of the two great parties, establishes beyond dispute the satisfaction of the people with this method of expre ing the popular will, while the well-known fact that
there are sufficient number of intelligent and pat1-iotic men
to overthrow their own party in case of its recreancy or misgovernment removes the peril of any continued domination
by a single party.
·
But politicttl parties, National in character, must have
policie and those based upon the conviction of its follower, or otherwise they cannot exist in a country where
principles count more than men and where results rather
than promises determine the supremacy of party rule.
Every great que tion or emergency, affecting tho public
welfare, and upon which the people are practically united .
lie., outside the realm of party politics and from the very
nature of the ca~e i unnecessary for present consideration .
But in those issues that frequently arise over the prope'~
e erci e of con titutional powers, the . maintenance of a repntatjve form of government, the wisdom of certain system · of currency and banking, the regulation of immigration, the acquisition of insular possessions, the best and
most equitable form of taxation, the protection of domestic
industrie from the injurious competition of foreign nations,
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we have examples of public controversies which may well
become a subject of party contest--and where the victory
is usually determined by the justice of the cause, or the manner in which it is presented, than through any prestige of
th~ party emblem.
In those questions of public policy in which there exists
a marked and permanent division of opinion t.heir submission to party consideration and action is usually wise
, and necessary.
President Taft has taken the position that the tariff
agreement iI?-volves no question of partisanship, and he has
_welcomed and counted upon the support of both political
parties. Yet the result must prove both a curious and disappointing one ·; for the Democratic caucus made the support of the agreement a matter of party fealty, while a majority of the President's party cast their votes against the
proposal, on the ground that it constituted an attack upon
the whole system of tariff protection, and the remaining
members of the party justified their support of the President's program on the general plea that tariff reciprocity was
a party policy. So that not a single member, on either side,
was willing to regard the question as other than a distinctly
political one and which was properly to be controlled by the
views held by the voters within the party responsible for their
presence in Congress.
In compliance with party promises and in response to
popular demand President Taft called Congress in extra session, in the spring of 1909, for the purpose of revising the
tariff. Many months of arduous labor were spent in thi
work and the bill, as flnally framed, was governed by the
idea of affording proper protection to borne industries and
at the same time creating a source of revenue demanded by
the present expenditures of the Government.
;
This act, taken as a whole, met with the cordial approval
of the President and most of the party leaders but was ap-
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patently a disappointment to many people, who, excited by
the high co t of living, have directed their hostility toward
the party in power, though the Payne Act, admitting more
than two hundred million of imports than any other
act, cannot be any cause for increasing prices. During the
framing of the bill "insurgency" developed in the ranks
of the Administration party and the President heartily endorsed the efforts to bring the revolters within the party
lines and even joined in making reprisals with this object
in view ; bowing how trong was his belief then that majority rule, within the party, was es ential to its welfare and
that of the country. If the majority of the President's party
committed an error in their revision of the tariff the party
has already uffered from it, and if they were right time will
vindicate it. This is the outcome of party rule and party
responsibility.
But when the President said in his m,essage endorsing the
Canadian tariff ibill, ''I feel that I have correctly interpreted
the wi hes of the American people in the arrangement now
. ubmitted to Congress for its approval,'' upon what authority
from hi party did he act? Not a member of Congress or a
party leader, outside of the Cabinet, was apparently con. ulted and yet the President's party in Congress has been
asked to confirm a radical revision of a recent act which the
• President was largely instrumental in having passed.
Now if a member of Congress becomes an "inrurgent"
when differing with his party colleagues upon the merits of
a tariff bill, whether acting upon his own judgment or under
authority of his con. tituents, in what position is the titular
head of the party, when, after initiating a new tariff policy
and finding it opposed by the great majority of party leaders, insi ts upon its enactment, even though it can only become a law by his political opponents making it a party
measure?
Thi rather pointed inquiry is not directed against the
President and his immediate advisers in any spirit of un-
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friendly criticism, but rather with the purpose of suggesting
that if a capable, conscientious and highly respected Chief
Executive can fall into a series of errors based upon a single
false premise, what may be expected of a successor less capable or upright?
·
The false premise, or what might be called "the angle of
error," was not at first easily discernible, but as the lines
extend the divergence becomes more apparent.
Starting with the idea that tariff reciprocity was a tresty
right and, therefore, indisput8ibly conferred upon the President of the United States, to be ,exercised iri accordance with
his conception of what was best for the National welfare, a
movement was started which has already resulted, and will
probably continue to result, in many remarkable changes
political and otherwise.
Yet in 1854 a similar reciprocal tariff agreement was made
with Canada in the form of a treaty, and neither Congres
nor the Pre,sident, at the time, regarded it as an infringement
upon the legislative power, or 3: meddling with party policies.
Twelve years later John Sherman, of Ohio, moved in the Senate for the revocation of this treaty, on the ground of its injurious effect upon the commercial interests of the Nation,
and it was agreed to.
Two marked changes have occurred since this former
treaty was rescinded and they largely account for the present
dilemma of the President. One relates to the intention of
Congress to guard more carefully its respective jurisdiction
over foreign commerce or in the raising of revenue, and the
other to the fact that the protective tariff has become a distinct and important political issue, requiring the most careful
consideration and co-operation by the party leaders. Both
of these conditions the President has wholly ignored in his
ingle-handed method of negotiating the tariff agreement
with Canada.
The extensive regulation of interstate and foreign commerce is a matter of recent date, if we may ignore the pro-
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t.ective tariff as uch a regulation, by reason of its misplaced
jurisdiction in the beginning.
With the development of this supervisory power came the
knowledge that Congress possessed a wide and most effective
method of regulating many forms of foreign and interstate
inter our e. Heretofore the various Presidents, with the concurrence of the Senate, have undertaken to regulate, by
t.reaty, much of the commerce with foreign nations, as well
as many other subjects committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress; the treaty of 1854 with Canada and that
with Japan have already been cited, while a dozen more
equally important were largely commercial in character.
But before and after the development of the commercial
power in Congress the protective tariff had become a political
i~ ue between the two great parties, and, except when ubordinated by poradic issues affecting the currency or territorial expan ion, has done more to make or break party
n cendency than any other single issue--if we ignore the
per onality of the candi.dates and confine the result to doctrinal question .
When the President became convinced that the lower
Hou e would object if the Canadian tariff agreement went to
the Senate only, he made an error, in the judgment of the
writer, by still assuming that it was a treaty,· and still another
one by assuming that it could continue to be such after it
submission to the House; while the next and most seriou.
error followed, in a suming that the Senate could pass it by
a majority vote-for while the action of the House might be
con idered mere surplusage, its consideration in the Senate
had to be in strict compliance with the constitutional requirements-if a treaty. If not a treaty then the Pre ident's
umption of power had no foundation to rest upon.
The last and perhaps most embarra sing position wa the
pledge of the President, given the Canadian Ministers, that
he would use his utmost efforts in having Congress ratify the
tariff measure. Had it been a treaty, such a di~play of Kx-
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ecutive energy might be considered as within the limits of
official propriety, but where the agreement had neither the
sanction of law nor any party endorsement, the promise wa
in the nature of "a gentleman's agreement'' and can hardly
be regarded as binding upon Congress or the basis of an
extra session.
These positions were all the result of attempting to make
a tariff bill under the guise of a treaty-a prevailing practice
that had escaped detection until the Cuban reciprocity treaty
~vas under consideration, at an extra session of Congress called
by President McKinley.
Collectively these several steps largely concern the legality
of the measure and with this we have already dealt sufficiently.
When, however, the subject is looked at from the standpoint of an orderly and well-considered method of putting ·
into effect a political doctrine, believed in and heretofore
receiving the earnest support of the President, the result of
his negotiating a tariff agreement brings us back to what
was the text of this chapter, viz: The impracticability of
treating a revision of the tariff as a .non-partisan matter.
It has brought confusion upon both the parties, demoralized the average citizen in his party allegiance and left the
country to await the settlement of a controversy, indefinit.€
as to time _and uncertain in its results.
In the final effort of the President to bring a, reluctant
enate to the point of seeing its duty in carrying out the
President's program, Representative McCall, the· foster-father
of the Tariff compact, on February 18th, gave out an official
jnterview, after returning from the White House, and, among
other things, he said :

"I ibelieve Republican Senators are gradually coming to tealize that, with the certain :prospect of an
extra session, unless they bring the reciprocity bill to
a vote there will be very serious inconvenience and
embarrassment, if not danger, to the business and
industrial enterprises that are really entitled to pro-
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tection. The President feel that he is under an
international obligation to ummon an extra session.·
He will do thi reluctantly, becau e it is bringing into
power a Democratic House and a Senate much inore
nearly Democratic than the present Senate. But if
the Senate should fail to act the President feels that
under his agreement with the Canadian goyernment
to use his utmost endeavor to have the reciprocity
agreement confirmed, he will be compelled to call the
session immediately.

*

*
*
*
*
*
"But what an extr:a se ion is likely to mean, is a
constant agitation and a continuous investigation into
the indu tries that are made possible by protection
and interference with their business that bodes no
good for bu iness at large. The consequence is that
if any one should prevent action on the reciprocity
bill he would be in the po ition of helping to })ring
about a condition most injurious to those industries
which really need protection. What follows in an
*

extm se88ion will not be the President/ s fault."
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Here, then, ·i the predi tion of confu ion in bu.-ines · and
in Congre . The final stat ment that it is not the President' fault carries the nece ' ary implication thai it will be
the fault of Congr if the e unfortunate conditions ari e.
Had the making of a reciprocal tariff law with Canada
been left to Congre s, the e po ible troubles could not have
arisen. But with the party leaders unable to define or control
the i ue and with each party clearly divided upon the legal
right and the policy of tariff legislation, it ought to be plain
that the Pre ident' effort to treat the pre ent i ue a nonpolitical mu t nece arily be a failure.
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The Extra ession and the Canadian Tariff Agreement.
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On March 4th, 1911, the PTe 'ident called Congre in extra
·on, for a econd time during his term, to consider a re. ·on of the tariff.
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On the first occasion the call was issued at the request of
the President's party, expressed in the platform upon which
he was elected, and was for the purpose of readjusting and
equalizing the existing duties in accordance with the cornmercial needs of the country and the revenue requiremen~
of the Federal government.
The present call for an extra· session was based partly upon
the President's conception of changes desired by the people
and partly upon the fact that he had officially pledged bis
utmost efforts towards the confirmation of the agreement at
the previous session · of · Congress and had failed in such
efforts.
In the message assembling Congress in extra session, ou
April 4th, is the following:
"Whereas a bill to carry into effect said aq,-eement
has passed the House of Representatives, but has
failed to reach a vote in the Senate; and
"Whereas the agreement stipulates not only that
the President of the United States will communicate
t-0 Congress the conclusions now reached and recommends the adoption of such legislation as may be
necessaJ'y on the part of the United States to give
effect to the proposed arrangement ibut also that the
governments of the two countries will u.se their utmost
efforts to bring about such changes by concurrent
legislation at Washington and Ottawa."
Since the McCall bill passed the House and was refused
consideration in the Senate, then largely composed of the
members of the President's party, the measure now comes
before a Congress with the lower House largely made up of
members committed against the legality and-the policy of a
protective tariff and before a Senate leaning somewhat in
the same direction but with a majority favoring a protective
tariff.
On March 10th the President in an address at Atlanta,
before the Commercial Congress, concluded his remarks with
a special plea for the adoption of "this treaty," where he said:
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"1 do not ask your support on the ground of any
local advantage. I ask it because I regard this treaty,
if adopted, as the beginning of a new relation between
our rapidly growing neighbor on the north and ourelve which will inure greatly to the benefit of both."
The accuracy of the prophecy need not be considered now.
But the difference between a treaty, made by the President
and ratified by the Senate, and an act, passed by Congress
and approved by the President, is a fundamental one, and
represents no less difference in kind than the difference between an act of Congress and a decree or judgment of the
upreme Court. Yet with Congress now called in extra
ion we still find the President calling this compact a
treaty and still insisting upon its ·passage by the House as
a bill.
But equally important are several other statements of the
Pre ident in his Atlanta address:
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"Of course, the greatest disappointment of the session was the failure of the Senate to follow the lead
of the House in ratifying the recipocity agreement
made with Canada.
"When we entered upon the negotiations, I authorized the Secretary of State and his commissioners
to offer free trade in everythting, but this Canada
could not grant us, because she has a protective system, and he was afraid of the competition of our
better organized industries.''
After the House had set such a splendid example of reponsiveness, doubtless becau e given the rare opportunity
of ratifying a t:reaty, the Executive disappointment was, of
cour e, keen, when the Senate failed t-0 ratify it also--especially when accorded an equally rare privilege of doing so
by less than the constitutional majority heretofore required
in the ratification of any ordinary treaty.
Through an extra session the Senate is now given a, chance
to redeem itseJf, by showing a more prompt disposition "to
follow the lead of the House," in just how to ratify a treaty.
8-V
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When the President says, "I auth01ized the Secretary of
State and his commissioners to offer free trade in everything," the question again arises where he, an executive officer, got the power to authorize free trade between the two
nations; and the country in entire ignorance of the proposition until months later. Upon this point the President
preserves silence. Free trade in everything, means no protection in anything, and no revenue from anything. Rather
a remarkable executive power to have endorsed by a legi
lative body supposed to be exclusively authorized to deal with
these matters.
That the President is not alone in his worry over the fulfillment of liis pledge or the manner in which he must use
his administrative influences to bring about the adoption of
the joint compact will appear from the following press di11 patch from Ottawa:
"Ottawa, March 4.-President Taft'~ immedia.te call
for ·a n extra session of Congress in April puts a new
face on the reciprocity situation. * * *
"The action of President Taft considerably relieves
the awkward situation created here iby the failure of
the Senate to endorse the agreement. The Liberal
majority at Ottawa today declare that Mr. Taft has
made good, for his government, the joint agreement
that each party to the bargain should use its best
endeavors to secure legislative approval of the reciprocity pact and consequently they assert that the
Canadian government rrvust fortlvwith c·o mpel ratification by Parliament."
While the American people may not be amazed at the
administrative branch of an Imperialistic Government compelling the legislative branch to get in line with the wisbe.,
of its Premier, yet it ought to seem a little strange to have
the same thing done in this country by one of the most
considerate and upright Executives that we have ever had.
It only goes to prove, what was stated at the beginning, that
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''the angle of error" was originally unnoticed. But is it .n ot
growing more apparent? Perhap it i an obtuse angle.
If the tariff must be considered again, it should be carefully tudied and should be settled upon a logical and comprehensive basis, for the public interests cannot endure repeated alterations in the tariff or the suspense of. prolonged
uncertainty.
The two great parties, at the pre ent time, are of nearly
equal strength. Each tand for a wholly different theory
in the purposes for which a Federal tax may be impo ed
upon imports; one believe that a tax or duty may be intentionally levied for the protection of domestic industry, as a
regulation of commerce with foreign nations authorized by
the Constitution, just as a tax may also be levied, under
another provi ion of the Con titution, for the sole purpose of
rai ing revenue; the other party ibelieves that any and every
tnx muQt be primarily for revenue and that any law imposing
a tax for the regulation of foreign commercial intercourse
i. invalid and a flagrant disregard of the organic law.
The is ue therefore is perfectly defined and has been o
for years.
ff the majority of the people of this country, after mature
eon ideration, now believe that duties should only be levied
for revenue and that the Federal government posse e no
power to regulate destructive foreign competition by du tie ·
o adjusted as to equalize the difference in the cost of production at home and abroad, or, if they believe that the time
has now come when the protective system can safely be
abandoned, then Congress, whenever it is elected to represent
uch view , hould proceed to alter the tariff accordingly.
But this cannot be done justly and according to any hone t
sy tern, by breaking down the protective barrier on the northern boundary of the United States or by revising everal
schedule affecting the woolen and cotton industrie of the
ew England State .
It must be done by an orderly and comprehensive plan.
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Piecemeal revision is as illogical as it is dangerous. While
the greatest of buildings are constructed piece by piece, imag•
ine the appearance 'a nd usefulness of one where no architectural plan had been prepared in advance or used during
the process of erection.
Undoubtedly it is an easy and slipshod way to revise the
tariff by schedules, but that doesn't mean that it is the proper
way, or that when the entire work is finished the result will
be satisfactory to its authors or to the people.
.
The Jacksonville, Fla., Times-Union, of March 6th, in a
long and well-con_sidered editorial upon "The duty of the
Democrats," offers the following advice:
"The Democrats should ~roceed at once to reduce
the tariff, and Canadian reciprocity should wait until
the new tariff is enacted. Until this is done no one
can know what concessions are being made. It would
be great folly to base a reciprocity agreement on concessions from a tariff that is about to be repealed.
"And it would be worse than folly-it would be
treason-to accept Canadian reciprocity instead of
general tariff reform. The Democrats were elected
on their promise to reduce the tariff-not on the idea
that they would accept the program of a party repudiated at the polls. If the Democrats do not reduce the
tariff at the earliest possible date they will betray the
people who elected them on their promise that they
would reduce it."
If the Democratic party believes in a tariff for revenue
only, if it believes that its growing ascendency is based upon
the popular support of this party doctrine, then the advice
of one of its leading organs has the merit of sincerity and the
warning of a friend.
The Republican party, until the apparent division over the
Canadian compact, has always stood for the protection of
every domestic industry, whether of the soil or the factory,
when of -a character warranting development and protection.
This policy is rejected by its opponent and any compromise
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upon thi i ue is evidence of insincerity or a cowardice based
upon uncertainty in the justice of the cause.
The plea that the removal of protective duties mu t be
gradual is largely without merit, a there is hardly a manufacturing industry that cannot withstand either free trade
or a reduced tariff, if the country is prepared to accept lower
wages, longer hours of labor and a greatly reduced cale of
puiblic and private expenditures. It is not now the case of
"pampered favorites," "robber barons" and "specially prot cted interests," for these slogans of the campaign orator
can no longer pretend to represent the situation, however
much the earlier industries profited and grew, when . hielded
from the blight of a deadly and merciless competition with
t.be then powerful nations of the Old World, for it i now the
entire system of American prosperity, erected upon industrial succe s, that is at stake.
Thaddeus Stevens, as long ago as 1852, aid in a speech
before Congress :
"I have heard of but two modes suggested to enable
the manufacturers of this country to compet~ with
Europe. The one is to lay a duty on foreign importation equal to the difference between the cost of the
article in Europe and the cost of the same article here.
The other is to reduce the price of American labor
to the a.verage price of labor in Europe."
For most manufacturing industries this still holds goodexcept that the wage scale and the hours of labor would be
more affected. With unlimited capital and with millions of
, killed and intelligent workmen-who must starve if they
will not work-it is easy to see that the manufacturer, in
<'a e of free trade, would have little difficulty in finding cheap
labor and thus be enabled to compete with his foreign rivals.
With the agriculturalist it would probably be different, for in
many cases foreign conditions could not be duplicated. Just
how the labor leaders feel-representing the largest class of
food consumers in the country-is shown by the following

protest:
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CONGRESS OF THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR,
GENERAL OFFICE, 667 STATE STREET
ALBANY, N. Y., February 11, 1911.
FRANCIS E .. WARREN,
Unitedi State8 Senate, Washington, D. C.
DEAR Srn: We would respectfully solicit _your cooperation to defeat the passage of the McCall bill,
which seeks to enact into law the reciprocity agreement entered into between the Department of State
and the Canadian Government, as any downward revision of the tariff such as this agreement propose!
would be unjust to both the manufacturing and agricultural interests of the United States, and would
ultimately mean one of two things--the closing of
American factories , mills, and workshops, or the
American workmen will have to accept a reduction
in wages to correspond with those paid in foreign
countries.
Faithfully yours,

Hon.
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CONGRESS OF THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR,
MANSION, Secretary and Treasurer.

J. R.

Honesty is the Best PolitiC8.
The Democratic party, to its credit, has usually stood for
a strict compliance with constitutional limitations, and
against any transfer or usurpation of authority vested exclusively in the separate branches of the Government. It
has often been a wholesome check upon any too rapid ex-,
pansion of Federal power, even though, at times, it may have
hampered the Government in matters in which it was within
its right. But a Federal power improperly withheld will
come in time, where such a. power improvidently granted i,
eldom relinquished.
Therefore, it may be proper to ask: when this 1,ariff agreement once more comes from the Executive Mansion to the
House, will the Democrats ratify it as a treaty or enact it, in
the customary way, as a bill?
Among such party members are some of the ablest constitutioMl lawyers in the Nation. Are they willing to surrender
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their convictions of law simply because this Executive measure i in line with the tariff reform advocated by their party?
How any member of this party can justify an Executive
tariff agreement and yet declare to be unconstitutional or
unworthy of consideration, a.ny measure or any information
prepared by a Congressional Tariff commission, would seem
to require explanation. A good article may have a defective
title and therefore be incapable of legal transfer. Are they
willing to be a go-between in forwarding to the Senate an
illegal Executive compact? The Democratic platform in
1892 denounced the McKiriley tariff as the "culminating
atrocity of class legislation.'' In 1904 protection was declared
to 1be "a robbery of the many to enrich the few." While one
of the earliest declarations on this subject was:

;n

"Justice and sound policy forbid the Federal Government to cherish the interests of one portion to the
injury of another portion of our common country."
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Con equently the logic of the ituation would require the
defeat of the Canadian compact by the member of both
partie in Congress--for one believe that this tariff agreement ha been improvidently negotiated and that it de troy~
the autonomy of the protective system, while the other party
recognizing, too, usurpation by the Executive, also believes
that all tariff dutie should be imposed impartially for revenue, and, therefore, any revision by a purely ectional mea ure i unju t to the class subjected to free trade while all the
other intere ts or sections continue under the old law and,
eon quently, until the tariff is revised systematically, free
trade in one general cla of products affecting one section
of the country would be unjust.
If however the Democratic party believe in a revision by
separate chedules, then, (1) in order to show it is not actuated by political animo ity towards the northern farmer and
(2) in order that all agri<7Ultural prod!ucts should go on the
free lUst at the same time, it should immediately undertake
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the passage of a measure giving Mexico free trade in her
products with the United States. If the southern agriculturists should object to this, surely the answer ought not be
that because of cheaper wages and a lower cost of production
in Mexico, as compared with Canada, the competition would
be more destructive, for this argument--sound as it is-necessarily recognizes the important fact that the retention
or removal of a tax is to be made dependent upon the cost
of foreign production-and this should end the controversy
between the two parties-for upon this proposition the Republicans rest their case.
Any party that "plays politics" upon a great question of
public concern, and which is only political in the sense that
it has been committed to so-called political parties becam~e
of the divergent views of the voters thereon, will, sooner or
later, pay the penalty. And this is said without either of
the contending parties being particularly in view.
For, aside from the honor and the emoluments of holding
office, practically every great problem committed to party
action by the people is non-political in the results sought to
be achieved, and the necessity for party existence and party
activity, while it justifies a partisan segregation of the voters
and the creation of an efficient agency for carrying into effect
the prevailing sentiment, should never be regarded as a reason for party existence alone. As mediums for ascertaining
and putting into effect the kind of government desired by
the people of the United States they are of great value, just
as their purposes may be wholly perverted if legislation is
passed to selfishly bene'fit the adherents of a party becau.se of
such allegiance, or to injure party opponents because of their
opposition to a policy advocated by the dominant party.
The next conflict upon this economic issue ought to be
clearly defined and this can only be done by each party
standing by its position.
Better defeat than injustice or insincerity, for in either
case the party guilty of either sin can have but a temporary
dominancy in the management of National affairs.
·
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Action of the Home.
Abdieation of Legwlative Fwrwtions a Matter of Fact and
Not of Form.

It has been contended by some that whe;n the House, at
the close of the l~t session, ratified the Canadian tariff compact under a cloture rule, it committed a tactical blunder,
because precisely the same result could have been achieveJ
under caucus instructions and, therefore, it would have been
possible to have kept out of the legislative record the fact
that the Executive tariff agreement was adopted under a
rule expressly designed to prevent any changes therein. This
seems to go upon the assumption that the question of the
bona fide exercise of legislative authority can be successfully concealed by the latent manner of its abdication and
not by the fact of its abdication.
Who made the Canadian compact in its entirety-who
insists upon its ratification in its entirety, 1md what body is
called upon to thus ratify it? Neither legal sophistry nor
the blandishment'3 of the Executive can befog the issue suggested above. As said before, the right of the House, either
by party caucus or by the adoption of a cloture rule, to pass
a tariff bill covering a multitude of subjects so as to possibly
avoid a series of separate amendments · that would finally rerult in a measure unsatisfactory to the majority, is a parliamentary right possessed by the Hou e and frequently and
properly exerci ed by it. But the constitutional power to
ratify a tariff agreement made by the President and foreign
conferees, either under a cloture rule or party caucus, /01·
the purpose of avoiding amendments that would otherwise
have been made by the majority of the House, is an entirely
different proposition-because the confirmatjon of the President's action is at the direct expense of the legislative dominancy of the House. The difference' between the House
using its power to pass a bill satisfactory to the majority of
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its members is fundamentally different from the proposition of using the same power to carry into effect a tariff
agreement satisfactory only to the President. For in one
case the procedure is to effect the will of Congress and in the
other, the will of the President.
Therefore it matters not, in a constitutional sense, whether
the majority vote cast in favor of the Canadian agreement
was by members who voted to adopt a cloture rule as the evidence of their intention to formally ratify the compact or
it was made up of members who agreed to surrender their
discretionary powers under a caucus rule to vote down all
amendments because such changes would destroy the President's agreement; even though the proffered amendment
actually represented their own desires.
When the time comes that Congress is willing that tariff
legislation of the Executive--carrying hundreds of change:
in existing law-should be accepted and ratified, it is no
excuse that the adoption was effected by a party caucus and
by personal pledges of ratification given to the President instead of under a cloture rule. For free agency is determined by the means possessed for its expression and not by
the means taken for its repression. The idea that legislative
sovereignty includes legislative abdication would seem preposterous were we not now confronted with this very situation.
Any rule, agreement, or understanding, whereby Congress confirms, consents to, ratifies or attempts to authorize
the President of the United States to make tariff laws is es'sentially wrong and when by such concurrence or authorization Congress undertakes to put in statutory form tariff
changes admittedly differing from those it would otherwise
have enacted upon its own initiative, it comes dangerously
near constituting a conspiracy to destroy the two most important and exclusive functions possessed by it: ( 1) the
power to originate, raise and expend the Federal revenues
and (2) the power to regulate all commercial intercourse
with all the foreign nations of the world.
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When any rule or caucus agreement is for the sole purpose
of protecting an Executive tariff compact from any legislative action expressive of the views of a majority of that body,
and when uch rule or caucus agreement effects this purpose,
the more the ulterior means employed the more significant
the fact that Congress believes an abdication of its jurisdiction i le objectionable when done clandestinely than when
done openly.
John Quincy Adam , then a Representative in Congres , aid when opposing a resolution forbidding the rereption of petitions concerning the existence of slavery in
the District of Columbia, "You cannot nullify the constitutional right of petition by a resolution adopted by a maJority of this House"; so now, it may be said with equal
truth the right and duty of the House of Representatives
to originate and maintain the tariff laws of the United States,
whether for the purposes of revenue or protection, cannot
he waived or abandoned by the vote of a majority of its
members.
But the question may be asked, What is the remedy if
.uch a vote be passed? The an wer is that the validity of a
.o-called treaty, based upon a disregard of constitutional
limitation , can be judicially tested, under the new Code
Congre has recently passed, which provides, among other
things, that a direct appeal may be taken to the Supreme
Court "in any case in which the constitutionality of any
law of the United States, or the validity or construction of
any treaty made under its authority is 1,n question."
If the Supreme Court would unquestionably declare unron titutional an act of Congress undertaking to delegate
legislative power to the President to originate revenue
measures and to make regulations of commerce with foreign
nations, subject to its formal approval or rejection, then
why should not the same court declare that the President
when unsupported even by an attempted delegation of legis~
lative power, is equally incompetent to make revenue and
tariff compacts with foreign countries?
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Can it be that the less the visible authority to do a thing
the greater becomes the difficulty of the court in restraining such increased usurpation of authority? ·
Duty of the Senate.

Should the Canadian compact again come before the
Senate for consideration, it may, without stultification, oocept the House measure as one originating therein, for even
if the House were unwilling to maintain its exclusive right
to originate revenue bills, it would be most unusual for the
upper branch to reject the measure upon the supposition
that the House had violated the most specific and important
mandate in the Constitution in so far as any of its distinctive
powers are concerned.
But any courteous assumption by the Senate that the
House had faithfully observed the requirements of the Constitution would be rendered worse than meretricious if it
then proceeded to disregard its own constitutional duties in
a manner more objectionable than in the case of the lower
branch.
The Constitution provides:
"All bills for raising revenue sh..all originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate 'ml1IY propose or concur with amendments as on other l>illi'
( Art. 1, sec. 7).
Possibly on no occasion, and certainly not in many years,
has the Senate passed a tariff bill, affecting hundreds of
items, without making numerous and important amendments thereto.
Therefore, when the Canadian tariff measure is considered by the Senate it cannot have any limitation'S p la,ced
11,pon its rig ht to make amendments that are germane to
such tariff legislation, pro1Jided it regards the measure as
a tariff bill originating in the House. Consequently the 1'1
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jection of any and all amendments, upon the sole ground
that they would vitiate the tariff compact made by the President of the United States with the Dominion of Canada,
would place the Senate in exactly the same position as the
Hou e--except that such abandonment of legislative control
would suggest its knowledge of, and its willingness to endorse, the House's previous surrender of its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, should the Senate regard the international agreement as a treaty in o far as its own jurisdiction
is concerned, then the necessity of confirming it by a twothird. vote is absolutely mandatory.
Either of these dilemmas should be met with that courage
and that fidelity which have so often given the Senate the
reputation for great care and deliberation in all matters
affecting the con titutional power of the different branches
of the Government.
The absence of a cloture rule or caucus action does not,
of cour e, relieve the individual members of the Senate in
the lighte t degree from the duty of faithfully observing all
the fundamental divisions of constitutional power-whatever may be the present temptation to make political capital,
or whatever may be the nature and extent of the Administ.rative pre ure, when candidly using its "utmost efforts" to
have the joint compact ratified. The combination of such
untoward influences would not be in keeping with the dignity and independence of the Senate of the United States-wholly aside from the illegality or benefit of the Executive
compact.
While, as has been sugge ted, the Senate may ordinarily
a.sume that the House of Representatives has complied with
a11 the constitutional requirements affecting its particular
juri diction, yet it would be carrying that presumption too
far if the Senate has reason to believe that any measure
roming from the House is invalid either by an infirmity
affecting its origin or because it was otherwise unconstitutional. For, unless the defect can he cured in the Senate
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by amendment, it is its bounden duty to reject the measuresince it would be an idle proceeding for the Senate to comply with its own jurisdiction when it had knowledge that
the measure was already void by reason of an incurable def ect arising in the lower branch. The Senate is largely an
approving or corrective body, in its relation to the House,
and few more important reasons exist for the maintenance of
the second branch. Indeed, no duty rises higher than that
imposed upon the Senate of seeing that Congress, as a
whole, observes and maintains the form of government e.itablished under the Constitution of the United State~.
Since the present pamphlet went to press, President Taft,
at a banquet of the American Newspaper Association in New
York, again declared, in the most positive way, that the
Canadian compact was a treaty, and this notwithstanding
the fact that the Canadian government is constitutionally
disqualified from entering into such a treaty, or that the
House possesses no right to ratify a treaty, even though it
were lawfully entered into by Canada. Among other statements the President made the following:

"This treaty provides for free trade in all agricultural products and in rough lumber down to the
point of planing."
"We tendered to the Canadian Commissioners absolute free trade in all products of either country,
either manufactured or natural."
"After the contract has been tentatively agreed
upon by those authorized to make contracts for ratification in both governments," &c.
"* * * but to put such a provision in a Canadian treaty and then have it opera~ as a free list for
the entire world, is legislation necessarily ill-considered."
"If objection can be made to the treaty on the
ground that a particular class derive leRR benefit,"
etc.
"There is one way"-if any class ''believes itself
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injuriously affected by this treaty-and that is to try
it on."
"Those of us who a,re responsible for the Canadian
treaty * * * are willmg to subject it to that
kind of a test."

If the Senate--yielding to the continuously reiterated as88rtions of the President that the compact is a treaty-feels
disqualified from making amendments-and then and thereupon declines to confirm it by a two-thirds vote-what would
it mean? For if a treaty it would be illegally ratified by a
majority vote, and if not a treaty, the withholding of amendments because regarded as a compact exactly similar to a
treaty-puts the situation outside of the realms of logic.
If the President cannot make tariff treaties with any foreign nation, and if, in particular, he cannot make any kind
of ·a treaty with a dependency of Great Britain, commercial
or otherwise, why does the President persist in calling this
agreement a treaty? And, regarding it as a treaty, why was
it sent to the House, or how can the President later approve
and ign it as a bill?
Again, should the Senate consider the eompact in .executive session and confirm it by a two-thirds vote as a treaty,
will the· President then be relieved of approving it as a bill
when presumably passed by the House as such?
Such queries are only for the purpose of again pointing
out the hybrid character of the measure, and how utterly
hopele becomes any intelligent demarkation between
treaties and acts, if such irreconcilable methods receive the
joint approval of Congress and the President.
President Taft, in his various public addresses, advocating the Canadian agreement, seems to assume that the only
controversy relates to the commercial advantages or disadvantage of the so-called treaty.
While it is entirely proper for the members of both
branches of Congress to argue pro and con regarding the
commercial effect of free trade with Canada, yet such argu-
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. ments, when made by those representing particular classes
of producers or consumers, usually -ignore the more important question of the greatest good to the greatest number; so
that the purely commercial results of the situation ought to
be judged by considering both sides of the question. Upon
uch an issue of fact the writer does not undertake to pM!
judgment.
When the ,President said in his New York address, quoted
above, that he was "willing," as the one responsible for the
Canadian treaty, "to try it on" the Northern farmer, it not
only suggests the idea that he has discovered a good thing,
but that the accuracy of his business acumen is the onl!·
thing at stake. Undoubtedly fifteen millions of farmer~ nrc
wondering whether he is mistaken and an equal" or greater
number of food consumers in the cities are wondering
whether he is right. Yet, in the writer's belief, this monetary question is a transitory one, for it largely affects the political prestige of one individual or that of his party. The
making or breaking of commercial prosperity, important as
it may be until later rectified, falls into insignificance with
the accept~d perversion of our system of government and the
impairment of party responsibility.
The great questions that stand out, and that should over.shadow all others, are :
A. Constitutional Power-

(1) The right of the President to originate revenue measures subject to the formal approval of Congress;
(2) The right of the President to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, including the system of tariff protection,
subject to the ratification of Congress;

(3) The extension generally of the treaty-making power
to cover subjects committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of
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(I) The propriety of allowing the President t-0 take upon
himself the responsibility of preparing complicated tariff
agreements and adopting them in toto;
(2) The delineation, by the President, of party policies
affecting doctrines committed by the people to equally powerful political organizations, and upon which the division i~
one of principle rather than of immediate profit or loss.
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Yet before these important questions of authority and
of policy can be satisfactorily considered, the Senate must
first decide whether the Canadian compact comes before it
, fi bill or as a treaty; for upon thi wholly depends th
right of amendment on the one hand, or, on the other, the
number of votes required to pass or approve the measure in
case it be a bill or a treaty. Until the constitutional chmracter of the measure is settled all other questions are subordinate. ·
If the Canadian agreement proves to be generally beneficial-so much more will it strengthen the assumed right
of the President to originate and force through Congress
any kind of commercial bargains that individual conception
or alien advisers may suggest, and so much more will it authorize the titular head of every dominant party to add to,
alter or discard the political doctrines upon which he was
elected or desires to stand for re~election.
The confusion of constitutional powers and the demoralisation in political parties are now apparent to every disinterested observer. No one--not even the President--haa
attempted to classify the respective jurisdiction of Congresi,
and the Executive in this international compact; while we
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find a majority of the party followers of the Administration voting against the agreement in both branches of Congress and its approval depending wholly upon the votes of
party opponents, who declare that their political support is
given for the purpose of eventually destroying the entire
system of tariff protection.
The New York Times, the able organ of the Eastern importers, in a long editorial endorsing the President's political independence ·and his business sagacity, says:
"The Canadian Premier and the American Presi. dent are alike and equally agreed that on this issue
they will not surrender, or dodge, or compromise."
- Yet the earnest effort of those in the Canadian Parliament
to protect their growing manufacturing industries from the
better organized and wealthier corporations in this country,
and the effort of those in the American Congress to protect not only the extended agricultural interests but to
maintain intact the general system of tariff protection, a.re
now regarded by · many supporte_rs of alleged reciprocity es
a mere contest between the administrative and legislative
branches of the two governments. It is such a contest, but
the fact that legislative sovereignty and the maintenance of
party principles constitutes the real basis of the controversy
seems to be lost sight of by those who assume that it is
simply a commercial controversy and not likewise, in its
more serious aspect, a constitutional controversy.
Therefore it matters not, in the slightest degree, whether
a national lawmaker believes in free trade, tariff for revenue
only, or for protection-he ought certainly be satisfactorily
convinced that the President possesses the constitutional
powe:r, and that it is sound in policy, of making secret tariff
treaties or trade agreements with foreign countries, and that
such an'international compact can be validated by the .formal
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concurrence of both Houses, under a denial of desirable
amendments and by a majority vote.
Unless so convinced it simply means that commercial or
political upremacy, rather than the supremacy of the Fed. eral Constitution, is the real test that should determine the
ratification of this tariff compact.
As the New York Times significantly said, neither the
President nor the Premier, representing the administrative
branches of the two governments, "will surrender, or dodge,
or compromise."
What will be the answer of the American Senate and that
of the Dominion Parliament to this issue of an arbitrary
and illimitable Executive dominancy in legislative matters
of fundamental importance?*
*Vid App ndix for a further discussion of Executive powers.
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• ore Publicity Needed in Negotiating Treatte•· and
in Their Approval by the Senate.
Our Government was modeled, so far as it followed any
form, after that of -Great Britain. For a long period the
power to make treaties was lodged in the Crown, and because Parliament seldom met, and for other reasons, it was
necessary then that the Crown should have much more power
than was amply sufficient for it later on. Gradually this
power passed into the hands of the Cabinet and a parliamentary committee. The fact that Great Britain could be
committed to all kinds of important international obligations, without either Parliament or the country being consulted, became the source of much complaint by the leading
English publicists, who have contended; from time to time,
that even an autocratic government cannot safely withhold
all inform·ation or any right of consideration from the people.
Mr. Bagehot, who has been in his grave upwards of thirty
years, said in his work on the English Constitution :
"If we require that in some form the assent of
Parliament shall be given to treaties, we should have
a real discretion prior to the making of such treaties.
We should have the reasons for the treaty plainly
stated, and also the reasons against it. At present we
have seen the discussion is unreal. The thing is done
and cannot be altered, and what is said often ought
not to be said, because it is captious, and what is not
said ought as often to be said, because it is material.
We should have a manlier and plainer way of dealing with foreign policy if ministers were obliged to
explain clearly their foreign contracts before they
were voted, just as they have to explain their domestic
proposals before they become laws."
(77)

'18
What was then said has greater pertinency now, especially in a nation where the reticence of old-world diplomacy has never been greatly favored.
Following the custom of the past, President Taft, by construing the tariff agreement with Canada as a treaty, in a
jurisdictional sense, at no time during the negotiations gave
out any information by which either Congress or the people
could anticipate the outcome of such proceedings.
It may be well, however, to consider the situation from the
viewpoint of the President, in so far as the legality of the
power is concerned, in order to discuss the propriety of methods long sanctioned by usage.
In all international agreements dealing with commerce
and navigation, with the tariff and customs duties, with the
regulation of immigration, ~ere is every reason for a wide
publicity, not only because of such agreements possibly infringing upon exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, but because
in a republic the p~ople are entitled to have all the advance
information consistent with the occasion.
True, under the Consti~tion, the President has the exclusive right to make treaties, and the Senate a similar right
to confirm or reject the same, yet there is nothing in the organic law inviting or endorsing secret and confidential negotiation of treaties or their equally secret confirmation in an
executive session of the Senate.
The writer has already intimated tha~ the Japanese treaty
of 1894 contained a number of provisions conflicting with
the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, and we may assume
that the same provisions appear in the new treaty recently
ratified by the Senate, except that relating to immigration.
The following extract, from a correspondent of a responsible New York paper, throws considerable light upon the
·situation:
"WASHINGTON, Feb. 24.-The Senate in executive
session late this afternoon ratified the treaty between
the United States and Japan. The injunction of
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secrecy was not removed from the treaty by order of
the Senate, but i~ contents are well known. No formal rollrcall was had on the motion to ratify. The
vote was practically unanimous.
"The Western Senators who have been exhibiting
a curiosity to know more about the provisions of the
convention expressed themselves today as being willing to accept the assurances given by members of the
Foreign Relations Committee that the treaty carried
no new concessions to Japan in the matter of regulation of immigra~on. Some of the Western Senators
expressed a desire to have the treaty modified in a W(JJJJ
that would make more specific the regulations concerning the coming of Japanese laborers into the
United States, but when they were told that it was
practically impossible to amend the treaty they accepted the situation and allowed it to be ratified in
the form in which it was sent to the Senate."

That the Japanese treaty was confirmed, under the conditions detailed above, is noticeable rather for the apparent
failure to comply with a strict constitutional requirement
than in following the custom of executive secrecy. If there
was no formal roll-call, then there was no formal record of the
action necessary to establish the approval of the treaty by a
two-thirds vote of those present. It was never intended that ·
the ear of the presiding officer should decide the number of
affirmative votes or that by the same means he should estimate how many present declined to vote, in order to compute the proportion; while in the future, aside from the
memory of the living, there is no way to prove that the
constitutional number of votes were recorded in favor of the
treaty, or in what way each member vo~d, if he voted at all.
Laws affecting two great nations ought not be passed in this
manner.
Possibly there are times--but extremely rare-when a
treaty should be confidentially nego~ated and later approved in executive session ; and on such occasions the President and the Senate may be trusted to exercise a sound dis-
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cretion; but that there is any justification for m~ntaining
secrecy in all cases would seem ridiculous were we no~ ac-customed to such methods for more than a hundred years.
Suppose Congress always heard witnesses behind closed
doors, that it introduced and approved its laws in executive
session, leaving the public to find out by guess-work what
took place? Yet there is just as much au~ority, ~r ji:m as
little, in the Constitution authorizing such methods by Congress as those in vogue in the making of treaties.
Once more Mr. Bagehot may be quoted with benefit:

"I am disposed to deny entirely that there can be
any treaty for which adequate reasons cannot be given
to the English people, which the English people ought
to make. A great deal of the re~icence of diplomacy
had, I think history shows, much better be spoken
out."
Just as the growing complexity of interstate commerce
finally compelled Congress to create a permanent and independent commission of its own, for the regulation of thiB
kind of intercourse and just as in the future it must create
a somewhat similar commission dealing with non-commercial intercourse, so ought Congress now to create its own
agencies to deal specifically with reciprocal tariffs, the regulation of immigration, international quarantine and like
subjects coming un der the control of Congress ; for the approval of compacts made or suggested by its authorized
agents is a different proposition, legally and practically,
from the ratification of unauthorized E xecutive agreements
or tl'eaties containing subjects primarily committed to the
determination of Congress.
Such a future method of regulating the tariff, commerce, quarantine, and immigration may be a departure
from the ancient customs; but it has the merit not only of
conforming with the kind of government enumerated in the
Constitution but with the kind of government demanded by
a free and intelligent people.
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But whenever international relations are best regulated
and afeguarded by treaty compacts, then there should be a
change in the present method of making (o!eign contracts
that hereafter become "the supreme law of the land."
Custom has heretofore justified the President in the secret
negotiation of all treatie , and, as the Constitution only provide that "two-thirds of the Senators prresent concur," therefore, theoretically at least, the President possesses the extraordinary power of making a secret treaty which may become
effective upon the equally secret approval of two Senators out
of three present at the time of its confirmation.
If, as uniformly held by the Supreme Court, a treaty
may repeal an act of Congre , then the President and a few
enator could secretly make and confirm a treaty allowing
the 'free entry of the Mongolian race into the United States-the existing exclusion laws and the wishes of the people of
the Western States to the contrary notwithstanding. Of
course, such an extreme case would never occur, for neither
the President nor any group of Sena.tors would ever be a
party to such a proceeding-however strictly constitutional
might be their action.
But this very elasticity of the treaty-making power,
coupled with the prevailing methods in negotiating and approving treaties, suggests the propriety of greater publicity
when entering into such international obligations.

Conflicting Acts and Treaties.
The confusion arising over the conflict of laws of different
governmental origin, such as Federal and State, may often
involve difficult constitutional questions; but where one is a!\
act of Congre , and the other a treaty, the confusion is often
due, seemingly, to the disregard of the purposes and limitation that should determine the character of each.
There is no need of considering here the inviolability of
treaties, since the right of every nation to abrogate the same,
11-v
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·whenever, by reason of unforeseen changes the continuance
of such a treaty threatens its sovereignty or existence, is now
well recognized in international law. But an effort to reconcile conflicting laws and preserve the supremacy of each,
presents a different situation.
In the regulation of foreign intercourse and foreign relations, every specific provision in the Constitution relating
thereto ought to be given a preference over a general power
that might, otherwise, warrant action thereunder.
The treaty-making power, being undefined, should for
this very reas_on be largely regarded as a supplementary
function, and only exercisable (1) where the purposes are
of kind clearly coming witpin the sovereignty of the National Government, and, (2) when the interests of the
Nation require its use, it may be employed because, in the
absence of any specific constitutional provision for regulating
a particular form of foreign intercourse, it, inferentially,
comes within the power granted the President.
After . a rather brief consideration of the subject, in connection with what precedes, the writer cannot unreservedly
subscribe to the doctrine that an act of Congress, when conflicting therewith, impliedly repeals a treaty or that a treaty
repeals an act of Congress under ·like conditions.
For such results, of necessity, presume not only a concurrent jurisdiction but that the last expression must prevail, in
entire disregard of the fact that where different methods of
regulating foreign intercourse, exist, each, when properly
exercised, should be maintained against the encroachment
of the other.
Most treaties, very properly, are made for considerable
periods of time and are usually so corelated with those of
other nations, by the favored-nation clause or through the
necessity of maintaining a uniform system of international
obligations, that it is highly important these compacts should
seldom be altered except by the consent of the contracting
parties and through the same means such obligations were
entered into.
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Whenever, in the past, the repeal of a treaty or of an act
of Congress has been judicially confirmed, or assented to,
it naturally suggests the alternative conclusion ( 1) that the
act or treaty thus repealed or superseded had not been
made in compliance with the organic law or (2) that it was
permitted to be overturned in disregard of law. And this
because neither an act nor a treaty should be permitted to
regulate the same kind of foreign intercourse, unless the
courts are clearly of the opinion that, in a given case, the
jurisdiction is a concurrent one.
During the session of 1908, Senator Teller, of Colorado,
had printed in the Congressional Record an interesting brief
entitled the "Power of Congress over Treaties," and I herewith present the summary of the authorities, which, as will
be seen, uniformly favors the view that an act of Congress
can repeal a treaty or that a treaty may repeal an act.
"That Congress can repeal a treaty with a foreign
power by an act can not be questioned, considering
the many decisions of cases to that effect. Such proceedi_ngs on the part of the courts can also be defended upon the theory that a treaty is the supreme
law of the land no more than that of a statute.
"In case of a conflict between the treaty and the
statute the same rule of interpretation is adopted that
would be between statutes aipparently in conflict.
The courts have no discretion and will · not consider
whether the statute ought to have been enacted or
not. The question simply for the court is, Does a
fair construction of the statute conflict with the
treaty.
, ·
· "A court will not inquire wpat Congress intended
by the act if the words plainly import a conflict between the statute and the treaty.
"Of course it is the duty of the court to reconcile
a difference between the statute and the treaty if that
is consistent with the plain words of the statute and
treaty.
"In the case of Ropes et al. vs. Clinch (8th Blatchford, 304), the syllabus reads:
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"'Congress may pass any law, otherwi,e c ~
tional, notwithstanding it conflicts with an existing

act of

treaty with a foreign nation.
" 'If an act of Congress is plainly in suoh conflict,
a court cannot inquire whether, in passing such act,
Congress had or had not an intention to pass a law
inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty.'
"In the case of United States vs. Lee Yen Tai
(185 U. S., 221), the court quotes from Whitney 11,.
Robertson (124 U. S., 190, 194), as follows :
" 'By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the
same footing and made of the like obligation with an
act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no
superior efficacy is given_to either over the other.'
"In the case of Ward vs. Race Horse (163 U. S.,
511), Mr. Justice White, in delivering the opinion
of the court, says:
" 'That "a treaty may supersede a prior act of
Congress and an act of Congress supersede a prior
treaty," is elementary' (Fong Yue Ting vs. UnitM
States, 149 U. S., 698 ; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11
Wall., 616).
"In the cases of Thomas vs. Gay and Gay v,.
Thomas (169 U. S., p. 271) the court says :
" 'It is well settled that an act of Congress may
supersede a prior. treaty and that any question.a that
may arise are beyond the wphere of judicial cognizance and must be met by the political department of.
the Government.
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If at any time a treaty, made under authority of law,
threatens the existence or general welfare of the country,
its withdrawal should be sought through the consent of the
other contracting Power, and if refused, then it may be
abrogated by Congress as the sovereign agent of the people
even though it constitutes a 00,8U8 belli.
But such an abrogation represents an exceptional condition and must be regarded as enforced breach of the contract rather than a legal repeal of the treaty law. On the
other hand it is difficult to see when a treaty can repeal an
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the juri diction enumerated in or implied under the Con~titution, the act should be sustained against any conflicting
international agreement made by the President, since this
latter agreement ought not to encroach upon any already
exercised juri diction of Congre , being-as suggested before--a upplementary power, and therefore not a concurrent one.
It mu t be remembered that for years Congress did not
realize the exten ive and exclusive character of its juri diet.ion over foreign intercourse, commercial or otherwi e, and
for thi rea on treatie were permitted to infringe upon many
of the upervi ory rights of Congre .
It ought now to be conceded that when Congress legally sets
aside any treaty-regulation, it represents rather the recovery
of an exclusive right than the assertion of a concurrent jurisdiction, in which a later act, by mere right of time, supersedes a previous treaty.
As an illustration of a cooperative jurisdiction, however there may be cited the case of a treaty, or a
series of treaties with foreign countries, providing against
pelagic sealing. By such treaties it is possible to give Congress an extraterritorial jurisdiction over oort,ain portions of
the high seas, whereby it may punish its own subjects or
those of the other contracting nations, by reason of such
treaty provisions. While, on the other hand, a treaty with
another nation providing for the security of the person and
property of alien residents may be supplemented by an act
of Congress providing penalties for any infractions of the
rights guaranteed under such a treaty-whereas, in the absence of a treaty, Congress possesses no power to extend its
criminal jurisdiction within the States for the purpose of
protooting any alien residents .
In the Head-Money Oases, 112 U. S., 580, the court said:.

"A treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one
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of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the
other, which partake of the nature of municipal law,
an~ which are capable of enforcement as between
private parties in the courts of the country. An illu1r
tration of this character is found in treaties which
regulate the mutual rights of citizens and subjects
of the contracting nations in regard to rights of property by descent or inheritance, when the individuals
concerned are aliens.''
And in the case .of Baldlwin vs. Franks, 120 U. S., 679,
it was held:
"That the United States have power under the
Constitution to provide for the punishment of those
who are guilty of depriving Chinese subjects of any
of the rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions
guaranteed to them by this treaty we do not doubt."
Thus it is easy to see how acts and treaties can be exclusive
in their jurisdiction and how each may supplement the
other-but as such jurisdiction is seldom or ever concurrent
a ca~e must rarely arise when it would be proper for one to
repeal the other merely by poster!ority of action.
The Most-favored-nation Clause and Others Affecting the
Com,mercial and Revenue Jurisdictions of Congress.

Another, and in the wri~r's belief, unnecessary complication, arises in the regulation of commercial intercourse by
treaties containing the most-favored-nation clause, whereby
any reduction of the tariff or other advantages granted by
either co-contracting nations permits a third nation to have
all the benefits of such changes.
Fol1owing the custom of foreign nations, few of which
have their sovereign powers defined by a written constitution , the President has been permitted to incorporate in
many treaties the most-favored-nation clause. This method
of automatically regulating the protective tariff system or
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of effecting exten'"'ive changes in the national income by redu ing import dutie , constitutes a dangerous interference
with the power::; committed exclusively to Congress. When
tariff on essions are made to any foreign country they
hould come through or under the direct authority of Congrei:; and not by way of a treaty, or otherwise it will be impo ible to avoid all kinds of commercial complications.
When foreign countries understand that the President in
the making of a treaty doe not con titutionally possess any
power to regulate foreign commerce, or to control the levying of taxe on import-s, it will be comparatively easy to adjut our trade relations in accordance with the methods prescribed under the Constitution. In recent years we had a
striking illustration of the inability of a foreign Power
(Italy) to surrender, under a rendition treaty, any of its
citizen charged with offen e in another country, and this
becau e it organic law prohibited such surrender. In the
same way we ought to observe the limitations implied upon
the treaty-making power in any international arrangement
affecting the tariff or revenue.
When, a few years ago, Congress lowered the duties or allowed the free entry of certain products from the Philippines,
it raised the serious question that if such an Insular possession was neither a State nor a Terri~ory, and therefore not
subject to the form of government provided under the Constitution, then did not such tariff concessions come under the
favored-nation clause? For the collection of duties upon
other imports was declared to be inconsistent with the nationality of such territory.
The pending effort of President Taft to establish free trade
with Canada, under a compact that in form and effect is
ttlmilar to the reciprocal treaty wi~ Cuba, may again raise
the question whether this clause can be avoided simply because the tariff agreement was so disguised, in its legal character, as to prevent any foreign government from deciding
just what this measure really was.
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In Europe such clauses have in practj.ce been uniformly
treated as applying to aU reductions of tariff without distinction. The United States' interpretation, on the other hand,
distinguishes between reductj.ons of a general character and
reductions made specifically in return for reductions by another State. The latter do not, according to this interpretation, come within the operation of 1ibe clause, and a cocontracting State is only entitled to obtain extension of them
to itself by granting similar concessions. In other words,
concessions ~o any co-contracting State are only allowed
gratuitously to a third co-contracting State, when nothing is
given for them, the clause not covering advantages gran~
in return for advantages.
Mr. John Osborne, chief of the Bureau of Trade-Relations,
State Department, and late Secretary of the Reciprocity Commission, is a gentleman eminently competent to describe the
American standpoint. Mr. Osborne maintains that "it is evident that the gratuitous ex~nsion to third Powers of commercial advantages exchanged in reciprocity between two
countries is absolutely inconsistent with the true principles
of reciprocity as understood in 1ibe United States; it would
not only seriously impair and even tend to destroy the value
of the original grant, but it would also involve duty upon the
entirety, or, at least, the bulk from the world, of articles of
merchandise affected, thus entailing a serious sacrifice in
national revenues."
Accepting this view, though it is not conceded in Europe,
it must still follow that. any third Power may obtain such
tariff concessions by offering the same.
Hence the most-favored-nation clause either goes automatically into effect, under all treaties containing it, or, if the
tariff reductions made by the United States are regarded as
reciprocal in character, they may still be taken advantage of
by a third nation .prepared to offer similar concessions.
Under such a power, exercised by the President, it is
possible through inadvertence or design, to break down all
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br the greater part of the Federal revenue on :imports, bringing about an empty treasury or an immediate resort to direct
taxation.
Under the Constitution it was clearly intended that Congress should be the author, and the responsible author, of
any Federal system of taxation, internal or foreign; and
with equal certainty Congress was to have the exclusive regulation of commerce with foreign nations. The idea never
presented itself to the framers of the Constitution that the
President, with the assent of ~e Senate, possessed by indirection the power to take away from the lower House its
right to originate revenue bills, or that by the same indirect
means all forms of commercial intercourse could be subjected tp Executive control at the expense of both Houses
thereover; nor did the framers of the Constitution anticipate that Congress, responsible for a satisfactory and dependable source of income for meeting public expenditures,
would ever attempt to delegate to an independent and separate branch of the Government any power to re8ulate foreign commerce or the sources of public taxation ; any more
than our forefathers believed that Congress would assent to
any such action or that it would undertake by a so-called acl
to ratify any compact, treaty, or other executive measure
demgned to remit customs or alter an existing system for
tariff protection.
Just how Congress, under the maximum and minimum
clause in ~e Payne act, under tariff treaties made heretofore
by various Executives, under tariff boards reporting only to
the President and under a so-called reciprocal tariff agreement made by the administrative officers of two nations, can
ever be expected to know just what the income of the United
States is likely to be at any given period; or how Congress,
with the sole right to expend public revenues, can safely have
taken away from it the equally import.an~ right to control the
sourc~s of revenue, seem to be matters of little concern at the
present time.
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if a treaty may repeal an act, then the existing revenue
methods established by Congress, and upon which the present
~laborate system of taxation and of governmental expenditures are predicated, may be suddenly changed by any sec~etiy negotiated treaty, the effects of which may be neither
understood nor discovered until too late to escape the charge
of bad faith when it may become necessary to abrogate such
an obligation later on.
·T he effort of President Taft, on his own initiative, to introduce free trade with Canada is an illustration thereoi, and
whether the compact is a treaty or an act of Congress, or some
undefinable measure, is immaterial since the alterations in
the tariff system and the loss of revenue are the direct results
of such Executive action.
By the same methods, the exclusive coast and internal
waterway ·traffic· could be taken away, in whole or in part,
from the citizens of the United States, by such treaty concessions.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that the objections now made to Presidential tariff agreements, affecting
alike the revenue and industrial protection, are based upon
any misconception or a lack of appreciation of the power still
·r emaining in the President's hands for the adjustment of international relations. For under the broad discretion of
such a prerogative he may provide for the delineation of
boundaries, joint fishery and navigation rights in closed seas
or boundary waters, the recognition of the independence or
the status of a State, the cession or exchange of territory,
the creation of Federal unions or other methods of effecting
a protectorate over dependent races or nations requiring assistance, the establishment of consular or other courts in foreign territory, the protection of aquatic life in the high seas,
treaties of peace following war or in the prevention of the
same, the gran~ing of reciprocal rights to alien residents and
like subjects requiring ·great 'diplomacy and foresight in their
adjustment.
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The President may also properly inaugurate a compr~hensive plan for the permanent and prompt adjustment of
international disputes by means of arbitration treaties; pro~
vided, however, that the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress
i in no wise impaired or that the Senate is not asked to
part with any of its concurring powers by delegating away in
an indefinite manner and for ari indefinite time its supervision over all such international obligations.
The prevailing impression, however, that the President
of the United States is peculiarly adapted for the negotiation and the making of all kinds of international tariff
agreements and regulations, should be subject to immediate
modification.
No public official in the world has greater and more varied
responsibilities or greater and more exhausting burdens imposed upon him than the President of the United States;
and as the country increases in population and business activity these official duties become more difficult and exacting.
The size of Congress, however, is, as yet, regulated by the
increase in population, and with its enlarged and experienced committees it is able to bear the increased responsibilities somewhat better than in the case of a single individual, who must continue to meet the ever-increasing demands upon his time and his energy.
Just why the President should have imposed upon him ,
through many different methods, the intricate and difficult
economic questions connected with the tariff system or the
raising of revenue, when he is neither responsible for the
enactment of such laws nor the raising and expenditure of
public revenues is rather strange.
And just why the President should take upon himself the
entire readjustment of the tariff and revenue system with
Canada, or the realignment of his party's principles, would be
equally strange, were it not attributable to Congress having,
in the past, so frequently imposed such burdens upon the
Executive that he now naturally inclines towards the making
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· of a reciprocal tariff agreement, when it seems not only to
be in accord with popular sentiment, but, in his judgment,
of equal benefit to adjoining and friendly nations.
If the results do not justify such expectations, Congress,
rather than the President, is largely responsible for the
origin and the continuance of this method of Executive
endeavor.

D. c.,
April 3, 1911.
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APPENDIX.

be

.ve
The Difference Between the Executive Powers of the Presir
dent and the Authority Delegated by Congress to the Socalled Executive Departments.

The writer's insistence upon the general proposition that
neither Congress, the Judiciary nor the President can legally
delegate their exclusive authority to the other, may require,
in one respect, an explanation.
For an examination of the preceding pages might create
the impression that it had been contended Congress could not
delegate its authority to any of the various administrative
agencies of the Government because they are usually incorporated in so-called Executive Departments.
Legal right,as well as custom and necessity,justify and sustain Congress in creating agencies for the administration of
its laws and for the purpose of exercising such delegated authority as may be necessary in carrying out its functions,
either when not in session, or, when such authority can otherwise be safely exercised by such agencies.
In order to bring about a satisfactory and permanent cooperation and co-ordination of these legislative agencies, and
for the purpose of dividing and fixing the responsibility and
in effecting economy and efficiency, most of the bureaus and
divisions have gradually been incorporated into and made a
part of general Departments; but with few exceptions have
they any relation to the official duties of the President.
The Interstate Commerce Comjmission, for instance, is an
agent of Congress and would remain such even if transferred
to a so-called Executive Department; and this is true of other
independ~mt organizations, like the Civil ServiceCommission,
(93)

N
tbr Sm Hh ~o nian Institufo , and the Government Printing
Office.
Congress originates and determines the functions of all
thes~ Departments, defines their jurisdiction, grants and
epec1fi.es the use of appropriations therefor, and consequently
Congress may, if it wiRheR, ·substitute independent ones withont. Cabinet representation , or it may con solidate or enlarge
~hem indefinitely.
These general Departments_, therefore, exist as the mediums
nf Con_gresRion al action an d authority and not for the purpose
nf serving or enlarging any Pre:-i<lential powers. It is, however, the duty of the President to see that the laws of Congress are enforce<l and through his cabinet officers this can
be best effected. but the administrative authority they thu
.exercise is that of Congress and not that of the President.
The fact that Congress has designated the heads of general Departments to be ex-officio cabinet officers does not. in
any way affect its control or authority over such officials when
clischarging the departmental duties imposed by law. Hence
whether a bureau, division, board or commission, created by
Congress for the purpose of carrying into effect its powers, i
within or without a so-called Executive Department, is immaterial, for they exercise and execute legislative authority.
Agency is determined by the source of authority1 the meam
of effecting such authority, and the purposes for which such
authority is exercised.
If a bureau is legally created by Congress, none of the authority delegated to it by express terms or by implication can
be assumed by the President of the United States unless relating to a subject falling within his constitutional powers.
U this were not so, then an indirect and insidious meanR
would exist whereby Congress could part with its exclusive
jurisdiction and vest the same in the President.
Whenever :my 11ower of Congress is delegated to the Presi·dent, as it'3 agent, there then would exist no practical mean
by which such authority could be enforced or withdrawn-if
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the Pre ident-as the alleged agent of Congress--objected to
the abrogation of uch delegated authority. For the act,
delegating the power, could not be repealed, if its alleged
agent, acting under his prerogative as President, vetoed the
repealing act, and could, thereafter, summon one-third of
either the Hou e or Senate in ~mpport of the veto. Such an
intolerable ituation ought to suggest not only the impropriety but the illegality of making the President the agent of
Congres in any matters committed to its exclusive jurisJiction.
The constitutional division of powers, in the three branches
of Government, is not only technical but substantial. While,
at times, the liberal delegation of authority to agencies within
each branch may be open to technical or other objections, it
more often ha.s the merit of practical penefit, without the funJamental and erious evil that must arise whenever a sovereign branch of the Government delegates to an equally dominant branch any of its special functions. 'l'he difference between irrevocably parting with sovereign powers and improviJently granting too much authority to a subordinate but
July constituted and controllable agency, is a marked ·one.
An agent mu t not only be in a position to carry out the will
· of its principal but ?11/u-st continue to b-e subject to its absolute
cont1·ol, for were this not so the power frequently either could
not or would not be used or might be abused. The President
of the United States can never, constitutionally, be made the
legislative agent of Oongre,ss, but the heads of Departments
may be.
An anomaly apparently exists in the fact that the President
c1m, at time , delegate his authority to cabinet officers, and
that Congre s can likewi e delegate its authority to the head
of a Department. Thus the ame individual, in different
official capacities, may become both the representative of the
Pre ident and of Congress; but as the prerogatives of the
Pre ident and the jurisdiction of Congress are distinct there
hould be no serious conflict.

00
Should the cabinet head of an Executive Department, acting even under the instructions of the President refuse to exercise the authority of his office as the head of his Department, or to enforce the laws of Congress, he· could be impeached and removed from his position; showing very clearly
that in the administration of sucb duties he represents Congress and not the President. On the other hand, while the
President can with entire propriety, retire a cabinet officer for
personal reasons, or because he is incompetent or unsatisfactory in the management of a Department, he cannot with
propriety, though possessing the authority, retire such an official because he obeys the will of Congress and not that of
the President. Therefore cabinet officers, serving as heads
of general Departments, are intermediaries in the three
branches of the Government and have powers and duties imposed upon them in their separate capacities that must be determined by the source of their jurisdiction and not by any
arbitrary classification.
Congress may provide that "the principal officer of each of
the Executive Departments," when appointed by the President, shall not be members of the Cabin~t, and that they, in
turn, shall possess the sole power of appointing all inferior
officers; for article 2, section 2, provides "Congress may by
law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they
think proper in the President alone * * * or in the
heads of departments."
Take for example the Secretary of Agriculture. He appoints all officers and employes in his Department, except
two; he directs the management of all bureaus, divisions, and
officers; he exercises an advisory supervision over all the agricultural experiment stations; he controls the quarantine stations for domestic livestock and defines and enforces an extensive quarantine jurisdiction between the States and the
foreign nations; he directs the investigation of domestic and
foreign foods and drugs, not only under the laws of Congre11
butunder regulationsCongress hasauthorized him tomake;he
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the -tariff and revenue needs of the country, for in such case
the duties would attach to the bead of the Department, not
by reason of membership in the Cabinet, but as the instrumentality of Congress.
The President, on the other band, may impose many of
the burdens of his office on his cabinet, and he could very
properly direct, for instance, his Secretary of State to negotiate a treaty, and all such preliminary work might be undertaken by this official; but the President could not authorize
a member of the Judiciary, or a member of Congress, to negotiate such a tr~aty any more than Congress could legally authorize the President to regulate foreign commerce or remit
or collect revenue duties--because in each case this authority
cannot be delegated to a separate and equally sovereign
branch of the Government.
Under the Constitution the President possesses the sole
power to appoint all Federal Judges, subject to approval
by the Senate. Congress could not, therefore, authorize the
President to delegate away this power to another branch of
the Government; and if the President under such alleged authority, or upon his own motion, directed the Supreme Court
to fill all vacancies therein, and to appoint all Circuit and District judges of the United States, and then the Senate, in turn,
transferred its power of approving such appointees to the
President, we would have an illustration of illegally transferring powers affecting all three independent branches of the
Government. Yet no one would contend that Congress could
authorize the President to transfer his appointing power to
the Supreme Court, that the Supreme Court could exercise it,
or that the Senate could transfer to the President its exclusive
right of approval.
For similar reasons Congress cannot authorize, or assent
to, the President of the United States making tariff laws or
originating revenue measures subject to its approval-for it
would likewise constitute a reversal of the constitutional requirements.
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Therefore, when the President, with or without the authority of Congress, makes a tariff compact with Canada directly affecting commerce and revenue, and then attempts to
confer upon Congress the Presidential right of approving or
vetoing this compact, he reverses the constitutional requirements; and if Congress then approves and ratifies such a tariff
compact it not only parts with an exclusive function but
takes upon itself an illegal one.
If the President, upon his own initiative, undertook to

"originate" revenue measures, and "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations," and if he were willing, in exchange
for the e legislative powers, to have Congress exercise the
Presidential right of approving or vetoing these measures,
and if Congress were willing to endorse this transposition of
con titutional functions, in what way could it be more clearly
accompli hed and in what way more clearly evidenced than
in the means now being employed to put the Canadian compact into effect?
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NECESSITY FOR ANtD CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE ACT OF CONlGRESS PROTECTING
MIGRATORY BIRDS.

Introductory.
On December 5th, 1904, a game protective measure, entitled "Ai Bill to Protect Migratory Grune Birds of the United
States," was introduced in Congress by George Shiras, 3rd, a
member from Pennsylvania.
No effort was made at that session for its consideration
before the House, as the object was a new one, and the author
desired to have the entire country carefully consider the
same before asking for action. This bill was reintroduced
by other members in the succeeding sessions, and finally
became a law March 4th, 1913. The only material change
in the original bill was the addition of migratory insectivorous bird, a change, by the way, which was heartily approved
by Mr. Shiras.
The ever-increasing necessity for more effi~ient and uniform protection of migratory birds was known by every one
familiar with bird life throughout the northern continent,
but these, compared with the public at large, were then
limited in number. Although the early supporters of the
bill were confident that the facts, when fully developed,
ould establish beyond dispute the need of a Federal supervision, it was recognized that it would take time to prove it.
And again they were equally confident that the proposed act
was constitutional, but nevertheless required the most careful
presentation, since its legal justification largely depended
upon pointing out an analogous jurisdiction involving the
same principle, as well as showing that the prospective use
1

2

of such a power included much more than the protection of
migratory birds, since other important matters in which the
States had a common interest were urgently demanding the
intervention of the General Government, because the controversies arising thereover were otherwise incapable of
proper adjustment.
But the idea of such a legislative jurisdiction was not a
hasty one, for its author bad been a sportsman from early
youth, and later, as a naturalist and explorer, became familiar with the habits of wild fowl and shore birds to an exceptional degree, thereby appreciating the causes operating in
their rapid destruction. The question of constitutional
power, which stands on all fours with the need of proving
that such a law was necessary, was likewise fully investiga~
before the bill was introduced.
In 1906 Mr. Shiras prepared an extensive brief on the
legal side of the subject, and the candid position of the
author was shown in the following paragraph:
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"I am heartily in accord with the suggestion made that
better no law at all by Congress, however desirable the object,
than one that must eventually be stricken off the statuUi
books as beyond the power of the National Government to
enact. Not only would such a result be harmful in hampering the States, during the period of its temporary operation,
but, ()f necessity, a reflection upo~ its author and advocates."
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The .b rief was published as a supplement to the well-known
sportsmen's journal, "Forest and 'Stream" (Vol. LXVII, pp.
815-824, Nov. 24, 1906), and bas long been out of print.
Misdirected attacks upon the new law by some and the
evident intention of market bunters to bide behind such a
screen has led many to request that the original brief be
revised and republished for the benefit of those who are apt
to be misled by selfish interests or by those who do not
understand the facts or the law.
Mr. Shiras comes from a family of lawyers, his father
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having served many years as an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, and his uncle, Judge O. P.
Shirrui, of the Iowa Federal Court, being equally well known.
Having practiced law for some twenty-five years in the various courts, and having served several years on the Judiciary
General Committee of the Pennsylvania Legislature, Mr.
Shirrui entered Congress with an experience favorable to a
proper understanding of State and Federal powers and their
respective limitations. His interest in this direction was
shown by an extensive brief on "National Police Power,"
another one on the "Supervisory Powers of the Federal Government," and in a series of papers on constitutional subjects,
several of which have been printed in the Departmental
reports and in Congressional proceedings.
So simple and easily understood are the fundamental
principles underlying the author's argument, that they may
be summarized as follows:
.
First. As a rule local game i,s protected by the States ten
months or more each year-while migratory game is killed
~n months or more each year, taking into consideration its
whole range. Result-certain extinction of the latter under
State jurisdiction.
Second. The Federal Government in recent years has admittedly had the right to control the inception and spread of
all noxious insects or the mediums by which they are conveyed, and few contend, as in the case of yellow fever, bubonic plague, cholera, or any other epidemic disease .of a
serious character, that Congress does not possess the power,
Uirough international and interstate regulation, to exercise
a paramount supervision whenever necessary to prevent the
entrance of contagious or infectious diseases from foreign
thores or from State to State. This means the Federal control of all vagrant and migrating forms of insects, germs,
or other organic life inimical to the health of the citizen or
lo the plant and animal industries of the nation. If the
Federal Government can exercise jurisdiction over harmful
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migrants for the benefit of the public, then in legal prin•
ciple. it can also exercise the same jurisdiction over beneficial
migrants for
the public.
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Third. Neither auarantine
quarantine nor any
anv other form of supersunervision over migratory life is mentioned in the Federal _,._,
ConmL~ ________
,,
stitution. This. power is absolutely essential to the safety
and welfare of the nation. While many are prepared to
concede that such a jurisdiction is inherent in every nation,
as an attribute of sovereignty, to those who demand that
every Federal power shall be expressly enumerated or inferable from such delegated powers, Mr. Shiras has advanced
the proposition that the clause of the Constitution which
confers a Federal jurisdiction over "Controversies between
two or more States" ( Art. III, sec. 2) is intended to meet
those disputes arising over nuisances and injuries affecting
the interests of two or more States in the same thing.
Therefore, just as the commerce clause has given an
adequate Federal jurisdiction over all kinds of commercial
intercourse between the States or with foreign nations, so
will this clause give the same needed jurisdiction over noncommercial intercourse between the States or foreign nations.
The pollution of interstate waters, needlessly costing
millions of lives; the passage of poisonous fumes from one
State to another, the regulation of interstate travel in private
automobiles or aeroplanes, control over private wireless
telegraphy, the unreasonable destruction of fish in waters
common to the several States, the ineffectual "shot-gun"
quarantine between the States, the exclusion from foreign
countries of dangerous insects, of destructive animals and
birds, the regulation or prohibition of immigration, racial
or individual, and the regulation generally of the non-com•
mercial intercourse between the States or with foreign coun•
tries depends largely or wholly, according to Mr. Shires,
upon the Federal power to settle controversies between the
States, and this power means any form of regulation necessary to achieve the purpose.
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This duly enumerated\ jurisdiction in the Constitution is
all-sufficient to meet those conditions, which, heretofore, did
not require its exercise, and the fact that it has been largely
dormant for years is likewise true of many of the other
regulatory powers now being brought into use by Congress.
The Supreme Court, as will be shown later, has recently
given this broad interpretation to the clause in question, and,
in the course of time, this jurisdiction will be of vital importance, not to the Nation in its sovereign capacity, but to the
States themselves in preserving, in a collective sense, their
equities and joint rights in all matters where the lack of
extra-territorial authority deprives them of uniform action.
The continuously unreasonable destruction of wild fowl
and of valuable insectivorous birds and of the migratory fish,
like the shad or salmon, has been the cause of bitter and
interminable controversies between the States. The migratory bird law is an effort to adjust one of these controversies.
Conclusion: Migratory life, be it beneficial or harmful,
can be brought under the control of the Federal Government,
whenever the States, acting through their representatives in
Congress, so declare.
JOHN B. BURNHAM,
President of the American Game
Protective and Propagation Association.
FEBRUARY

10TH, 1914.
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PART I.
Why tbe Migratory Bird Law Was Necessary.

The Swpporters of the Law.

II.I
I

~

On the first introduction of the bill, in the Fifty-eighth
Congress, and its publication in the various sportsmen'a
papers, great interest was aroused, and the measure was
unanimously and continuously supported thereafter by all
the leading papers and magazines devoted to outdoor life in
the United States and Canada, with the result that in a very
short time the popular feeling manifested itself in many
directions.
The leading sportsmen, game protectionists, naturalists,
and nature lovers, comprising thousands of leading citizens,
joined hands in the nation-wide movement to save the wild
fowl, the snipe, and the more valuable varieties of song and
insectivorous birds.
Associations, national in scope, like the American Game
Protective and Propaganda Association, the League of American Sportsmen, the Boone and Crockett Club, the Camp
Fire Club, the Canadian Camp, the Explorers' Club, the
National Audubon Society, the New York Zoological Society,
the American Ornithologists' Union, ,the Farmers' Unions,
became ardent supporters, followed in time by practically
every State Game and Fish Commission and the hundreds
of private clubs and State organizations throughout the country, like the New York Association for the Protection of
Game, New York Fish, Game and Forest League, the Maryland Game and Fish Protective Association, Ohio Fish and
Game Protective Association, Game Protective Association
of Virginia, Massachusetts Gunners' Association, Georgia
Game Protective Association, the Vermont Fish and Game
League, and similar associations.
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The Federal jurisdiction in the bill instead of arousing
the jealousy or opposition of the State game wardens was
declared to be the only effective means of saving the migratory birds, and few stronger friends of the measure came to
its support than the men officially selected by the States to
enforce the game laws.
A majority of the Governors of the States volunteered
their support, and none, except Governor Elease of South
Carolina, openly opposed it.
The legislatures of fourteen States declared by joint resolution their opinion that the National Government must
intervene in the interest of all the States, if the migratory
birds were to be saved.
President Roosevelt in writing and by personal appeal
declared the effort to save the migratory wild fowl was most
commendable.
The National Conservation Congress, ifi.rst at St. Paul and
then at its subsequent annual meeting at Kansas City, unanimously passed resolutions declaring for Federal supervi ion
over migratory birds.
When the various bills had been before Congress for
several years, awaiting the verdict of the country, Congressman Weeks in the House and Senator McLean in the
upper body gave notice of their intention to press the
measure for passage. Unimportant as such game legislation
may appear to some, the bill received a greater degree of
popular support than any in many years. Congressman
Weeks, the successful sponsor of the Appalachian bill, declared that the effort to save beneficial migrants was more
active, diversified, far-reaching, and persistent, than in the
case of the former bill, which had enlisted such a remarkable
number of followers, while Senator McLean, in presenting
the matter before the Senate committee, and on the floor, did
not meet a single antagonist, and found all his colleagues
actively supporting the measure or in sympathy with it.9
purposes.
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When considered in the House Committee on Agriculture,
composed largely of lawyers and of men familiar with the
distribution of bird life throughout the country, the bill was
unanimously endorsed and recommended to the House under
a most favorable report, where, out of a membership of four
hundred and thirty-five, less than half a dozen members opposed the measure. On the Senate side the vote was unanimous, and as this chamber contains many of the leading
constitutional lawyers of the country it was a significant
endorsement.
The bill was signed by President Taft March 4th, and
later President Wilson, possessing the power to veto the
regulations, approved the same and issued a proclamation,
signed by himself and attested by the Secretary of State, for
the purpose of informing the public that the law was then
in effect.* Probably this was tile !first instance in which
such a proclamation was ever issued.
The support throughout was non-partisan, non-sectional
and made up of every class of citizens, irrespective of their
calling or residenc~.
There are more than four million sportsmen in the United
States, and a greater number still of persons interested in the
proper conservation of wild life. That is the reason the bill
commanded such a diversified and far-reaching support.
Just why it was so persistent and continuous will be considered under the head dealing with the necessity for such a
Federal law.
Regulations of the Department of Agriculture.

The regulations prepared by the Department of Agriculture, putting the law into effect, have been well received
throughout the country. The fundamental regulationprohibition of spring shooting-has been opposed only by
the classes against which it was purposely directed-the
* See Appendix A.
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market hunter and those improvident, ignorant or selfish
shooters who are unable to withstand the temptation of killing every migrant in s~ght, when the spring flight to the
nesting grounds takes place. The other regulations, permanently protecting insectivorous birds, providing two zones
for the open seasons and prohibiting shooting before sunrise
and after sunset, have received general approval, although a
few whose motives are les.s open to question are opposing the
same; while a closed season throughout the year for certain birds approaching extinction is accepted as a necessarily drastjc remedy.
Whatever modifications are to be made in the regulations
should not be attempted until the present ones are given a
fair trial, and whenever a change is desirable, it will be found
that the law is flexible and easily adjusted to meet present
or future conditions.
Under the authority of the Department, the" regulations
'!e~e prepared by three members of the Biological Survey:
Dr. T. S. Palmer, assistant chief ( in charge of game preservation), whose familiarity with the State and Federal game
laws is exceptional; Dr. A. K. Fisher, in charge of economic
investigations, and who, as an experienced sportsman, has
had the practical knowledge required; and Prof. w:-w.
Cooke, the leading expert of the country, if not of the world,
~on the migration of birds and their breeding and .winter
homes. This board has had the co-operation of an advisory
committee of fifteen, appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture, and composed of some of the leading sportsmen, game
protectionists and field naturalist.s of the country.*
1

Relation of the States to the Federal Government.

The assertion, by several opponents of the Act, that it
deprives the Sta,tes of control in their domestic affairs and
oonfers upon the Federal Government an uncalled-for and
• See Appendix D.
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arbitrary authority, is, above all others, a criticism with the
least foundation, · though the one best calculated to excite
the strongest opposition of those misled thereby.
As a matter of fact, the whole purpose of the present law
is to protect the rights of the States and not in the least
degree confer upon the Federal Government any duty other
than that of a mediator, provided for under the Constitutioo.
•
Constitutional construction has been unquestionably in•
fluenced by the way in which this Republic came into being.
While the present Constitwtion, strictly speaking, was
framed by popular conventions, yet it is within the fair
meaning of history to say that the thirteen colonial Stata
created the Federal Union and its form of government;
hence as creators, relinquishing, with more or less hesitation,
the power theretofore possessed by each State. Consequently
we find, for many years, a tendency to regard the new
Nation as the offspring of joint statehood, and the States
scrutinized,
scrutm1zect., with
w1tn rather
ratner severe countenance, any disposition
ct.1spos1t1on
to assert powers conflicting with their so-called "right&" .
Just how the States and the Union gradually shifted their
nric;:it.inn
ic;: instructive,
in~t.M,f'.t.ivA and
i:inrl will
will 1-lAln
AYnhiin the
t.hA nl'{)('f3.Q.Q
nl
position is
help explain
process of
centralization on a reasonable basis, instead of treating it as
a necessarily dangerous and manifest departure from those
fundamental principles underlying the relations of the
States to the Union.
The States, at the outset, were isolated, lacked common ·
interests, differed materially in social and
i~terests,
and_ economic
~conomic conditions, and, above all else, posse&<:ied a positive and natural
t10ns,
rlrM1.rl ot
s:i.11 nOWP.1'
~Ant.rs:i.li7.Arl within
wit.hin a
s:i. government
O'OVArnmAnt erected
P~t~il
dread
of all
power centralized
over and above them, which, in their colonial days and in
the history of the world, had stood for some form of coercion
us1118lly, downright despotism. It is therefore not surand, usually,
prising that a combination, in which common defense ,
against foreign and domestic foes was one of the great impelling
attempt to
many •
_po.u..1..u5 causes
uauoc;.:, for
J.Vl. uniting,
u.u1.1.1u..1b, should
.:,.1.1vu.1u Ullllti.lH.Pll
I.IU limit
Ull.111.1 in
lll llW.ll,Y

respec
Per
curaUi
States
I

gmi
El.O
[lei
[l]

E)T£l

ne

I

..

,-. ~1

i \
i ,

l

if

.JIii
. ;:

. _'ii' 'I·~1

-1~-·,
. :~J
'

J

1

·

oron£l
prope

I

the

·
·

•• :.
.

ness 0
era.I
istent
one e
forms
torily
ing
mg t
senti
seu
adequ
adeq

P
cep
'i.·r n
':eu
t1al pq

of go
the m
--o.o
ouno

1

11

lh the
excite

ft law

r least

[ other
stitu-

, was
e fair
States

r::::~

~uently
e new
States
osition
. ghts."
their
of
git as
those
of the

ress

mmon
condinatural
erected
and in

respects the functions belonging to the General Government.
Perhaps nothing has done more to bring about an accurate valuation of those powers which are necessary to the
St.ates for the administration of local affairs and those
"rights" existing withourt; regard to their essence, than the
admission from time to time of new States. The change
that has taken place since thirteen "sovereign States" created
a Union, and this Union subsequently created thirty-five
States, is remarkable, not only in the material advancement
of the country, but in the rerations that the States now bear
to the Nation, as co-ordinate parts of the Republic.
It is an undeniable fact that, as we increase the responsiveness of our local governments, we add to the growth of Federal unity. Centralization and de-centralization are co-existent forces working in entire harmony in a true republi~
one extending downward in the effort to reach the lowest
forms into which our governmental system may satisfactorily be divided-the other developing upward, concentrating the diverse minor powers into a central medium, representing the Nation at large. The right of Congress to have
adequate powers to meet all National requirements, is a
proper centralization of authority, and, on the other hand,
the assertion of any power derogatory to a necessary and
purely functional right of a State or any political sub-division therein is an invasion of a form of government
prescribed by the Constitution, and, as such, always susceptible to restraint by the Federal juidiciary.
The States, therefore, are now regarded just as much convenient physical divisions of the country as they are essential political divisions of the Government, for they have been
created from time to time out of the public domain, in order
that the residents, living heretofore under a territorial form
of government, may participate in and be responsible for
the management of their local affairs. This double purpose~
more than any other, carries into effect the true spirit of the
founders, while the continual growth of National power is
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in response to the many new duties imposed upon every
great and progressive country. To say that a Nation,
wherein three-quarters of the States have been given life
by the parent government, cannot exercise every function of
sovereignty because the Colonial States were at one time
sovereign-can no longer be considered a sufficient reason.
Assuming, then, that all matters of internal management
and in which the citizens of each State are alone concerned,
fall within their exclusive control and that because each
State, lacking any extra-territorial jurisdiction, possesses no
power of regulating intercourse with other States, it manifestly becomes the duty of the General Government to exercise such authority as it may have in protecting and adjusting all forms of interstate intercourse whenever the joint
interests of the States demand it.
And in analysing the relation of the States toward each
other it is necessary to review the status of each before it is
possible to understand the situation attempted to be met by
the law now under consideration.
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Why the States are the A·oper Custodians of Local Game.

The reason why the States a.re best able to care for local
game, whenever disposed, may be considered in connection
with their inherent inability to protect that of a migratory
character. Such game being present throughout the year,
the supply manifesdy depends upon proper local legislation
and its efficient enforooment. Thus it increases or decreases
,according to the protection afforded and, very properly, the
sportsmen are the direct and immediate beneficiaries of wise
laws or the sufferers from inadequate\ ones. Should the
quail, grouse, deer, trout or bass become greatly reduced, or
even exterminated, a longer closed season, the establishment
of game refuges, and domestic propagation will restore the
same, or, by importations from nearby States, ex.tinct native
species can be replaced. Local pride and local benefits in-
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. vite this action. Such methods are largely unavailing or
impossible with birds or fish of migratory habits. Then,
again, the idea of killing lo.cal game in the nesting period or
when about to bear its young is naturally revolting, beoause
it is as improvident as it is indecent. Unfortunately the
opposite rule prevails with wild fowl and shore birds, for the
greater proportion are killed in the ·spring migration, just
a.s the salmon and the shad are netted to an unreasonable
extent in the spawning waters of the several States, while
local fish are carefully protected at that period . .
An examination of the State laws will show that resident
game is protected usually 10 or more months each year and
often by a closed period of five years or more, while the laws
relating to migratory birds allow an aggregate open season
of 10 or more months each year, with practically two-thirds
of the species not protected at all during their presence in a
State. This tells the story of the States' relations to stationary game and compared with that of seasonal occurrence.
While the deer, elk, moose and many varieties of grouse are
now being introdUlced or restored to the States, many varietie of migratory birds are becoming extinct. This cannot
be attributed purely to selfishness, but because there are certain causes over which the States have no control, and this
fact emphasizes the necessity for the new law.
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Why the States are Unable to Protect Migratory Birds.
"An open season, whenever a migratory game bird is in
sight," is the rule and not the exception under State protection. In the same w~y the valuable sa.lmon have been exterminated on our eastern coast and the supply of shad now
depends wholly upon the persistent efforts of the General
Government to get enough eggs on the spawning grounds to
maintain the species. The fact that ,a number of Federal
fish hatcheries, with a capacity of 100,000,000 eggs a season,
have been able to get only a few million by reason of the
continuous netting at the mouths of the streams shows how
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indifferent such States are in maintaining a permanent in-.
dustry or in conserving the rights of the citizens in the other
States. The jurisdiction the Government is now asserting
in the perpetuation of game and commercial fish, which
migrate to and from the high seas, is no greater than over
migratory birds.
While local game has no concentrated or well-defined seasonal movement along narrow avenues -of migration, the sit~ation is different with the birds traversing a continent twice
a year.
Geese, brant, ducks and shore birds, in the spring and
autumnal migration fly in flocks an_d usually follow the
ocean beaches, the larger rivers and water-courses of the continent. On the Atlantic coast fourteen States are on the line
of migration; along the Mississippi and Missouri valleys are
fifteen States, while on the Pacific side California alone
covers more than 700 miles of the flight-way, and unfortunately, with most of the other States, affords some migratory
birds little or no protection. Adjacent to and forming a
considerable extension of these routes are Canada and Mexico, each willing to co-operate with the citizens of the United
States if the latter can put into effect a nation·al law, instead
of leaving the prowction of migratory birds to the futile
or wholly inadequate legislation of forty-eight States. In
some instances ducks and shore birds cover a range exceeding 8,000 miles in the migration of twice a year, often passing over a dozen States in a few days and from one nation
to another.
That a State can, if it wishes, take excellent care of its
local game depends not so much upon the permanent hal>itat, important though it be, as upon the fact that all conditions favorable or unfavorable to its existence can be taken
into consideration. This advantage is lacking when States
undertake the protection of migratory birds, since local
hunters regard the visiting migrant as one to be killed when
conditions best favor its destruction, ignoring the fact that
the same influences make the laws in all the other States.
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Therefore, if such birds are killed during both migratory
flights and throughout all the fall and winter, where does
any protection come in under State laws? The fact that
several States have closed seasons on geese, ducks and snipe
after they have left their territory is, of course, a legislative
joke and a sad one at that.
Shore Birds.-For more than twenty years the writer has
been a member of a gun club owning extensive marshes on
the Eastern Shore of Virginia. Formerly the great spring
flight of curlew, yellow legs, plovers, tumstones, dowitchers,
willet, robin snipe and many varieties of sand-pipers lasted
two months or more, and all day long the birds could be
seen passing north or circling over the mud-flats in search
of food. Thousands were killed daily in the spring by the
members of the various clubs in this vicinity as well as by
the native shoremen. What was then considered the only
check on the number killed was the ability to give the birds
away before they spoiled. The decrease in the past ten years
has been so marked that some members have given up
spring shooting, and in my case the camera has been substituted during this migration. The number of shore
birds following the coasts can be accurately estimat.ed
by one familiar with a locality where all must pass in
spring. Hardly enough now rem~in to insure their perpetuiation even if immediately protected. As throwing; some
light on the question as it is at the preseit time, I quote a
atafA3ment made a few mK>nths ago by a fellow-member ·of
the Virginia club:
"Last May I visited the club on a fishing trip, for
the decrease in the flight of shore birds no longer
made shooting worth while. One day my attention
was called to a large flock of robin snipe circling over
the marsh, the first I had seen in several years.
The 'migratory bird bill' had passed Congress several
months before, but the regulations authorized thereunder had not yet gone into effect, so the decoys were
set out and in an hour I had killed 100 birds. Other
shots, from the club north of us, showed that the
2o
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bunch of snipe were getting the usual bombardment
all along the line. AE the weather was warm the
birds were dressed immediately and I was surprised
to see that fifty-two females had eggs well developed,
indicating they were already mated and in a short
time would be on the nest within the Arctic circle.
Realizing what this meant, I applied a little common
sense to the problem. Had I permitted those 100
birds to go north, in less than 90 days they would
have returned 300 strong, giving a profit of 200 per
cent in three months. As it was, none came back.
Such an inve.stment, if advertised in the public press,
would be regarded as a 'get-rich-quick' proposition
and land the promoters in jail. Yet, it will apparently take an act of Congress to protect a legitimate game investment, and this must be forced upon
us, too, by the strong arm of the law."
It may be interesting to note that last spring, and shortly
before this when the sportsman was decrying such improvidence, the wild ducks were gathering in flocks south of the
Canadian boundary, ·a waiting open water. The "Waterloo
Courier," of Iowa, thus describes, in the temperate language
of a lay paper, one of the scenes occurring at many points
south of the international line:
·
"More wild ducks have been shot in Iowa during
the past two weeks than in many seasons previous.
Northerly gales and cold waves have twice arrested
the northerly migration of wildfowl and driven them
· southward, and wherever there has been open water,
the hunters have been able to kill them with ease,
Assuming the average number shot in each county
during the past two weeks to be 500, a conservative
estimate, 50,000 ducks have been slaughtered in Iowa
this spring. If permitted to pass on to the breeding
grounds unmolested, these birds and their progeny
would have furnished fine sport next fall."
This destruction of 50,000 mated birds, most of them
emaciated and easily shot, meant a decrease of fully 250,000
ducks on the return flight.

17
rdment
rm the
rprised
eloped,
a short
c circle.
ommon
ose

100

y would
200 per
e back.
lie press,
position
will a.pa legiticed upon

d shortly
'improvith of the
'W.a.terloo
language
· ny points
a during
previous.
arrested
·ven them
pen water,
with ease.
a.ch county
onservative
ed in Iowa
e breeding
ir progeny

"
st of them

lly 250,000

As stated before, spring shooting of local game, either
birds or animals, is strictly prohibited in the States, but
aside from ten or a dozen States, along the Oanadian border,
where this protection of wild fowl results in their nesting
locally, the country is thrown open to the rapid destruction
of birds en route to the nesting grounds. . On the Atlantic
coast, Maine, Niew York, New Jersey and Massachusetts have
long been leaders in the effort to protect migratory birds,
but the rest of the States in the south permit spring shooting
and four or five States have no laws protecting wild fowl or
shore birds any season of the year, the chief offenders being
Arkansas and Texas.
From the Gulf of Mexico and up the Mississippi to Canada
the situation is equally bad, for although Minnesota and
Wisconsin have excellent game laws even the latter permits
killing of geese in the spring. North Dakota, one of the
great wild-fowl resorts, and where protection in the spring
has added greatly to the fall shooting, is a contrast to South
Dakota, which allows shooting of wild f~wl and snipe from
September 10 to April 10. From these States south there
is practically no pretense of protecting migratory birds.
On the Pacific -coast, where an enormous number of
aquatic birds pass yearly between AJaska and the Gulf of
California, the State of California, with its exitensive shore
line, does not protect geese a single day in · the year and
allows ducks to be killed until March 1, besides permitting
snipe, plover and curlew to be shot until May 1. The
adjoining States on the north, Oregon and Washington,
have much better laws, which would be greatly improved if
they could get California adequately to guard, by way of
reciprocation, the birds whose protection in the North maintains the supply in all the southern waters.
Although many of the Southern States are the worst offenders, the ablest, most energetic and persistent supporters
of the migratory bird law come from this region, just as
the southern delegation in Congre~ was almost a unit for
the measure.
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Take, for instance, the House report on the migratory bird
bill, where Congressman Lee, from Georgi.a, says:
"The committee gave a public hearing and ·a large
amount of testimony was produced before it to sustain the provisions of the bill. It appeared that most
of the States of the Union have laws more or 1~
effective in the protection of game or other birds resident and breeding within their borders, and \jy
special reservation in the bill none of its provisions
are to be deemed to affect or to interfere with these
laws as to such birds or to prevent the States from
enacting laws and regulations in aid of the regulations of the Department of Agriculture provided for
in this bill. Through these local laws, however, it
appeared that because of their nomadic habits little
or no real protection was afforded water fowl and
other migratory game birds, and therefore, to secure
for them adequate protection, particularly in the
spring, when they are on their way to their nesting
grounds, they should be pla:c.ed under the custody of
the General Government. It also appeared that some
of the most valuable species of these nomads would
soon be extinct unless immediate congressional protection is afforded.
·
"It was clearly shown that the economic aspect was
twofold. The game birds yield a considerable and
an important amount of highly valued food, and if
given adequate protection will be a constant valuable
asset. The insectivorous migratory birds destroy annually thousands of tons of noxious weed seed and
billions of harmful insects. These birds are the deadliest foe yet found of the boll weevil, the gypsy and
brown-tailed moths, -and other like pests. The yearly
value of a meadow lark in a 10-acre field of cotton,
corn, or wheat is reckoned by experts at $5. The
damage done to growing crops in the United States
by insects each year is estimated, by those who have
made the matter a special study, at about $800,000,000.

"The majority of the committee believe that to
give Federal protection to these birds is no invasion
of State rights, for being migratory they belong to no
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single State, but to all the States over which they ..
pas.s and within which they simply pause for food,
rest, or breeding. It is believed that the question is
purely a Federal one and that under the strictest
construction of the Constitution these migratory birds
may and should be subject and entitled to national
protection by act of Congress."
One of the ·ablest and most effective game conservationists
in the United States is John H. Wallace, Jr., Game and Fish
Commissioner of the State of Alabama. Of his efforts to
have his State and other recreant ones protect migratory
birds, he says, in the Game Bulletin issued by his State:
"As a reciprocal obligation which is due by us to
those who reside in the North, migratory game birds
should be protected by the Southern States. Were it
not for the fact that during the nesting and breeding
sea.son these birds are protected, it would not be long
before there would be no birds to migrate during the
autumn and winter seasons to this section. Birds
know no State lines, -and, so far as the preservation
and protection of those that belong to the migratory
family is concerned, it is a national and not a State
question.
"A few of our citizens have objected to the protection of robins. These birds nest to, the north in
orchards and in the immediate vicinity of the homes
of citizens; they are much loved on account of their
friendliness to man and because of their sweet songs
during the spring. Formerly, robins were slaughtered by millions in the South, and oftentimes were
fed to hogs. The sensation of horror that must have
been felt by the people whose sweetest songbird is
the robin would be much akin to that which we
would experience if our mocking bird, the Southland's sacred songster, should migrate to Cuba and
be there butchered, as robins were formerly in Alabam1a .''
"These nomads should be placed within the custody and protection of the Government of the United
States. The Department of Agriculture, at Washington, should be authorized to adopt suitable regula-
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tions looking to this end by prescribing and fixing
closed seasons on game birds which migrate, having
due regard to the zones, temperature, breeding habits,
and times and lines of migratory flight.
"On account of the variability of the statutes relating to the protection of migratory birds in the
various States, little or no protection is afforded water
fowl and migratory song and insectivorous birds. In
order that many; of the most valuable species of
migratory birds be saved from extinction, immediare
congressional action is imperative."
Fall and. Winter Season Must Be Shortened.

But if spring shooting is wholly without justification there
remains yet another condition almost as bad, namely, the
continuous killing of migratory birds in the fall and winter
resorts, covering practically all the year, when taking spring
shooting into consideration. In this the individual Sta~
attempt an ingenuous justification by saying they only kill
the birds during the time it is possible to kill them. But, of
course, if each State does this and never curtails the season at
any time when th~ birds are there, it must follow that the
open season in the entire range amounts to eight months
or more, even though a few States protect the birds in the
spring. The shooting, therefore, must stop during som.e
period when the birds ·are still numerous in the States if
they are to be saved; but how can this be accomplished by
the few .States that are entirely willing to cut down their own
season? Surely such a controversy presents a Federal question if any ever did.
Though the great increase in the number of shoorers,
the deadliness of modern arms, the drainage of swamp lands,
and the commercial use of the water-ways make present conditions generally against aquatic birds, yet human nature, so
far as market hunters and selfish sportsmen is concerned, is
the same now as it was in 1857, when the Ohio Legislature
made the following report:
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"The passenger pigeon needs no protection. Wonderfully prolific, having the vast forests of the north
as its breeding grounds, traveling hundreds of miles
in search of food, it is here today and elsewhere tomorrow, and no ordinary destruction can lessen them
qr be missed from the myriads that are yearly prodbced."
"The snipe needs no protection. It does not breed
in Ohio, but merely tarries a while in its migration
to the breeding grounds in the extreme north. The
snipe, too, like the pigeon, will take care of itself, and
its yearly numbers cannot be materially lessened by
the gun."
The only difference in view . consists in there having _
been no protection on migratory birds in 1857, while now
many of the States have laws protecting these birds after
they have passed into another State or country I
When we consider that the wild pigeon far exceeded in
numbers any other species of local or migratory game bird,
and that these countless millions became extinct a few years
ago, because they were rrui,grrants, it ought to be plain what
will happen to the others of similar habits when they receive
hardly any more protection than the passenger pigeon, besides having many more enemies now to contend with. Sev- .
eral species have become extinct since the pigeon, others are
dangerously near the end, while the rest, from a hard-earned
sagacity rather than from the aid of man, are waging a desperate fight for survival.
The official record of wild fowl killed in Louisiana during the season of 1910 is as follows:
Wild ducks, sea and riven ........ 3,176,000
Coots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280, 740
Geese and brant. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . 202,210
Snipe and plover.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606,635
Likewise in Texas find other winter resorts of the wild
fowl the carnage is the same. This is what W. G. Sterrett,
Game and Fish Commissioner of Texas, says:
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"Migratory birds belong to no State and no State
has a right to slaughter them •a t cost of other States.
It is purely a Federal question. An open season for
wild ducks all the year in Texas and a closed season
for them in States lying north is an absurdity. We
kill them as they leave and kill them as they come
from Mexico on their way to their nests."
Game Warden E. V. V,isart, of Arkansas, under date of
March 2, 1912, telegraphed:
"Unles.s we get Federal protection of all migratory
birds, they, like the pigeon, will be extermmated.
Ninety thousand six hundred ducks at one shipment
from Missi$ppi County for eastern markets, October
16, 1911."
From the North, where spring shooting, combined with
the slaughter in the South, makes the inroads noticeable,
comes the following complaint:
"TOPEKA, KA'NS., March 4, 1912.
"American Game Protective and Propagation Association, 111 Broadway, New York City:
"Federal protection of migratory game birds absolutely necessary to prevent exitinction of many species
in this part of the country. Birds that were abundant
25 years ago are rare. Where formerly they passed
given points by the thousands during migratory season now only a few stragglers are seen. Every species
shows marked decrease ea.ch succeeding year. Hunters with improved guns and methods of destruction
increasing each year and game birds rapidly decreasing. State laws do some good, but are irregular and
defective. Federal protection seems to be the only
solution.

"L. L. DYCHE,
"Kansas State Fish and Game Warden."
In the opinion of practically every one familiar with the
situation, the Federal Bird Law will not only stop the rapid
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destruction but, in a very few years, will afford excellent
shooting, under reasonable seasons, in States suitable for
aquatic birds. Just as the productiveness of these birds have
made possible their survival, so will it, later on, mean a quick
and permanent restoration.
But with 4,000,000 spor~men in the United States (half
of whom are registering under licenses required by a part
of the States), and representing, in the aggregate, a body
much larger than the combined armies of th,e world, how
futile it is to expect that migratory birds can be killed practically all · the y~ar, while local game must receive ten
months' or more protection in order to survive.

PART II.
Why the Federal Migratory Law is Constitutional.
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In considering whether an act of Congre~ is constitutional the necessity for it may be, ·a nd in this particular case
is, of considerable weight in reaching a conclusion. Especially is this true when the jurisdiction takes the place,
in part, of one heretofore left to the States for exercise. If
the States in the past, or if they could in the future, effectively protect migratory birds, the demand for a Federal law
would lose most of its supporters, while the need of sustaining the law in the courts would be less important.
But in the past ten years the verdict of the people, who
favor game protection, has boon taken in every part of the
country and it has been unanimous on the urg~nt necessity
for the law. In considering the opposition ·of the market
lrwiters and all other selfish interests, it will be found that
their attack on the law resta more upon the loss of occup~tion or the lesooned chances for killing these birds than on
the unteil'able assertion that such a law was not needed in
conserving the wild fowl of this country.
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The fact that sportsmen in every vocation and in every
State supported the bill is rendered more emphatic by the
equally true statement that forty-four States, either through
their Governors, Legislatures, Game Commissioners or
Wardens, petitioned Congress for its passage, and that, too,
upon the ground that only the General Government could
satisfactorily and permanently settle the differences arising
over the inability of all the States to agree u[><)n and enforce
any set of laws fair and equitable to the people of all the
States. And this feeling, more than any other, was what
actuated both Houses of Congress in supporting and in
enacting the legislation.

Those Who O'[YPose the Act on Oonstitwtional Grournds.
The opposition and the only opposition to Federal control that merits the slightest consideration is that voiced by
several on the question of the constitutionality of the jurisdiction. And while we may assume that most of these objections are made in good faith, it is well to remember that behind such objections will come trailing a vast horde of market hunters, spring shooters, the owners of a certain class of
sportsmen's resorts and others who a.re against the Act for
purely selfish reasons and who will use the legal issue as a
screen for the mercenary or improvident destruction of wild
fowl and shore birds.
Should this jurisdiction be denied Congress or the Government, under any judicial proceeding, the end of those
birds now particularly the object of man's attack is not far
off. But the loss cannot be measured by the commercial or
sentimental value of the birds, its effect upon the pleasures
and outdoor life of millions of our citizens, or its influence in
preventing class antagonism should the remnant of the game
hereafter be reserved only for the rich. It will also directly
affect the continued existence of the greatest army of skilled
marksmen in the world, who, self-reliant, enured to hardships and educated in the use of firearms, now stand in re-
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serve for the defense of our country, and thus save hundreds
of millions of dollars to the tax-payers, should we maintain
a standing army compatible with the size and interests of
our nation.
This latter view is respectfully called to the attention of
the great business interests, the leaders in public affairs and
all other sensible and patriotic men, who, perhaps, having
no direct or personal interest in preservation of game, have
lost sight of its diversified and far-reaching benefits.
Therefore the presumption must follow that, in passing
upon the constitutionality of the Act, only the most urgent
and substantial reasons should be taken into consideration
by the courts.
The objections of Govemor Cole Blease, of South Carolina, contained in his recent message to the Legislature,
would not be worth refutation did he not stand for the
selfish class oppo,sing this bill, and, like them, use a number
of false statements in supporting his position, as the following extract shows:
"This is only an effort to protect a certain set of
Northerners. They establish their hunting clubs,
which are often nothing less than barrooms, and a.re
sometimes gambling dens, and put fences around
their hunting preserves and say to our people, 'Stay
out.' The United States Government, because these
people are rich, is attempting, in their interest, to deprive the people of our State of their God-given liberty and right to hunt and fish for the game and fish
which an all-wise Providence has provided free to all
mankind.''
If there is a worthy and philanthropic purpose behind this
Act, it is the one so to preserve the game supply that all may
have a chance in the hunting field. Wild fowl and shore
birds belong particularly to the class of game that ean be
pursued by the average sportsman in nearly every part of
the Union. To men of wealth and leisure wild game will be
found somewhere on the continent during the present gen-
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eration, and the cost of transportation and time cuts
figu;re with them.
fi~enl-n-n +l..n+ +l..:~ :~ n~ n~n~ ,..
The ~i:~-~~~.I!'
assertion of 1"'1~----~Governor Blease
that this is an effort to
deprive the people ef the right to hunt and fish is, therefore,
entirely uncalled for, and his plea that it should be "free"
to all is the-plea of the opportunist, for if wild life has not
--------·------- game
----- buticher
_, .. _,... ___ ---·
.... ·- ....... ----reasonable ------------protection every
would
kill every
living...., thing,
at
every
season
and
by
every
means.
In pleas....,,
ing contrast to this wide-open policy of the Governor is the
following telegram from his State, sent March 2, 1912:
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"In my opinion migratory birds should be under
the protection of the Nati.onal Government. This is
necessary --for their
preservation
proper r--·-proooo·---- r----· ----- and
- - - r--r-tion.r<•
,"
(Signed)
"JAMES HENRY RICE, JR.,
"Ohief Game Warden of Sowth Carolina."
-------,1
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'IJ Gen'l
uen i Oarrn,od;y's
va'IVfTlAUU//J s Opposition.-It
u1>Vom1iwn.-u 1s
rnnunaw that if the Act be attacked the. assault should be made by ~
able a lawyer as Att'y Gen'l Carmody, of New York. First,
because it may be assumed that the position taken by him
represents, in the main, all that can be said against its constitutionality; and second, because the State he represents
has one of the best set of game laws in the country, and yet
has been most insistent upon the passage of the migratory
bird bill, on the gro,u nd that the States had always been unable to agree upon the protection needed.
Therefore, instead of assailing the Attorney General for
his alleged presumption in questioning the law, as has been
the case with some who have supported the movement so
earnestly and successfully, it seems to the writer that Mr.
Carmody's opinion should be given the most careful and
respectful consideration, since those responsible for the suggested jurisdiction understood, from the beginning, that its
constitutionality involved several intricate questions. Had
the jurisdiction been apparent years ago the Act would
doubtless have been passed years before. But not until the
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decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Chicago
Drainage Canal case, and those subsequent decisions extending its scope, was the true nature and the po~ible futwe use
of such a Federal jurisdiction recognized by some. Ther~
fore, instead of evading the questions raised by Mr. Carmody or others equally sincere in their opposition, they
ought to be promptly met, and, it is hoped, that a refutation
of. their views will be accepted in the same spirit that questions their correctness.
Before taking up in detail the legal issues, the attention
of those desiring to acquaint themselves merely with a summary of the argulment is called to Mr. Burnham's introduction and also to a letter of the writer's appearing in the
Appendix ''E," wherein the legal side is presented in a more
condensed form.
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Mr. OarrrwiJJy's Written Opinion.-In the opinion rendered the New York State Game Commi~ion, on November
5, 1913, and in several communications growing out of the
discussions engendered thereby, the position of Att'y Gen'l
Carmody may be stated, justly, I think, as follows:
1st. That the States have heretofore exercised, and without denial of the General Government, the exclusive right
to protect all classes of game within their borders.
2d. That the courts, both State and Federal, have unifonnly sustained this exclusive right.
3d. That each State is capable of protecting all kinds of
game, and if not it is a matter that only concerns the States.
4th. That the Federal Government possesses no constitutional power to classify certain species of game as migratory
and assum~ a general jurisdiction thereover.
The first thing noticeable in the argument covering these
objections is the fact that Mr. Carmody does not seriously
oontend that the States collectively are capable of affording
proper protection to migratory birds, nor does he attempt to
overcome the proof that the intervention of the Federal Government will result in saving and perpetuating migratory
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birds. In other words, it is the doctrine of sovereign StarightB in its most ancient and most dogmatic form; for ht
claims, with evident equanimity, the technical p~ession
of a power incapable of exercise in one sphere and the with,
holding of a power capable of efficient exercise in anotb
sphere. This is clearly shown in an extract concluding Im
opinion to the State Commission, and was doubtless plMed
there for the purpose of emphasizing his legal position:

"It would be better to submit to an ineffective exercise of the power of a State in regard to a subject over
which the State has a recognized jurisdiction than
submit to a much more effective exercise of power on
·the part of the Federal Government in relation to a
subject over which it has no jurisdiction."
In other words, it is better to bastardize the offspring of
the Federal Government and recognize as a vested "right"
the congenital impotency of the States than to take the posi•
tion that legislative power follows the character of the dl&y
to be performed by the States or the National Governmen\
respectively.
In comparing the legal relation of the States and the Fed·
eral Government to local and migratory birds, I will quote
from a brief filed at the Senate hearings, Ma:rch 6, 1912:

"Why a Federal Supervunon Over Migratory Bird, i,
Oonstit,wtional.
"Under our dual system/ of government the Sta.tea
have absolute control of their local affairs, including
the right to protect or to neglect all interests in which
citizens of each are alone concerned. This privilege of
local self-government, and in which the responsibility
for good or bad management rests directly upon tpose
benefited or injUtred by the exercise of their own
power, is the most important of our political righ1B,
since the material and social welfare of the average
citizen is more affected by the proper or improper administration of local laws than in those of the General
Government.
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"But the very evident purpose of the founders of
our Government in granting to the people within their
respective States all the rights and responsibilities of
local control was no more manifest than the intention
to absolutely deprive them of all power to interfere in
the dome,stic management of other States or with matters of a national or international character.
"Just as a State is divided into counties, boroughs,
townships, cities, wards, and precincts and into legislative, judicial, and congressional districts, in order to
reduce to the lowest possible unit the privilege of local
self-government and just as a State is dominant in
legislative power over all such subdivisions-so the
National Government, with the States as the units of
the Republic, is supreme in all matters that concern
the States as a whole or which have to do with matters
of general administration.
"The wisdom of this plan of sovereign State administration in all domestic affairs is, however, no greater
than the wisdom of centering in the General Government all the power necessary to manage the affairs of
the whole.
"A number of overzealous advocates of the pending
legislation, lacking legal training and a knowledge of
our system of government have decried 'States rights'
as an antiquated doctrine, just as the few opponents
of the measure naturally misled thereby have been
induced to attack its constitutionality through the belief that, however beneficial, it necessa.rily involved an
attack upon our system of local self-government.
Each o.f these mistake the scope or purpose of this
measure.
"States Rights A.re of Two Kin<ls.

"In any effort to properly analyze the extent and
character of the governmental powers granted or reserved by the several States, it becomes of importance
to determine whether or not such existent powers are
sufficient for the preservation of all the rights incident
to citizenship; for there is a vast difference between
the preservation of the powers of each'. State and the
ability to preserve the individual or joint rights of all
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under the full exercise of the jurisdiction p ~ by
the States.
"And in this analysis it will be found that such
privileges are divisible in two great but very different
classes, viz: (1) intrastate rights and (2) intersta~
rights.
"In the first division will be found all those matters
of domestic concern and which include the regulation
of public health, public morals, industrial safety, and
the general welfare of the people. So far as the Federal Government is concerned, in a jurisdictional
sense, it matters not how wisely or badly such affairs
are managed. And under this exclusive control come
laws affecting local game and fish in local waters, for
whether such laws are efficient in form or in their enforcement is likewise immaterial to the National Government.
"But the citizens of every Statie have many domestic interests that cannot be satisfactorily protected
even by the fullest exercise of their own State laws,
and these rights are of interstate character, dependent
upon the recognition of a comity, which, however apparent, is incapable of protection without the intervention of the General Government. · This because
the .State laws have no extraterritorial jurisdiction
whatsoever, and hence in many cases the citizens
thereof must suffer without recourse if Congress, representing the States as a whole, does not supply the
remedy.
"Character and Extent of Interstate Intercourse.

"Intercourse between the States, and out of which
such interstate rights usually arise, may likewise be
divided into two kinds: (1) Commercial and (2)
non-commercial intercourse.
"Under the Federal power 'to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the States' there has
gradua1ly grown up a most extensive system of regm•
lating business intercourse between the States, covering not only the manufacture, production, and shipment of commodities ·a nd the instrumentalities entering into such commerce, but everything that promotes
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or retards such commercial intercourse. Were this
not so, and the States arbitrarily controlled and regulated interstate and foreign commerce, the controversies would be endless, while the progress and prosperity of the Nation would be greatly retarded.
"This fact was clearly understood by the framers of
the Constitution, for much confusion and friction had
arisen from this cause under the former Articles of
Confederation. But this provision for the Federal
regulation of commercial intercourse, little as its
future importance may have been understood at the
time, did not fully cover various forms of non-commercial intercoUTse, and which, for precisely the same
reasons, would require the intervention of an impartial and efficient medium in their regulation.
"In the early history of the country this was not so
manifest, and the need of Federal laws regulating
any other form of intercourse than that relating to
commerce between the States seemed unnecessary, and
for many years the States were permitted to regulate
immigration, foreign and interstate quarantine, and
the like. Yielding the right to regulate immigration
and foreign quarantine, the States nevertheless are becoming more and more involved in other controversies arising out of intercourse that cannot be controlled under their own law or by any resort to the
commercial jurisdiction of the Federal Government,
broad and elastic as it may be.
"On investigation it will be found that non-co~
mercial intercourse between the States, like that having to do with commerce, may be evidenced in many
ways; nor is it necessary to confine it to the action or
activities of mankind, but it may properly include all
the instrumentalities entering into such intercourse as
well as all the elements of nature, organic or inorganic, which enter into or influence such intercourse,
beneficial or injuriously, as the case may be.
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"Why Interstate IntercO'Ufrse Must Be· Subject to Federal Swpervision.
·
"If one State unreasonably obstructs or diverts the
waters of a navigable interstate stream to the disadvantage of the other States, the latter would be power3c
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less to correct this, and hence the General Government, acting under its implied authority to keep such
W1ater open for commerce, must act.
"But suppose the offending State unreasonably pollutes such waters, what remedy have the injured
S1iates? Or if an interstate water, navigable or nonnavigable, be so diverted as to cease flowing into adjoining States, thereby causing great financial lo~ and
great inconvenience arising out of such States being
deprived of water needed for domestic purposes, for
irrigation, for water power, or for its value in providing game and commercial ·fish, what would be the
remedy possessed by the injured States in any or all
of the instanc.es cited? Absolutely none under the
jurisdiction of their own laws.
"Again, another form of intercourse has arisen that
reqUJires some form of Federal supervision, not only
in safeguarding the public, but in protecting the
rights of those involved, viz, the passage of hundreds
of thousands of people from one State to another in
private automobiles and a fewer number using flying
machines. As this form of intercou['se is in nowise
connected with commerce any more than when one
walks or rides in his private conveyance from State
to State, it would be a direct perversion of the commercial jurisdiction to attempt any regulation thereunder.
"Still another and more serious form of intercourse
may be cited,· namely, the passage of noxious animal
and insect lift from one State to another, imperiling
the health of communities having no control over the
origin or transmission of such vagrant life, even
though by this means yellow fever, malaria, and the
bubonic plague are conveyed the,reby.
"Again, hundreds of millions of dollars and general prosperity may be threatened by the passage of
certain insect life, injuring and destroying the plant
and -animal industries of the country. And what is
t~ie remedy for all this? Surely not shotgun quarantme.
"Some will suggest that a Federal interstate quar. antine law will reach most of these evils. But the
word quarantine or ·a nything representing such a sys-
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tern of supervision is not mentioned in the Federal
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Constitution. An effort has been made to predicate
such sanitary regulations upon the commerce clause,
but it is simply false pretense. The quarantine power
is greater than the commercial power of any Government, since quarantine may destroy or suspend commerce, but C9mmerce never can destroy or suspend
any proper system of quarantine, simply because public health must be rated above individual wealth.
Consequently, we mu t look for some other authority
in the Constitution than that arising out of the commercial jurisdiction.
·"In the same way air passing from one State to
another must be protected, at times, since it may be
unreasonably polluted or poisoned, and thus become
a menace to the health or property of the citizens in
the adjoining State. Yet no State UJllder its own laws
can protect itself against any of these acts of commission or omission occurring beyond its borders, although the sole sufferers therefrom may reside
within it.
"These cases might be ~ultiplied but should suffice
by way of illustration.
"In the writer's opinion, the Constitution has provided another most effective way for regulating certain forms of intercourse between the States which, by
reason of its injurious character or because of its benefits, stands in need of a regulation not poESible under
State laws.
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"The Gonetit'IJJ.tiorial Right of the Federal Government
to Settle Oontro1Jersies Between the States.
"While it may be conceded that the framers of the
Constitution did not realize the full import of the
power given Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, yet it was undoubtedly understood
that this was, fundamentally, a national function, because the States, however sovereign within their borders, were powerless to adjust or settle controversies
arising out of foreign and interstate commerce.
"But the very fact that the States were deprived of
all authority over intercourse originating beyond their
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borders, or which, originating therein, passed beyond,
made it quite essential that such a situation be provided for, and so, after giving Congress the power to
regulate commercial intercourse between the States,
there was inserted in the Constitution the express right
of the Federal Government to settle all other controversies between States. ( Art. III, sec. 2.)
"This power to settle controversies, vague and uncertain as it may first seem, is destined to become as
useful and as efficient in reguJating all forms of noncommercial intercourse as that now being eX1ercised
so successfully by the Government in the control of
business intercourse.
"Originally it was supposed that this jurisdiction
only extended to the settlement of boundary disputes
and other controversies having to do with the . geographical or political character of a State-just as the
power to regulate commerce was originally believed
to be a negative one and intended only as a bar against
State regulation.
"While it is true that this jurisdiction to settle controversies is, primarily, a judicial one, under the section quoted; but this was because any controversies
which might arise between the States could not be definitely anticipated, as in the case of commerce. Hence
it was properly left to the Supreme Court to decide
what constituted a. controversy between the States. In
order to invoke Federal intervention the controversy
must be of a justiciable character-some contentionthat were it to arise between the citizens of a State
would be subject to judicial determination or legislative action. This power was intended to meet all the
possible and all the unforeseen contingencies arising
out of the States possess.ing no extraterritorial jurisdiction. Already this view has been given judicial sanction by the Supreme Court of the United States. In
the case of Missouri vs. 'rhe Chicago Drainage Commission, et ·al., it was held that no State or any citizen
thereof had the right to unreasonably pollute the
waters of an interstate stream, since such a menace to
the health and property of the citizens of another
State constituted the kind of controversy contemplated
by the Constitution. Again, in the case of the Ten-
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nessee Copper Co. the same court held, in effect, that
no State, or any one acting within its authority, could
so pollUJte or poison the atmosphere as to injure the
health or property of citizens in an adjoining State.
Were the general quarantine power of the National
Government ever questioned, apart from a connection
direct or remote, with commerce, the writer believes
that this court would undoubtedly hold that the inability of the States to enact and enforce a uniform and
efficient system of quarantine, ·a nd especially when
dealing with epidemic diseases of great virulence,
w:ould constitute such a series of controversies as to
require a general supervision Ulllder laws to be enacted
by Congress.
"A judicial jurisdiction may imply a subsequent
legislative jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has already decided this in the affirmative, and the reason
is plain. For when the Supreme Court declared that
one State may not unreasonably pollute the water or
the atmosphere so as to injuriously affect the citizens
of another State such a finding involved both a que~
tion of law and of fact; and it nece~arily decided that
such a wrong was, per se, a public nuisance, and which
thereafter must be regarded as settled, so far as the
legal character of the wrong is concerned. And thereupon Congress can, if it wishes, regulate what the
court has decided to be a Federal offense. Were this
not so, the Supreme Court would have to spend much
of its time passing Ulpon questions of fact, not involving a new question of law.
"The same reason for the Federal regulation of controversies over interstate waters was announced in the
case of Kansas v~. Colorado, where the coUJrt held that
no State had the right to so unreasonably divert the
waters of a river as to deprive a neighboring State of
it.a previous uses of such waters for irrigation and general domestic purposes. The fact that in this and in
the Missouri water-pollution case the bills were finally
dismi~ ( without prejudice), because the evidence
failed to suipport the allegations, is immaterial, since
the principle was laid down at the time demurrers
were overruled.
"Unless Congress can in the future regulate the pollution or unreasonable diversion of interstate streams,
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just as it does now in all matters affecting navigation,
such controversies between the States will never be set,.
tled in the absence of uniform regulation enforred
by a government that is not only disinterested but
capable of maintaining its authority.
"Conceding, for the sake of the argument, the correctness of these conclusions, we will now look at the
possible scope of the Federal jurisdiction created
thereby.
"The Right of the Govemment to Protect Migratory
Birds and Migratory Fish.
"If it be admitted that the regulation of noxious insect life-be such carried by water from State to State,
as in a case of typhoid germs, or by the atmosphere or
·a ny other medium-depends solely upon the legal
right of the Government to settle controversies between
the States, then it must be apparent that the moment
it can be shown that Federal control of certain migratory life can be exercised because of the injuries to the
public it must also follow that the protection of beneficial migrants, such as wild fowl, insectivorous birds,
and fish, must likewise become subject to a Federal
supervision whenever it appears that the States fail to
enact or enforce laws suitable for their protection.
"Take the case of a stream flowing through a dozen
States to the sea. If the State at the mouth of such a
river would allow the placing of nets and dikes across
the entire entrance in order that a few local fishermen
could reap a temporary harvest while exterminating
such fish, or if, upon the other hand, such a State
erected .a dam for water-power purposes across such a
stream, thereby preventing the access of fish to the
States above, what remedy do the injured citizens of
the other States possess? Again, in what position are
the people of the United States when the Federal Government erects fish hatcheries at the headwaters of
certain streams and then is unable to obtain any of
the spawn of the shad or salmon, because practically
all such fish are intercepted by nets on the lower
reaches of the rivers?
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"When it can be shown to the satisfaction of the SupremeCourt that the shad and the salmon, which must
seek the fresh water for reproduction,or that the mackerel and other commercial fish, following the tilfol
shores of the coast States, are threatened with extinction because of controversies between the States oYer
their protection, then it seems likely that some form
of Federal intervention will be permitt~d; and when
this occurs, one may rest assured that it will fake the
form of regulations just alike to all the State., and to
all the people. It is this comity in things t.liat are
common to two or more States, whether it be N"ater
useful for potable purposes, for irrigation, fer wRter
power, for fisheries, that require the arbitration and
the sub.sequent regulation of the same by the Central
Government.''

National and State Poliee Power.-Still another error of
Mr. Oarmody's, and also of some others questioning the con-

stitutionality of the Act, is the confident assertion that police
powei: is reserved exclusively to the States, and hence, as
the enactment of every game law and its enforcement admittedly depends upon the possession of this so-called power,
the alleged inability of the National Government to exercise
it proves conclusively that the subje_ct of game legislation was
reserved emlusively to the States. I quote several paragraphs
of Mr. Carmody's expressing this view:
"From the beginning of the Government a police
power over public health, which includes the protection of its food supply, of which migratory birds form
a valuable pa.rt, was one of the rights designedly reserved to the States.''
And again:
"The assumption-is unavailing in the face of the
decisions of our courts that the protection of all game
has been from the earliest times a State police power."
The fact that a similar view was expressed, shortly after
the bill was introduced into Congress, led the writer, some
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eight years a.go, to prepare and publish a monograph on
"The Extent and Character of National Police Power." The
following extract therefrom may be sufficient to indicate his
position, but if any one desires to consider the question more
at length a further extract from the article appears in A ppendix "G":
"The generally accepted doctrine that police power
is reserved exclusively to the States is based upon an
old misapprehension regarding the purposes for
which this power is invoked in all legislative spheres.
"Police power, it must be remembered, is only that
part of the penal law which deals particularly with
offenses derogatory to the public welfare, in contradistinction tiO those grosser offenses affecting the individual rights of man. It matters not whether a law
be enacted by Congre....c::s or a State legislature regulating pure food and drugs, meat inspection, safety appliances, hows of labor, water pollution, the sale of
lottery tickets, the transmission of obscene matter, the
protection of game and fish, political contributions by
corporations, trade monopolies, rates of transportation, or the regulation of epidemic diseases by quarantine---for one and all are police regulations 1
whether connected with commerce or not. Such a
penal jurisdiction necessarily exists within the legislative sphere of either class of sovereigns, since each
must possess all the authority necessary for enacting
or maintaining any supervisory regulations of the
above character."

Oertain Game Within a State Subject to EXJ.clusive Fe<lJeral
Regulation.
The oft-repeated assertion that all game within a State is
subject to its exclusive control and that the ~lice jurisdiction thereover is one only possessed by t~e Stares 1s erroneous
in both respects.
In recent years several hundred bird and wild-animal
refuges have been established on the public domain within
the States and private la.nds have been purchased at times
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for this purpose, so that formerly where the State game laws
were supreme they have been abrogated and replaced by Federal regulations. Large National Parks exist within States,
primarily intended for conserving the flora and fauna
therein, and National Monuments also, like that in the
Olympic range in the State of Washington, set aside partly
for the preservation of a nearly extinct variety of elk.
Bison ranges, under fence, exist in some States and are maintained by the Federal Government, while numerous Federal
Fish hatcheries are to be found in the States. All these lands
for the preservation and protection of game have come under
the control of the National Government. In an opinion,
some years ago, Att'y Gen'l Knox stated that the National
Forests within the States, comprising hundreds of millions
of acres, could be brought under the regulations of Congress
for the protection of game therein.
As late as February 6, 1914, Congress passed a bill to
establish a Fish Culture Station in Florida, appropriating
$50,000 for the purpose and providing, among other things,
that "the State of Florida, through appropriate legislative
action, should accord the U. S. Commissioner of Fisheries
and his duly authorized agents the right to conduct fish cultural work and all other operations connected therewith, in
any manner and at any time that may be considered necessary, any fishery law of the State to the contrary notwithstanding." In commenting on the proposed Act the Assistant Secretary of the Department tif Commerce said:
"Among the migratory fish of great economic importanc.e
which may be cultivated to advantage in Florida are the
shad and st11rgeon."·
The Lacey Act was one of the first national game laws
passed to take effect only in the States, making a penal offense
of any game shipped in violation of State laws, and subjecting the vio:lator to a Federal jurisdiction, and that, too, in a
State where the Hilleged offense may not be one under the
State law where the v ~ndee or consignee receives the game.
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The Fishery Treaty, recently entered into with Great
Britain, would place the Great Lakes system, the connecting
rivers and tribut.aries under the joint control of the United
States and Canada, thus setting aside the fish laws over
waters belonging to the .States of Minnesota, Wisconsin,
~chigan, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York and
Maine, heretofore under the exclusive game regulations of
these States. And this for precisely the same purpose as
that in the migratory-bird Act, namely, regulation of mutual
interests in the same thing by a Government capable of adjusting and protecting the same.
Thus it will be seen that the Federal Government does protect certain game within the States and that it does exercise
a police jurisdiction over such as may come within its jurisdiction. The o.n ly question, therefore, in the present case
arises over the right of the Government to protect migratory
birds in the States and not over the power required, whenever such migrants become subject to Federal regulation.
Geer vs. OonnecticUit.-As an insurmountable obstacle to
the exti.stence of any form of Federal control over any kind
of game within a State the case of Geer vs. Connecticut has
been cited by Mr. Carmody.
I quote from his brief as follows:
"The authority, however, which seems to be decisive of a State's sole right of property in wild game
within its territory is Geer vs. Connecticut, 161 U. S.,
519, where a statute of Connecticut forbidding the
killing for transportation without the State or possession with intent to transport beyond the State-was upheld as a commendable State police act and
in no way violative of the Federal commerce clause."
The writer was quite familiar with the law laid down in
the above case before he prepared the migratory-bird bill for
introduction. He then and no.w regards it as one of the best
and most effective decisions for the protection of game that
ever came from any court. The opinion, by Chief Justice
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White, was concurred in by the writer's father, then an A~ociate Justice of this court, •a nd who, as an active sportsman,
aided the majority in sustaining a State law which the minority of the court, under a dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan, claimed to be unconstitutional. The purpose was the
legislative right of a State to prohibit the shipment beyond
its bo:rders of game killed within it. On the result depended
the since successful movement of the States to prevent the
shipment of game for commercial purposes, which, more
than any other thing, was rapidly depleting the game of the
country, because the market hunters and the game dealers,
working in combination, were able to supply the great game
markets of this and other c•iuntries from States where game
was still to be found. The question and the only question
was whether game, when lawfully reduced to possession, became an article of commerce, thus permitting the person in
possession to ship it out o.f the State. The court held that
the rights of ownership in / era natural could be qualified by
a State law. No Federal law was in existence a~erting a
supervision over migratory birds, and therefore the State
statute was very properly sustained. The statement by the
court that "common ownership imports the right to keep the
property, if the sovereign so chooses, always within its juris-diction for every purpose" particularly suggests the conc.Iusion that the court did not have in mind a later and necessary classification of game based upon the fact that there were
certain kinds which, from their migratory habits, could not
be always kept within its jurisdiction for every purpose.
In an address before the New York Forest, Fish and Game
League, at Elmira, December 4, 1913, Dr. J. S. Palmer said:

"It is often urged that the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Geer vs. Connecticut acts as an
effective bar to any Federal legislation on migratory
birds, inasmuch as the court then held that game
was entirely under the jurisdiction of the State.
?-'hose who h_o~d this view apparently read something
mto the doo1s10n of the Supreme Court that is not
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there. The question presented to the court was simply the distinction between individual and State
property rights in game, whether game having been
reduced to possession was the absolute property of the
individual who had killed it or whether State laws
regulating its use could be enforced. No question of
the distinction between State and Federal authority
was presented to the court and no decision on this
point was rendered."
An erroneous suggestion, though possibly invited by some
other supporter of the bill, is made by Mr. Carmody in the
following, statement:

"It is claimed, I understand, by the patrons of this
bill that the Act is based upon sec. 8, art. I, which
gives to Congress power to provide for the common
defense and the general welfare of the United States."
On the contrary, so far as the writer is concerned, no legislative jurisdiction whatever was based upon the section in
question, and in a brief, several years ago, he said:
"Any effort to Sllfltain the migratory-bird bill or
any other legislation whatsoever upon the 'general
welfare' clause in the preamble or in the body of the
Constitution is a most mischievous endeavor. Were
the general welfare made a basis for establishing a
new. jurisdiction instead of the object of legislation
under an existing jurisdiction any written constitution would be a farce, for, as all bills, public in scope,
are supposedly for the general welfare there would
be no limit whatever on legislative action."
Nevertheless it is true that the welfare clause gives Congress, when acting under any express or implied jurisdiction,
the same right to protect the citizens of the United States as
a State has in its internal, affairs.

To Those Who Strain at a Gnat and Swallow a Gamel.
The contention of som~ is that, if no Federal jurisdiction
exists over migratory life within the States, it becomes their
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manifest duty to resent this perversion of the law. In this
view of the law they are wrong, however right may be their
motives. If such objectors, however, had attacked many important duties now being performed by the Central Government, instead of viewing the same with evident satisfaction,
their sincerity, at least, would be less open to question, since
-a technical case can be made against numerous extra-legal
exists over migratory life within the States, it becomes their
acts of the Government.
Look at this list, lacking any specific authority under the
Constitution: Extension of the Admiralty jurisdiction beyond tidal waters; governmental currency not based on gold
or silver; the establishment of a national bank system with
private stockholders, issuing notes; banks of deposit in the
postal service; Parcel Post for merchandise; eminent domain; the creation of the Department of Interior, including
thereunder the Bureau of Pensions, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, exercising a custodianship over Indians far exceeding the regulation of commercial intercourse authorized by
the Constitution, the Bureau of Education, the Geological
Survey, the Reclamation Service and the use of public funds
for the redemption and improvement of private lands for
local benefits, the Bureau of Mines and the use of its employees in aiding private firms and corporations; the Department of Agriculture-one of the most important of allwith numerous divisions, such as the Weather Bureau,
largely used for the protection of plant and animal life and
the conveniences of the general public, the two Bureaus of ,
Animal and Plant Industry, with thousands of employees;
the Bureau of Chemistry, the Bureau of Soils, the Bureau
of Entomology, the Bureau of Biological Survey, Division
of Publications, Bureau of Statistics, Agricultural EQ{periment stations, free distribution of seeds, plants and technical
publications, Office of Public Roads, Department of Commerce and Labor ( since divided), including the Bureau of
Corporations, the Bureau of Manufactures, the Bureau of
Labor, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Bureau of Fisheries. Be-
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sides these there is a Board of Engineers for rivers and harbors, who exercise exclusive powers over navigable waters
heretofore supposed to be only possessed under a proprietary
right; also the Life Saving Service; the Bureau of Public
Health; a United States Federal Court in China; National
Parks; National Cemeteries, Battle-Field parks; irrigation
dams and canals within the States for private benefit; the
levee system, intended primarily for the protection of private lands from inundation and not for the promotion of
navigation; preservation of water-sheds in the States; various forms of government over the Insular Possessions and
not contemplated in the Constitution. Besides these there
are many other offices, functions and duties which, with those
heretofore mentioned, involve the employment of hundreds
of thousands of public servants and the expenditure of
millions of money in affairs necessarily incident to the existence of a nation such as ours. And though this be true,
the supporters of the migratory-bird law do not ask that it
be sustained on the ground of necessity alone, but contend
that the authority of the Government can be shown to rest
upon a substantial constitutional right, however lntnca.te and
however advanced may be the interpretation of the existing
power.
S'Ulm.lTM,ry of thk Oonstitwtional Questio~.

The failure of the States to properly protect migratory
birds is due principally to three causes: (a) the selfishness
or ignorance prevailing in some States that prevent any
effort being made to either enact or enforce effective laws;
( b) the natural disposition, on the part of other States to
have an open season during the period transient birds are
present, resulting in spring shooting, or again in a too prolonged fall and winter season, when the entire range is taken
into consideration; ( c) the lack of any extra-territorial authority or any practical meians of entering into joint com-
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pacts, so as to make possible uniform regulations and their
enforcement throughout forty-eight States.
The question of selfishness or ignorance, however destructive to migratory birds or to the extension of closed seasons in neighboring States, is no basis in itself for Federal
intervention, since the failure of a State to do a performable
duty seldom warrants such performance by the Federal Government.
But the natural disposition of a State, authorized only to
legislate for its own citizens, to have an open season all the
time the migrants are present or en route, is an important
question when considering the legal and equitable rights of
the citizens of the United States collectively.
While the lack of any extra-territorial jurisdiction is a
vitally important question, just as is the inability to put
into effect interstate regulations under a joint agreement; for
such a situation indicates very strongly that this inherent
inability to act means an exlisting power elsewhere.

The Remlt of the States Having No Extra-territorial
Jwrisdiction.-As -already appears the supremacy of the State
in all matters of local self-government has been freely conceded. While, in the relation of the States to each ofilier, it
has been pointed out that all forms of oomrrrercial intercourse requiring regulation fall within the powers of CQngress, under a duly enumerated section of the Constitution.
Therefore, whatever confusion or harm results from the lack
of extra-territorial jurisdiction must arise from intercourse
that is non-commercial in character.
For many; years Congress did not undertake to exercise its
·a uthority over commercial intercourse beyond keeping commerce free and unhampered by State regulations. Then
gradually, as trade between the States increased and new
methods and new instrumentalities entered into manufacture
or transportation, Congress began to pass laws regulating
various forms of commerce, including monopolies, restraint
of trade, impure food, meat inspection, traffic in drugs and
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lottery tickets, regulations over navigation covering the erection of bridges, dams and docks, levees and whatever would
promote or safeguard travel, be.sides enacting laws affecting
rebates, traffic rates, the liability of employers and even the
so-called traffic in "white slaves."
In the same way, but somewhat less apparent, there gradually grew up many forms of intercourse between the States
requiring the same kind of regulation as that exercised over
harmful commercial intercourse. It was found that many
streams and waters common to two or more States were being
unreasonably pollmed, resulting in sickness or death to hundreds of thousands of citizens, besides entailing a tremendous
burden on municipalities in filtration plants or the building
of distant reservoirs with costly conduits; while other beneficial uses in waters, for manufacture, for ice refrigeration,
in the maintenance of fisheries, for irrigatio.ri or water-power,
were interfered with by unreasonable pollution or the unreasonable diversion of such waters. Even the protection of
Niagara Falls, on account of its scenic beauty, became a matter of great concern to the citizens of all the States. Then
smelting and rendering plants were located where they were
not a nuisance to the citizens of their own State, but affecting and injuring the health and property of citizens residing
in ·adjoining States. What was the remedy for these manifest evils? While, under the common or statutory law of
each State, every citizen has a remedy for a private nuisance,
or, when the nuisance is a public one, the State can abate
the same or punish the offending persons criminally, yet
such legal remedies cannot be directed against nuisances
originating beyond the borders of their State.
Probably very few realize how lacking each State ism any
power to protect its citizens when their property or personal
rights are affected in the way suggested. If, for instance, a
citizen of Ohio, using a deadly weapon, shoots across the
boundary line and kills, without provocation, a citizen in the
adjoining State, he may return to his home and remain unmolested so far as the jurisdiction of the other State is con-
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cerned. Even the right of extradition, under the Constitution, only provides for the rendition of a fugitive when he
flees from a State in which he committed the crime. Yet it
will be recalled how, a few years ago, a citizen of Kentucky
charged with murdering the Governor of his State found a
safe refuge in the State of Indiana, where the Governor refused to honor a requisition from Kentucky. The Thaw case
is another instance of a fugitive successfully resisting a return to the place of commitment.
Suoh -a condition of absolute independence of each State
in the management of its own affairs and the equally plain
lack of jurisdiction when undertaking to protect itself or its
citizens beyond its borders, shows how necessary it is to have
some central authority invested with a power to adjust and
settle controversies between the States.

Missouri vs. Illinois.-It was such a condition that confronted the United States Supreme Court when, in 1900, the
State of Missouri filed a bill against the State of Illinois and
the Sanitary District of Chicago, 200 U. S., 496, alleging
that the construction and proposed maintenance of a sewa.ge
disposal canal, connected by other waters with the Mississippi River, wouJd so poison the water supply of inhabitants
of Missouri that it would be dangerous to the public health
and a source of continual injury to the commercial and domestic uses of such waters; and that this nuisance could only
be prevented by the intervention of the Federal Government,
under the clause in the Constitution authorizing settlement
of controversies between two or more States. The defend·a nts
demurred to the bill for want of jurisdiction; taking, in
effect, the position that the State of Missouri had no legal
right of complaint against the defendants, since each State
was supreme in the control of ·all public waters within its
borders; and, further, that there existed no jurisdiction in
the Federal Government to settle any such alleged controversy arising over a State's unreasonable use of waters, because this use was a matter for each State to determine as it
4c
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saw fit, without interference from other States or from the
National Government.
Thus we perceive that exactly the same issue arose then,
as now, in respect to the alleged right of a State to have an
unlimited and arbitrary jurisdiction over whatever property
or element of nature that might come within its regulatory
powers. Heretofore, it is true that the uniform decision of
the courts, State and Federal, were to the effect that, aside
from navigation, each State possessed a sovereign and 81'clusive control over all puJblic waters within its borders. But
now, for the first time, we have the court differentiating between local waters and those that pass from State to Stateexactly the same issue as in local and migratory birds.
The opinion of the court in the above case is summarized
in the following paragraph (page 248):
"What is sought is relief against the pouring of
sewage and filth, by artificial arrangements, into the
Mississippi River, to the detriment of the State of Missouri and her inhabitants, and the acts are not merely
those that have been done, or which when done cease
to operate, but acts contemplated as continually repeated from day to day. The relief prayed for is
against not merely the creation of a nuisance but
against its maintenance.
"Our conclusion, therefore, is that the demurrers
filed by the respective defendants cannot be sustained."
Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Justice Harlan
and Justice White, dissented, taking the position that the
settlement of controversies between two or more States, and
relied upon by the complainants, did not extend beyond the
differences arising over matters involving the sovereignty of
the States, when brought into direct antagonism, as in the
case of boundary disputes, etc. This view, if it had prevailed, would have narrowed the jurisdiction very m~h.
It is interesting to note that in the latter case of Kansas
vs. Colorado, involving the alleged unreasonable diversion of
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waters by the State of Colorado so as to greatly impair the
former's use of water needed for irrigation, that the court
was unanimous in its conclusions sustainingi the right of the
Government to treat this as a justiciable controversy under
the Constitution, the dissenting Justices in the previous case
accepting the principle laid down in the former one.
In the Tennessee Copper Company case (206 U. S.)
the scope of these decisions was extended to the pollution
or the poisoning of air passing from one State to another,
which nuisances heretofore were supposed to be under the
exclusive regulation of each State.
Thus we find the important principle laid down that
whereas eaoh State may do as it pleases with local waters or
other elements of nature, yet when any such acts of commission or omission affect the interests of persons living in other
States the Constitution has provided the means for permanently and satisfactorily settling these controversies.
Is there any one who, on due inquiry, is prepared to say
that the passage of noxious insect or animal life from State
to State or from foreign nations, carrying plagues, fevers, or
other dangerous diseases, has not become a matter of Federal
regulation or that insects injuriously affecting our plants,
our forests and our live-stock, is a matter wholly of State regulation? Yet quarantine and any similar method of supervision does not come under the commercial power of Congress. That the transmission of disease, by any medium,
from State to State, comes within the class of controversy
laid down in Missouri vs. Illinois and subsequent cases is
certainly not a strained construction, since the conveyance
of typhoid germs was the main contention in the Missouri
case.
Therefore, whenever it appears, under satisfactory proof,
that valuable fish passing from one State to another or coming temporarily from the high seas are so unreasonably destroyed or so intercepted in their access to the waters of the
several States as to indicate their quick extermination, ~mst
it not follow that a Federal jurisdiction axis~ in settling suoh
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a controversy between the offending and the injured States?
Yet when this is admitted, as it ought to be, the main position of those opposing the migratory-bird law is hopelessly
shattered, for, over and above all their other contentions, is
the continually reiterated assertion that no possible jurisdiction exists in the Federal Government for protecting migratory life within the several States. Although local waters,
local game and local fish are subject to the exdusive control
of the State, yet whenever water, or air, or fish, or birds pass
regularly from State to . State, a compact or comity exists
therein that is just as needful of protection as any other natural or vested right.

Treaties Protecting Migratory Birds.-In the past few
years fourteen foreign nations have entered into treaties protecting migratory birds, and in one instance we, with several
other nations, have a.gTeed to protect certJain migratory
aquatic animals.
The pending treaty, giving the United States and Canada
control over fish in the Great Lakes and tributary waters, is
based wholly upon the transient or migratory character of
the fish in waters common to each nation. Any unreasonable depletion by one country injures the other, just as the
propagation of fish by artificial means by one country is an
unreciprocated benefit to the other. Therefore the constitutionality of the treaty depends upon fish passing from one
jurisdiction to another. A treaty that would attempt to protect fish in local waters of a State would be unconstitutional.
In the same way the contemplated treaty covering migratory
birds would be constitutional when applying to those species
passing between the two nations, just as it would be unconstitutional if it only related to local birds, like grouse or
quail. Hence the constitutionality of each treaty depends
upon the migratory chamcter of the birds or fish and in the
same way the constitutjonality of the present act of Congress
depends upon its supervision being confined to migratory
birds and not to those localized within a State.
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The Existence of Judicial Power Implies a Legislative Jurisdli,ction When Necessary to Efject the Purposes of the
Forrmer.
In the regulation of interstate intercourse by the Government, that of a commercial character, is vested primarily in
Congress and that arising through the other rela6ons of the
States depends, to a large extent, upon a judicial jurisdiction
granted the Supreme Court.
If Congress plainly exceeds its regulatory powers over
foreign or interstate commerce, an implied judicial jurisdiction gives the Federal courts the right of reviewing such
regulations, while if an act of Congress requires the action
of the Federal courts in carrying it into effect,' as has often
been the case of late in the dissolution of trusts In restraint
of trade, then such judicial jurisdiction, though not originally available, comes into existence.
In the same way a judicial jurisdiction, especially when
created for a particular purpose, implies the existence of ;
legislative jurisdiction when the same is required to give
effect to judicial action. This principle is now one well
established in our jurisprudence and finds expression in a
recent case ·(207 U. S., 398), wherein Justice Holmes says:
"The same argument that deduces legwlative power
of Oongrress from the jurisdiction of the National
Courts tends to establish a legislative power of the
States when Congress has not acted."
This rule applies in treaties where a legislative jurisdiction follows the exercise of the treaty-making power whenever the latter requires it. A treaty prohibiting pelagic sealing would be of no avail unless ea.ch country, through its
legislative branch, enacted laws putting into effect the treaty.
Therefore the suggestion that the only jurisdiction in the
protection of migratory birds or migratory fish is a judicial
and not legislative one becomes meritorious only in case the
judicial jurisdiction does not require any legislative action,
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When the Supreme Court decided that the unreasonable
pollution of interstate waters could be prevented by the authority granted the judicial branch of the Government, it
did more than pass upon the facts, for these were conceded
under the demurrer filed in the case. It decided this case
not only on the facts, but the case of all arising subsequently, when involving the question of an unreasonable
pollution or an unreasonable diversion of interstate waters.
In other words, the Court declared that no State hereafter
possessed the hitherto supposedly arbitrary power of regulating the use -of waters passing from one State to another.
Thereafter the interstate rights of each and every State in
such waters became a matter of legal right and if their protection required the subsequent action of Congre~ it was
necessarily implied. · Were this not so nothing would have
been "settled" in the sense meant in the Constitution, for
the power to settle, in whatever branch of the Government
the power is granted, implies the use of all other governmental powers necessary to give it effect. The Supreme
Court decided in McCulloch vs. Maryland and the other
cases following this precedent that the powers which the Federal Government derived from the Constitution must necessarily be broad enough to meet exdgen·cies as they arose. In
this case Chief Justice Marshall said:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which a.re plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
Consequently Cong:ress now has the right to regulate the
degree of pollution or the extent of diversion in interstate
waters, since the court held that such supervision could not
be performed by the States and that it was a Federal functlion. B!ut it is equally plain that the Supreme Court cannot
prepar~ rules or regulations prescribing the extent or charq,cter of the pollution or diversion of interstate waters, nor
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does it possess the machinery for enforcing the same. This
is a matter for expert consideration and under a system
established by Congress, just as the War Department, under
authority of Congress and through a Board of Engineers,
regulates all the navigable uses of interstate waters. Were
it otherwise the Supreme Court would have to sit continually
as a nisi 'f)'fius tribunal, and this notwithstanding that it was
supposed to have the power of settling the principle of law
involved in any controversy requiring Federal intervention
and regulation. It would be against all common sense to
contend that the construction of every great system of municipal sewerage, of sanitary canals, of irrigation companies~
must be left to a subsequent and uncertain determination of
the Supreme Court whether the methods in vogue were reasonable and proper for use in such waters. Therefore, as the
previous controversies have been settled, so far as the judicia1
branch of the Government is concerned, it now rests upon
Congress to pro.toot the joint and several rights of the States
in accordance with the doctrine of equity laid down by the
court.
It ought to be conooded, too, that the Supreme Court can
take judicial notice of any controversy at the instance of
the States themselves or through the action of Congress.
There is nothing in the Constitution in the settlement of
controversies between two or more States that requires such
settlement to come through any particular form, of petition.
While it is true, in the first instance, where neighboring
States were unable to ·agree upon the extent of water pollution or water diversio.n, that the injured State sought relief through a suit in equity. But the issue was new and a
single defendant involved. But in the case of forty-eight
States, many of them separated thousands of miles from
States permitting the unreasonable destruction of birds or
fish migrating to the other States, it would be impossible, by
suits at law or equity, to so formulate the character of the
controversy as to make it possible for the court to provide, in
any degree, a satisfactory settlement of such a controversy.
Take the case presentied in the following communicatio~:
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''DALLAS,

TEX.

'''United States Senator McLean, Washington, D. C.
"DEAR SEKATOR: I am glad to notice that you are
urging a bill for the protection of migratory birds.
The slaughter of robins during extreme cold weather
when driven to this country for feed and shelter is
beyond computation. Men, void of principle, go to
the robins' roosts at night and, by blinding the poor
birds with a bright light, the birds are thrashed down
by hundreds. I have talked with men who have
seen sacks full of dead birds. I have seen large numbers that were trapped as I have noted.
"Last winter boys shot 20 to 30 each day for a long
period of cold weather. People of the Middle and
New England States may conclude that the robins
have gone elsewhere when it is noticed that they are
not building nests as of yore or that so few have been
noticed. The cause of it is that they have been
slaughtered in the South during the winter.
"Senator Culberson is a humane man and no doubt
would agree with the writer if his attention were
called to the gradual extermination of robins, ducks,
and all other migratory birds. There are many good
people throughout all Southern States that would be
delighted to have the Government, through the Agricultural Department or any other department, take
measures to more fully protect migratory birds.
"With best wishes, I remain,
"Yours, most respectfully,
"THOS. s. SPEAR."
Yet this appeal is but one of thousands. An examination
of a part of the Senate report on the migratory-bird bill, relating to insectivorous birds, will. give an idea of the present
situation. See Appendioo "H."
Consequently, when the court becomes satisfied that conditions exist requiring the protection of m~gratory birds and
migratory fish in the interest of all the States and for the
permanent preservation of such forms of migrant life, it
seems to the writer that the power to settle· such a controversy
includes the means whereby such settlements can be best ef-
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f ected. When it appears that the States, through their legislatures and various officials, have requested Congress to prepare a method for the preservation of the rights of the States
in migratory birds, and that this has been duly enacted, the
Supreme Court, on becoming satisfied that only in this way
was it possible to settle this controversy, may, in its wisdom,
sustain such an -act without the States first having come into
court under a bill in equity. In fact no bill could possibly
so include as complainants and defendants all the States and
present either the controversy or the remedy, as the Act and
regulations thereunder will show. It must be kept in mind,
in determining the character of the controversies between the
States over the proper protection of beneficial migrants, that
even if ten out of the fourteen States on the Atlantic coast
could agree separately upon the prohibition of spring shooting or a shorter season in the fall and winter, that the intervening States would defeat the purpose, besides driving the
other States into a retaliatory warfare. Just as the strength
of a chain, is determined by the weakest link, so does the
effort to protect migrants depend upon there being no break
in their line of flight--where the market hunter and the
greedy sportsman can concentrate in an attack ·upon the
passing flocks. When one of the Southern States cut a few
weeks off the spring shooting this was the comment of one of
its papers:
on

it
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"The sportsmen of Leesburg and community seem
to be much dissatisfied with the game law as it applies
to ducks. Our lakes are full of ducks ; they can be
seen by thousands on any day, and yet the time for
killing them expired February 15. They are of no
value to the country except for eating. They are a
migratory bird and will remain here until about
April, but no one dares to hunt them. They will simply go further north in spring for other hunters to
kill. ~Iunters would be in their glory if they could
only kill them now. We are told that many tourists
are leavin~ this section because they are prohibited
from huntmg ducks. These are statements which we
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hear from our sportsmen. How about it? Why not
have the season extended or eliminate ducks and
snipes from the game laws entirely?"-Leesburg
Commercial.
Shortly after this local pre~ure became so great that
spring shooting was again allowed. How can such shifting
and ever-changing conditions be reached except by an act
of Congress, and that submitted to the Supreme Court, as the
remedy it can utilize in settling such controversies?
That this situation has existed for years will appear from a
resolution of Western sportsmen adopted · on .t he first introduction of the bill :
"HASTINGS,

NEBR., May 10, 1905.

"Whereas, There has been a great deal of agitation toward State legislation to abolish spring shooting of water fowl, and
"Whereas, We believe such restriction by the Central and Northern States unfair, inasmuch as our
neighbors in the Southern States are permitted to
shoot until the birds begin their northern migration,
be it
"Resofoed, That the members. of the Nebraska
States Sportsmen's Association, at their twenty-ninth
annual mooting now assembled, request the United
States Senators and Congressmen from Nebraska to
use all honorable means to secure the enactment into
law of the Shiras bill introduced in the Congre~ of
the United States December 5, 1904, which is as
follows:" [Quoted in Appendix "B.']
When Att'y Gen'l Carmody took the position that local
legislation was best suited for all classes of game or insectivorous birds, whether they migrated from nation to nation
or remained permanently within the State, he ignored the
following resolution passed by the legislature of the Stat.e of
New York on March 4, 1912, without a di~nting vote:
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"STATE OF

NEW

YoRK-IN SENATE.

"Whereas three bills (Nos. H. R. 36, H. R. 4428,
S. 2367) to afford Federal protection to migratory
game birds have been introduced in Congress, and
"Wh~reas there is a general sentiment in this State
in favor of such protection and an urgent request for
the enactment of such a law has been made, as appears by nu.rnerous petitions received: Now, therefore,
"Reso"fmedJ ( if the assembly concwrs), That Congress be, and hereby is, requested to enact a law gi.vin~ ample protection to migratory game birds.
'Resolvied, That the legislatures of all other States
of the United States now in session or when next convened be, and hereby are, respectfully requested to
join in this request by the adoption of this or an
equivalent resolution.
"Resolved further, That the Secretary of State be,
and hereby is, directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States and to the several members of said
bodies representing this State therein, ·also to transmit
' copies hereof to the legislature of all other States of
the United States.''
If it can now be assumed that the highest_.court in the land
has decided, as a matter of 1-aw, that there exists a newly
established class of interstate rights growing out of common
interests in the same thing, such as water, air, birds, fish and
all that belongs to the citizens collectively, wherein is this
doctrine detrimental to rights of the States?
In conclusion let nm quote the following by Justice Bradley in Robbins vs. Shelby ( 120 U. S.) :
l

"It seems to be forgotten, in argument, that the
people of this country are citizens of the United
States, -as well as of the individual States, and that
they have some rights under the Constitution and
laws of the former independent of the latter, and
free from any interference or restraint from them."
This declaration of governmental relations should' carry
weight by reason of its source.
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The citizens of the United States represent a nation and
are entitled to all the privileges thereof; and each may be a
citizen of a State and enjoy the privilege of local self-government therein. The problem connected with a supervision
over beneficial or harmful migrants is a nation-wide one.
And whenever the States, through joint resolutions of their
legislatures, petition Congress to adjust and enforce their
respective interests in wild fowl, shore birds, in song and
insectivorous birds, in the shad and the salmon, the Supreme
· Court can take judicial notice of such official action of the
State. And when satisfied that the protection of the rights
in question come within the class of controversies contemplated in the Constitution and indicated in the previous decisions of the court, it becomes the duty of the court to declare that a Federal jurisdiction exists, and that the action
of Congress, if questioned, only brings before the court the
matter of determining whether the existent controversies, involving all the States, can be properly and permanently adjusted by a procedure implied from the rights heretofore declared by the court to belong to the States in relation to each
other. The issue, however, is greater than the destruction
of our birds and fish, of the loss to agriculture, of the inability 1io maintain a proper system of interstate and international quarantine, but goes to the existence of governmental
powers needed alike by the State and the Nation in maintaining their autonomy and their harmonious relations.
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APPENDIX.

A.
Regulations for the Protection of Migratory Birds.

By the President of the United States of America:

A Prockrnation.
Whereas, an Act of Congress approved March fourth, nineteen hundred and thirteen, entitled "An Act making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the fiscal
year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and fourteen"
(37 Stat., 847), contains provisions as follows: [See Appendix C.]
Whereas, the Department of Agriculture has duly prepared suitable regulations to give effect to the foregoing provisions of said Act and after the preparation of said regulations has caused the same to be made public and has allowed
a period of three months in which said regulations might be
·examined and considered before final adoption and has permitted public hearings thereon;
And, Whereas, the Department of Agriculture has adopted
the regulations hereinafter set forth and after final adoption
thereof has caused the same to be engrossed and submitted
to the President of the United States for approval;
Now, Therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the
United States of America, by authority in me vested do
hereby proclaim and make known the following regulations
for carrying into effect the foregoing provisions of said Act:
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REGULATION

1.

DEFINITIONS.

For the purposes of these regulations the following shall be
considered migratory game birds:
(a) Anatidre or waterfowl, including brant, wild ducks,
geese, and swans.
( b) Gruidre or cranes, including little brown, sandhill,
and whooping cranes.
.
( c) Rallidre or rails, including coots, gallinules, and sora
and other rails.
( d) Limicolre or shore birds, including avocets, curlew,
dowitchers, godwits, knots, oyster catchers, phalaropes,
plover, sandpipers, snipe, stilts, surf birds, turnstones, willet,
woodcock, and yellow legs.
( e) Columbidre or pigeons, including doves and wild
pigeons. '
For the purposes of these regulations the following shall
be considered migra.tory insectivorous birds :
(f) Bobolinks, catbirds, chickadees, cuckoos, flickers, flycatchers, grosbeaks, humming birds, kinglets, martins, meadowlarks, nighthawks or bull bats, nuthatches, orioles, robins,
shrikes, swallows, swifts, tanagers, titmice, thrushes, vireos,
warblers, waxwings, whippoorwills, woodpeckers, and wrens,
and all other perching birds which feed entirely or chiefly
on insects.
REGULATION

2.

CLOSED SEASON AT NIGHT.

A daily closed season on all migratory game and insectivorous birds shall extend from sunset to sunrise.
REGULATION

3.

CLOSED SEASON ON INSECTIVOROUS BIRDS.

A closed season on migratory insectivorous birds shall
continue to December 31, 1913, and each year thereafter
shall begin January 1 and continue to December 31, both
dates inclusive, provided that nothing in this or any other
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of these regulations shall be construed to prevent the issue
of permits for collecting birds for scientific purposes in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in the respective States and Territories and the District of Columbia;
and provided further that the closed season on reedbirds or
ricebirds in Maryland, the District of Columbia, Virginia,
and South Carolina shall begin November 1 and end August
81 next following, both dates inclusive.
REGULATION

4.

:F1IVE-YEAR CLOSED SEASONS ON CERTAIN
GAME BIRDS.

A closed season shall continue until September 1, 1918,
on the following migratory game birds: Band-tailed pigeons,
little brown, sandhill, and whooping cranes, swans, curlew,
and all shorebirds except the black-breasted and golden
plover, Wilson or jack snipe, woodcock, and the greater and
lesser yellowlegs.
A closed season shall also continue until September 1,
1918, on wood ducks in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, California,
Oregon, and Washington; on rails in California and Vermont; and on woodcock in Illinois and Missouri.
'REGULATION

5.

CLOSED SEASON ON CERTAIN

NAVIGABLE

RIVERS.

A closed season shall continue between January 1 and
December 31, both dates inclusive, of each year, on all migratory birds passing over or at rest on any of the waters
of the main streams of the following navigable rivers, to wit:
The Mississippi River between Minneapolis, Minn., and
Memphis, Tenn. ; and the Missouri River between BismarcK,
N. Dale, and Nebraska City, Nebr.; and on the killing or
capture of any of such birds on or over the shores of any
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of said rivers, or at any point within the limits aforesaid,
from any boat, raft, or other device, floating or otherwise, in
or on any such waters.
REGULATION

6.

ZONES.

The following zones for the protection of migratory game
and insectivorous birds ar~ hereby established:
Zone No. 1, the breeding zone, comprising States lying
wholly or in part north of latitude 40° and the Ohio River
and including Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin,
Minnesota., Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington-25 States.
Zone No. 2, the wintering zone, comprising States lying
wholly or in part south of latitude 40° and the Ohio River
and including Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee,
Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada,
and Utah-23 States and the District of Columbia.
REGULATION

7.

CONSTRUCTION.

For the purposes of regulations 8 and 9, eac~ period of
time therein prescribed as a closed season .shall be construed
to include the ,first day and to exclude the last day thereof.
REGULATION

8.

CLosED SEASONS IN ZoNE No.

1.

Closed seasons in Zone No. 1 shall be as follows:
Waterfowl.-The closed season on waterfowl shall be b&
tween December 16 and September 1 next following, except
as follows:
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Exceptions : In Massachusetts the closed season shall be
between January 1 and September 15.
In New York, except Long Island, the closed season shall
~ between December 16 and September 16.
On Long Island and in Oregon and Washington the closed
season shall be between January 16 and October 1.
In New Jersey the closed season shall be between February
1 and November 1 ; and
In Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin the closed season shall be between December 1 and
September 7.
Rails.-The closed season on rails, coots, and gallinules
shall be between December 1 and September 1 ne~t following, except as follows:
Exceptions: In Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island the closed season shall be between December
1 and August 15.
In Connecticut, Michigan, and New York, and on Long
Island the closed season shall be between December 1 and
September 16.
In Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin the closed season shall be between December 1 and Septem ber 7; and
In Oregon and Washington the closed season shall be
between January 16 and October 1.
Woodcocik.-The closed season on woodcock shall be between December 1 and October 1 the next following, except
as follows:
Exceptions: In Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey the closed season shall be between December 1 and October 10.
In Rhode Island the closed season shall be between December 1 and November 1; and
In Pennsylvania and on Long Island the closed season
shall be between December 1 and October 15.
Shore birds.-The closed season on black-breasted and
golden plover, jack-snipe or Wilson snipe, and greater and
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lesser yellowlegs shall be between December 16 and September 1 next following, except as follows:
E:x:ceptions: In Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and on Long Island the closed season shall
be between December 1 and August 15.
In New York, except Long Island, the closed season shall
be between December 1 and September 16.
In Minnesota, North _Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin the closed season shall be between December 1 and September 7 ; and
In Oregon and Washington the closed season shall be
between December 16 and October 1.
REGULATION

9.

CLOSED SEASONS IN ZoNE

No. 2.

Closed seasons in Zone No. 2 shall be as follows:
Water/ owl.-The closed season on waterfowl shall be between January 16 and October 1 next following, except as
follows:
Exceptions,: In Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas the
closed season shall be between February 1 and November 1.
In the District of Columbia., Kansas, New Mexico, and
West Virginia the closed season shall be between December
16 and September 1.
In Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina the closed season
sha.Il be between February 16 and November 20.
In Missouri and Nevada the closed season shall be between
January 1 and September 15 ; and
In Arizona and California the closed season shall be between February 1 and October 15.
R'ails.-The closed season on rails, coots, and gallinules
shall be between December 1 and September 1 next following, exeept as follows:
Exceptions: In Tennessee and Utah the closed season shall
be between December 1 and October 1.

\ ~
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In Missouri the closed season shall be between January 1
and September 15.
In Louisiana the closed season shall be between February
1 and November 1 ; and
In Arizona and California the closed season on coots shall
be between February 1 and October 15.
W oodcoak.-The closed season on woodcock shall be between January 1 and November, except as follows:
Exceptions: In Delaware and Louisiana the closed season
shall be between January 1 and November 15.
In West Virginia the closed season shall be between December 1 and October 1 ; and
In Georgia the closed season shall be between January
1 and December 1.
ShoTe bird8.-The closed season on black-breasted and
golden plover, jack-snipe or Wilson snipe, and greater and
lesser yellowlegs shall be between December 16 and September 1 next following, except as follows:
Exceptions: In Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina the
closed season shall be between February 1 and November 20.
In Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas the closed
season shall be between February 1 and November 1.
In Tennessee the closed season shall be between December
16 and October 1.
In Arizona and California the closed season shall be
between February 1 and October 15; and
In Utah the closed season on snipe shall be between December 16 and October 1, and on plover and yellowlegs shall
be until September 1, 1918.
I

.. _.. i

REGULATION

tall

10.

HEARINGS.

Persons recommending changes in the regulations or desiring to submit evidence in person or by attorney as to the
necessity for such changes should make application to the
Secretary of Agriculture. Whenever possible, hearings will
be arranged at central points, and due notice thereof given
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by publication or otherwise as may be deemed appropriate.
Persons recommending changes should be prepared to show
the necessity for such action and to submit evidence other
than that based on reasons of personal convenience or a
desire to kill game during a longer open season.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this first day of October
in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and
thirteen and of the Independence of the United States the
one hundred and thirty-eighth.
WOODROW WILSON.
By the President:
[SEAL.] w. J. BRYAN,
Secretary of State.
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B.
The Original Shiras Bill.

Fifty-eighth Congress, 3d Session.

H. R. 15601.
In the House of Representatives.
December 5, 1904.
Mr. Shiras introduced the following bill, which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture and ordered to be
printed:
A Bill to Protect the Migratory Game Bir& of the United
State8.

Whereas experience has shown that laws passed. by the
States and Terri~ries of the United States ·to protect game
birds within their respective limits have proved insufficient
to protect those kinds and classes of said birds which are
migratory in their habits and which nest and hatch their
young in States other than those in which they pass the
usual hunting season, and in some cases breed beyond ,the
boundaries of the United States; and
Whereas such local laws are also inapplicable and insufficient to protect such game birds as, in their migrations, are
found in the public waters of the United States, outside the
limits and jurisdiction of the several States and Territories;
and
Whereas the absence of uniform and effective laws and
regulations in such cases has resulted in the wholesale destruction and the threatened extermination of many valuable species of said game birds, which cannot be practically
restored or restocked under State laws applicable in the case
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of game birds having their permanent habitat within the
respective States and Territories: Therefore,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representativ'es
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
all wild geese, wild swans, brant, wild ducks, snipe, plover,
woodcock, rail, wild pigeons, and all other migratory game
birds which in their northern and southern migrations pass
through or do not remain permanently the entire year within
the borders of any Sta.te of Territory, shall hereafter be
deemed to be within the custody and protection of the Government of the United States and shall not be destroyed or
taken contrary to regulations hereinafter provided for.
SEc. 2. That the Department of Agriculture is hereby
authorized to adopt suitable regulations to give effect to the
previous section by prescribing and fixing closed seasons,
having due regard to the zones of temperature, breeding
habits, and times and line of migratory flight, thereby enabling the Department to select and designate suitable districts for different portions of the country within which said
closed seasons it shall not be lawful to shoot or by any
device kill or seize and capture migratory birds within the
protection of this law, and by declaring penalties by fine or
imprisonment, or both, for violations of such regulations.
SEc. 3. That the Department of Agriculture, after the
preparation of said regulations, shall cause the same to be
made public and shall allow a period of three months in
which said regulations may be examined and considered
before final adoption, permitting, when deemed proper,
public hearings thereon, and after lfiinal adoption to cause
same to be engrossed and submitted to the President of the
United States for approval: Provided, howev'er, That nothing
herein contained shall be deemed to affect or interfere with
the local laws of the State and Territories for the protection
of game localized within their borders, nor to prevent the
States and Territories from enacting laws and regulations
to promote and render efficient the regulations of the DepartJllent of Agriculture provided under this statute.
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0.
Weeks-McLean Bill, as Incorporated in the Act of March 4,
1913, Making Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture (37 Stat., 847).

"All wild geese, wild swans, brant, wild ducks, snipe, plover,
woodcock, rail, wild pigeons, and all other migratory game
and insectivorous birds which i.n their northern and southern migrations pass through or do not remain permanently
the entire year within the borders of any State or Territory,
shall hereafter be deemed to be within the custody and protection of the Government of the United States, and shall not
be destroyed or taken contrary to regulations .hereinafter
provided therefor.
"The Department of Agriculture is hereby authorized and
directed to adopt suitable regulations to give effect to the
previous paragraph by prescribing and fixing closed seasons,
having due regard to the zones of temperature, breeding
habits, and times and line of migratory flight, thereby enabling the Department to select and designate suitable districts for different portions of the country, and it shall be
unlawful to shoot or by any device kill or seize and capture
migratory birds within the protection of this law during said
closed seasons, and any person who shall violate any of the
provisions or regulations of this law for the protection of
migratory birds shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be ·fined not more than $100 or imprisoned not more than
nin~ty days, or both, in the discretion of the court.
"The Department of Agriculture, after the preparation of
said regulations, shall cause the same to be made public,
and shall allow a period of three months in which said regulations may be examined and considered before final adoption, permitting, when deemed proper, public hearings
thereon, and after final adoption shall cause tlie same to be
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engrossed and submitted to the President of the United States
for approval: Pro'lfided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be deemed to afroot or interfere with the local
laws of the States and Territories for the protection of nonmigratory game or other birds resident and breeding within
their borders, nor to prevent the States and Territories from
enacting laws and regulations to promote and render efficient
the regulations of the Department of Agriculture provided
under this statute.
"There is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the purpose of
carrying out these provisions, the sum of $10,000."
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D.

Advisory Committ~e of Fifteen on the Preparation of Regulations by the Department of .A.(ricul\1re for the Protection of Migratory Birds.
(Associated Press.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 21.-The Department of Agriculture announces the selection of fifteen men prominent in
the protection of game and other birds in various sections of
the country to advise Secretary Houston in framing regulations to make the new Federal protection of migratory birds
effective. To these men, who will serve without remuneration, will pe referred certain questions arising in connection
with the tentative regulations recently published by the Department in connection with the Act of March 4, which gives
the Federal Government jurisdiction over the migratiory
birds of the United States.
.
The fifteen men selected, and who have ruready consented
to assist in this advisory capacity, are as follows: John B.
Burnham, New York city, President of the American Game
Protective and Propagation Association, Chairman;· F. W.
Chambers, State Fish and Game Commissioner, Salt Lake
City, Utah; Prof. L. L. Dyche, State Fish and Game Warden,
Pratt, Kans.; W. L. Finley, State Game Warden, Portland,
Ore. ; E. H. Forbush, State Ornithologist, Boston, Ma~. ; Dr.
George Bird Grinnell,. New York, Vice-President of the
Boone and Crockett Club and former editor of "Forest and
Stream"; Dr. William T. Hornaday, New .York,. Director of
the New York Zoological Park; Hon. John F. Lacey, Oskaloosa, Iowa, aU1thor of the Lacey Act, regulating importation
ap.d interstate commerce in birds and game; Marshall McLean, New York, Chairman Committee on Conservation of
Wild Life of the Ca.mp-Fire Club of America; T. Gilbert
Pearson, New York, Secretary National Association of Audubon Societies; Hon. George Shiras, 3d, Washington, D. C. 1
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author of the original bill protecting migratory birds; Gen.
John C. Speaks, Chief Warden, Columbus, Ohio; Wm. P.
Taylor, Berkeley, Cal., Chairman Committee on Conservation of Wild Life in California; Hon. John H. Wallace, State
Game and Fish Commis...Qjoner, Montgomery, Ala., and Major
Bluford Wilson, Springfield, Ill.
Letter of MT. Slviras Accep,t ing Appointment on the Advisory Committee, Suggesting Character of the Regulaiions
an~ the Reasons for Federal Regulation.
March 27, 1913.
"Hlon. R. T. Galloway, Acting Secretary Department
of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.
"DEAR Sm: Your letter of the 21st inst. expressing the desire to have ·a n Advisory Board to .co-operate
with your Department in the preparation of regulations, authorized under the Act of ·March 4th, 1913,
is to be commended, and I would deem it an honor
and a pleasant duty to serve in the capacity.
"As the author of the original bill for the Federal
protection of migratory birds, it is natural that I
should feel a certain responsibility for the successful
operation of the law and especially for those provisions taken from the first bill. It is of the utmost
importance that both the nec~ity and the legality of
such legislation should be clearly understood, and
therefore the regulations of your Department should
be so drawn as to produce the best immediate results
and at the same time avoid any unnecessary antagonism.
"Prohibition of spring shooting, limited closed seasons on game birds approaching extinction, the protection of certain insectivorous birds clearly valuable
to agriculture, will cover, I think, the fundamental
purposes of the Act and are regulations best suited in
the beginning.
"As I expect to be in Alaska this summer and fall,
I take the liberty of enclosing a memorandum giving
a summary of my ideas thereon.
"Yours very respectfully,
"GEO. SH1RAs, 3n."
"ORMOND BEACH, FLORIDA,
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E.
Why Federal Protection of Migratory Birds Became

Necessary.

The harmonious conclusion of the l~ading sportsmen, naturalists, agriculturists and game protectionists that it is impossible to have uniform and adequate State regulations for
the protection of migratory birds is not only based upon practical experience but the knowledge that the States, under the
Federal Constitution, are lacking in any jurisdiction, or in
any interstate power necessary to obtain or enforce the joint
rights of the respective States in a matter of this lrind. It
was for these reasons that the members of Congress, directly
representing, in an official capacity, the several States, passed
this bill and the President signed the same.
Local birds like quail, grouse and wild tu,rkeys, under
State laws, are protected from ten to eleven months each
year, and sometimes for longer periods, while migratory
wild fowl and certain insectivorous birds in their entire range
are only protected a couple of months each year, and· most of
them not at all.
Even though a State law may be apparently reasonable,
yet the seasonal movements of migratory birds are such that
the open seasons in' each State, when added together, always
permit a period for lawful killing so far in ax~ss of what is
proper that no such species of game birds can stand the
drain. The first to go are the most valuable or the least wary,
but in the end few can survive, now that to an un.reasonably
long open season there must be added a decrease in food
supply and shelter, the increase in the number of hunters
and the use of modern weapons. When we recall that the
wild pigeon existed in far greater numbers than any other
game bird in this country and that it was finally destroyed by
reason of its migratory habits, we can easily see how the same
cause is now affecting other birds of similar habits.
1
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A belief somewhat prevalent, that the Federal jurisdiction
now invoked is a novel one and therefore possibly lying
outside the prescribed powers of the General Government, is
one that should be met at the outstart, for such a jurisdiction has been in active exercise for many years and, in the
present case, is new only in the class of subjects covered by
this law.
Any one who believes that interstate and international
quarantine is purely a Federal function and that the States
are incapable of enaicting and enforcing adequate regulations
for the control of epidemics like yellow fever, bubonic plague,
typhoid fever, and similar diseases endangering human life
or such as affect plant and animal life-like the cattle tick,
the boll weevil, the gypsy moth-must come to the conclusion that both in the necessity .and legal right there can be
no distinction made between a Federal supervision over
harmful migrants-be they game, insects or animals-and
a Federal supervision over beneficial migrants-be they wild
fowl, insectivorous birds or migratory ·fish like the shad and
salmon.
The fact that a quarantine jurisdiction is neither directly
or inferentia.lly mentioned in the Constitution and that such
regulations originally represented a fixed period of detention
over a suspected or infected sea Ve$0l, shows clearly that this
arbitrary, antiquated and limited method does not now represent the true character or extent of the sanitary and
health jurisdiction of the Federal Government on land or sea.
Originally the maritime States exercised an exclusi~e control over international quarantine, while all the States at~mpted the enforcement of interstate quarantine, but have
yielded up the former and much of the latter, simply because such duties are Federal in character. In the same way
the States have finally recognized the fact that the rernlation
of immigration is a Federal function, because the in~pection
and admission of those deemed worthy and the e~clusion of
those that are undesirable, either individually or racially, re-
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quire uniform standards of fitness, uniform methods of enforcement, under a jurisdiction capable of providing this,
whereas such powers are clearly not ~essed by the States.
Yet immigrant inspection is not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, but must come under th® powers that the
States now concede to be national. Regulating immigrants
and migrants, human or otherwise, involves precisely the
same legal principles and the same necessity. Therefore:
when we consider that, from a constitutional standpoint,
Federal quarantine and Federal regulation of immigrants
are exactly on all fours with the Federal regulation of migratory birds, it must appear how insincere or thoughtless are
those who contend that the effort of the Government to prevent the extermination of our migratory wild fowl and insectivorous birds is beyond its power or involves a new principle of law.
Moreover, the Constitution has wisely provided for the settlement of "controversies between States'' and, under this
provision, the Supreme Court has recently decided that where
joint or common rights of the States in the same thing require adjustment, it lies within the power of the General
Government to act. Under this interpretation of the Constitution it is possible to sustain Federal legislation seeking to
preserve the comities and joint rights of the States whenever controversies arise thereover. Quarantine, water pollution, irrigation, sanitary canals, defilement of the atmosphere
and all other subjects, whenever involving an interstate use
or right, come under such a Federal jurisdiction.
long and futile efforts of the States to protect these
migratory birds, both game and insectivorous, worth millions
of dollars annually to the citizens of the United States, is
surely a controversy coming under this provision of the Constitution.

The

•
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F.
Col. Acklen Named Chief Game Warden-Fonner Tennessee
Member of Congress to Protect Migratory Birds.
(Evening Star, Nov. 13, 1913.)

The appointment of Col. Joseph H. Acklen, of Nashville,
Tenn., former representative in Congress and former president of the Bar Association of Tennessee, as chief warden of
the United States to enforce the provisions of the new Federal
migratory-bird law was made public today. Secretary Houston, of the Department of Agriculture, made the appointment.
The game commissioners of over two-thirds of the States
requested his appointment. Most of the Audubon societies
of the country did likewise, and the National Association of
Game Commissioners also pa$ed resolutions indorsing him.
Col. Acklen's fath1er built the celebrated Belmont place
near Nashville, where before the war he entertained many
distinguished men. His mother was a daughter of 0. Bl.
Hayes, a first cousin of ex-President Hayes.
Col. Acklen married the granddaughter of John Tillotson, of New York, and she is a great-granddaughter of Chancellor Livingstone, whose statue is in statuary hall in the
Capitol.
Col. Acklen is now chairman of the Committee on Legislation of the Tennessee Bar Association. He served as State
warden in that State for ten years without salary.
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G.
The Character and Extent of National Police Power.*
( Extract from a monograph on this subject.)

The gradual extension of the Federal jurisdiction is evidenced by the advanced ground occupied each year by Congress, and the readiness of our Federal courts to sustain certain supervisory powers, in matters relating more particularly
to public health and safety, public morals, trade monopolies,
unfair and fraudulent commercial transactions, which, heretofore, were supposed to be subject only to the police power
of the State. Nevertheless, the evolution has been continuous with the increase ,a nd concentration, in population, in
business, and in the growing homogeneity of the people.
Certain principles when advancing slowly may, for the time,
apparently stand apart, and the general doctrine wp.ich they
represent collectively may escape notice. So in the growth
of nationalism there have developed many powers, concerning public welfare, that are based upon new conditions and
necessities. The method by which these new problems are
to be met is not to be denied, because heretofore unrecognized, or because, in many cases, left previously to the separate States for action. In this way we have come face to face
with a doctrine, in the recognition of which lies the only
escape from the almost farcical efforts of Congress and the
Federal courts to keep within the written words of isolated
clauses in the Constitution, and at the same time assert Federal powers utterly at variance with the true meaning and
spirit of the phraseology relied upon.
The conservation of health, morals and business prosperity
depends, to a large extent, upon the proper exercise of one
of those governmental attributes, commonly ca.Iled police
•Published by Geo. Shiras, 3d, in 1906 and revised in 1912.
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power. This power has always been exercised by the States,
and has proved most efficient in placing those restraints upon
its citizens which experience }].as shown to have become necessary in the preservation of the general welfare of the local
community, and each State has determined for itself just
how far it would place such restrictions upon its own citizens.
Under the constitutional construction of the past it has been
frequently said that police power is exclusively reserved to
the States, and that the National Government is without that
sovereign attribute because the State must employ it in the
preservation of the life, liberty and property of its citizens,
and that ergo, such an exercise is incompatible for similar
purposes, by the National Government, even though it may
be directed wholly toward subjects beyond the actual and
effective jurisdiction of the States. Hence, when we now
wish to legislate, through Congress, upon the subjects of public health, public morals, restraint of trade, and the innumerable other subjects falling naturally under the* police power
of a sovereign, we turn to the Constitution, and there, under
the commerce clause, the taxing clause, the clause covering
transmission of mails, assert a police, power identical with
that possessed by the States over Sl]bjects of like character submitted to internal regulation.
When a State places restrictions upon the freedom of its
people in order to conserve morality, life and property, it
doe,s so under its general police power to promote the public
welfare of the community within its boundaries; and in
doing so it may destroy those private rights of the citizens
otherwise inherent or especially accorded them under the
common law. A legal restriction has usually embodied
therein some penalty for a violation thereof, and hence in
those that relate to things harmful to the comfort and welfare of society, there has booll' given the title of "police regulations," synonymous with "police power" when referred to
generally. As a matter of fact, such a designation can be
wholly dropped and the same called according to the nature

79
l

of the subject it relates to. Hence, when health boards are
created and invested with the plenary power to impose and
enforce by fine or imprisonment the innumerable regulations
necessary for the preservation of public health, it is not incumbent to style this a "police" regulation, but it can be
called a "health" regulation. So, when the State interdicts
or restricts the manufacture, sale or transportation of adulterated or misbranded goods, dangerous drugs, or the vending of diseased meats, impure milk, etc., it imposes a restraint
upon its local business affairs, and very properly this power
may, be called -a "trade" regulation-though it is a police
power. When a State compels pilots~engineers and others in
charge of public conveyances, to pass an examination and
take out a license, or compels common carriers to adopt
safety appliances or regulates the rate of transportation
charges, or prohibits combination Qf competing railroads, or
the ownership of products carried by said common carriers,
it o~ly exercises its sovereign right over "local commerce"
by land and water-though it is a police power, pure and
simple. When a State, in order to restrain the too dangerous
use of intoxicants, exacts a high license and imposes numerous restrictions upon the vendors, it is of course using its
power in a way to conserve "public morals," but it need· not
be called a police power-though it is such. When a State
prohibits lotteries, the sale and transmission of obscene matter, or prohibits the corrupt use of money in el~ctions, it is
safeguarding "public welfare," but it need not be called a
police power-though it is such. So on ad infinitum. But
how different when we come to the exercise of these very
same regulatory powerr8 by the National Government.
Let me make three crucial statements:
1. That we have a Federal police power as complete and
far-reaching ll,nder the sphere of the General Government as
is that within the boundaries of a State.
2. That for every instance that can be cited of a proper
exercise of police power within a State there can be shown
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an equal number of cases where it is operative under National
laws, and in most instances it will be found precisely similar
in application.
3. That the recognition of a National police power is not
derogatory to, nor an impairment of, the police power of a
State, but on the contrary renders it more effective, and likewise affords the general government a supervisory power
wholly incapable of use or exercise by the State beyond its
own limits.
So clearly established and openly exercised is the Government's police jurisdiction over iall Federal territory coming
under the exclusive control of Congress, and so equally a.pparent is the same jurisdiction in the performance of those
duties 'directly associated with its purely administrative functions, that one need only call attention to the character of
existing laws and methods of enforcement to clearly establish these facts.
The real difficulty, if any, arises in determining the exact
legal character of Federal police regulations over foreign and
interstate intercourse, and in defining the exrtent of such regulations.
In classifying the very diverse police jurisdiction of the
Federal Government the same may be divided into several
elementary classes, viz., those covering the jurisdiction over:
1. Federal territory, (a) territorial or insu1'ar, ( b) within
the States.
2. Federal administrative affairs, (a) legislative, ( b) judicial, ( c) executive.
3. Indian tribes.
4. Foreign intercourse, (a) commercial, ( b) non-commercial.
·
5. Subjects of the United States on high seas, and·
6. Interstate intercourse, (a) commercial, (b) non-commercial.
The first of these great divisions covers a most extensive
and exclusive police jurisdiction, including the District of
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Columbia, Alaska, Y ellowstiOne National Park, the Panama
Canal Zone, the Island of Guam, the Tutuila group of the
Samoan Islands, and maritime, naval, cable, and coaling
stations· it likewise includoo an e~clusive or concurrent police
'
jurisdiction
over Hawaii, Porto Rico, and the Philippine
Islands, and over the public domain dedicated to particular
uses, such as forest reserves, reclamation projeet.s, dikes and
dams connect.ed with navigation, national parks, as well as
over ·Federal buiidings and grounds, such as quarantine stations, marine hospitals, military and light-house reservations,
arsenals, forts, naval and soldiers' homes, life-saving stations,
military and naval academies, post-offices, customs-houses
and coU.il't buildings, national cemeteries, experimental and
weather bureau stations, etc.
Over this diversified area, within and without the States,
the police jurisdiction is intrafederal, interfederal, intrastate,
interstate, and international; while under the other five
branches come many forms of regulations covered by maritime, treaty, and international law, as well as a police jurisdiction over a half a million of Indians scattered throughout
the States and Territories, and over every citizen of the
United States, independent of his residence, so long as he~is
within any specified jurisdiction of the United Stat.es.
This police jurisdiction of Congress--as, for instance, over
the District of Columbia or Alaska-is, in kind, precisely
that possessed by the States, and the hundreds· of police regulations relating to public health, public morals, .restraint of
trade,-·and the industrial and social welfare generally find
their counterpart in State legislation. Again, in the multitude of police regulations safeguarding the operations of the
Central Government, in its legislative and judicial branches,
its postal service, revenue service, co_ina.ge and currency,
Army and Navy, Federal corporations, quarantine supervision, and in those preserving the well-being of the various
Executive Departments, covering the regulation of thousands
of employees, or the public in its dealing therewith, we can
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find their duplicates in the various police regulations of the
States.
That the Governnrent, therefore, does possess an extensive
police power can no longer be denied; but those who begrudgingly admit it contend that this power is limited to Federal
territory or to some administrative function of the Government, and that it does not extend ov·er foreign oq- interetate
int~cowrse, commereial or otherwise. But when the admission is made that national police power may exist within
a sphere where the Constitution has given Congre3, "an exclusive jurisdiction," then this concession admits all that the
writer is at this point contending for, since the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce
is admitted.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Why Police Power Was Supposed to be Reserved Exel'UJiively
to the States.
The generally accepted doctrine that police power is reserved exclusively to the States is based upon an old misap,prehension regarding the purposes for which this power is
invoked in all legislative spheres.
Police power, it must be remembered, is only that pa.rt of
the penal law which deals particularly with offenses derogatory to the public welfare, in contradistinction to those
grosser offenses affecting the individual rights of man. It
matters not whether a law be enacted byi Congress or a State
legislature regulating pure food and drugs, meat inspection,
safety appliances, hours of labor, water pollution, the sale of
lottery tickets, the transmission of obscene matter, political
contributions by corporations, trade monopolies, rates of
transportation, or the regulation of epidemic diseases by quarantine-for one and all are police regulations, whether connected with commerce or not. Such a penal jurisdiction necessarily exist.a within the legislative sphere of either class of
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sovereigns, since each must posse~ all the authority necesary
for enacting or maintaining any supervisory regulations of
the above character.
Such police jurisdiction is not, therefore, in derogation of
the rights of the States, sinee tluis '[X)UJeT i,s distinct and cooperative. The.. failure of Congress to recognize the fact that
most of its recent supervisory legislation is police in character, and as such coming within its jurisdiction when directed
tioward matters in which it concededly has ·a n exclusive or
concurrent power of regulation, constitutes one of the present
difficulties in properly presenting the supervisory powers of
the Federal Government.
There are three impressions regarding police power that
seem well-nigh universal: ( 1) that police power originally
was reserved exclusively to the States; ( 2) that because it was
not specifically enumerated in the Federal Constitution it
cannot be exercised by Congress, and ( 3) that to the ex.tent
Congress attempts to exercise it just to that extent it must
encroach upon the police powers of the States.
Now, there is a vast difference, in legal principle, between
a jurisdiction that is exclusive within a given sphere and a
jurisdiction which excludes its exercise in any other sphere,
Undoubtedly there was reserved, by implication, to the
States an exclusive police jurisdiction over all matters concerning the internal welfare of their inhabitants, and no
power possessed by the States in its aggregate benefits exceeds
this in value. But the reason why police power, so called, is
not enumerated in the Federal Constitution is because it does
not exdst as a concrete ·a nd separate function, but is in reality
only an indivisible part of the criminal jurisdiction incident
to legislative sovereignty, dominant or inferior. The most
important acts of Congress, whether regulating international
q'Ujarantine or monopolies in interstate commerce, are the
same, in kind, as the councilmanic ordinances of any small
town regulating local sanitary conditions or the licensing of
street vendors in local trade.
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Police power in American jurisprudence only received
such a generic title about the year 1845-as this form of
supervision grew up in the protection of the public welfare.
There is no better indication that police power is an e&Sential element of every legislative body than by asking: In
what form could police power have been specifically enumerated ip. the Constitution? Any amendment to the Constitution giving the Federal Government police power within the
scope of its general legislative authority would only be declaratory and of no affirmative value, unless the time has
come when it is necessary to have constitutional amendmentB
for the sole purpose of overcoming a prevailing misconception regarding a legally existing Federal power.
That, therefore, such a supervisory jurisdiction can harmoniously exist in separate legislative spheres ought to be
perfectly plain. Yet the friction and endless controversy
over the so-called twilight zone is almost wholly due to calling most of the supervisory powers of the Federal Government "regulations of interstate commerce," and similar regulations of domestic commerce by the States "police" reguJ.ations of intrastate commerce. This effort to differentia.te
!,he same power instead of confining it to different spheres
accounts for most of the confusion and most of the conflicts
in Federal and State jurisdiction.
All Regulatiom of Gorrumerce, Federal 'or State, are Police
Regulations.

· When the States were isolated, sparsely settled, and the
business interests largely local, it is not strange that all regulations relating to the public health, public morals, and internal trade should emanate from governments specially
charged with the protection of these interests. And, again,
~here existing no apparent necessity or demand for Federal
legislation upon such questions, since practically all the populated area was within the States, and the limited character of
interstate intercourse did not require any regulation over the
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transportation of food, drugs, live stock, or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, it, therefore, came t.o pass that
all police regulations relating to the public welfare were regarded as belonging exclusively to the States, and for many
years it constituted one of those numerous rights accorded
each Commonwealth, regardless of the fact that in the future
it might become necessary to divide such re.gponsibility between the Stat.es and the Nation, so that while the former
would regulate their local affairs the National Government
should exercise a like supervisory jurisdiction over all territory under its exclusive control and over all persons, property, and business subjected to a Federal regulation by the
Constitution.
Each State bas the right, under its reserved powers, to reg..
ulate its domestic or internal commerce in every reasonable
wlaY: it may see fit, not only for the protection of public
health, but public morals, physical safety, or the economic
welfare of its inhabitants, but all S'lwh. s,urpervision mu.st,
without exception, be judicially sustainable as a proper exercise of its police power over sriooh commerce.
The National Government, under its enumerated constitutional power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the States," has precisely the same righJ.t to regulate
the comrmerce thUB subrnitted to its eXAClUBive jwrisdiction.
In other words, in the enum,.erated power to regulate commerce granted Congress by the Constitution and in the implied powe_r to regulate internal commerce accorded to the
States there exists no legal distinction in the metlvods employed in effecting BUClv regulation.
The regulation of commerce by Congress should not be
regarded as an arbitrary one and beyond, therefore, judicial
review, but should be controlled by exactly the sanne li'IYVitations as are irruposed upon the States in their control of domestic commveree.
True, commerce may be promot.ed by opening, freeing, or
improving the various channels of trade, be they artificial or
1
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natural, just as publio health may be promoted by the expenditure of public money for the furtherance of medical
knowledge or sanitary science, and without nece~ly involving, in either case, the exercise of police power; but in
all those commercial regulations embracing, as they must,
the exercise of police power the existence thereof constitutes
tlie sole and only foundation upon which any governmental
agency can predicate- its legal right to supervise or regulate
commerce. For the privilege of carrying on commerce ls an
inherent one, and in the restriction or curtailment of which
( or any other form of intercourse) there must exist not only
some public nece.ssity,, but a penal jurisdiction that can be
invoked for punishing those who refuse to submit to the restrictions or prohibitions demanded by the public welfare.
Until Congress and the Federal courts recognize the fact
that all reguilations of commerce, be they State or Federal,
are police ~regulations, without exception or qualification, it
will be difficult to properly present the axitent and character
of the police jurisdiction po~ed by the Government.
And until the legal profe&9ion realize that a Federal police
jurisdiction over interstate and foreign commerce is a restrietion upon the otherwise arbitrary commercial power of Congress, and not, there/ ore, an additional gmnt of poweJr, will
it be possible to remove the prejudice against the same.
Jwrisdiction of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Oomnnierce is PoUce in Character.
If there is one position that most of the members of the
above committee have insisted upon it is that Congress possesses no general police power, and that the jurisdiction of
their committee is based entirely upon the right of Congress
~ regul~te commerce between the States and foreign nations,
irrespective of police power. The position of the writer, upon
the other hand, is that this particular committee possesses no
~u~sdi~tion whatever that is not wholly and unqualifiedly
pohce m character, though necessarily associated with the

87
control, in some form or other, of commerce or commercial
intercourse requiring a supervision for the protection of the
public welfare. Yet this radical and apparently unreconcilable differenoe is easily explained-if what has already
been .said does not do so.
This committee, while it may never have conceded it, has
never publicly contended, so far as the writer is aware, that
Congress had the unlimited power to regulate absolutely as
it saw fit all forms of interstate and foreign commerce. It is
admitted that Congress may prohibit the shipment between
the States of impure food a.nd drugs, but will any one assert
that it can prohibit the shipment of wheat, coal, oil, salt, iron
ore, timber, or any other such article or product unless it can
be shown that the trade therein is injurious to the public welfare? It may require the preliminary inspection of meat
products before shipment, but it cannot arbitrarily prohibit
the interstate shipment of all meats; it may require safety
appliances on the cars of interstate carriers, but cannot prevent the passage from State to State of such vehicles arbitrarily; it can bar lottery tickets from the channels of interstate commerce, but it cannot exclude Government bonds and
other like secU:ritie.s; it can strike down contracts that unreasonably restrain interstate comrp..erce, but it cannot willfully abrogate all contracts because connected with such CQ~merce.
In the same way Congress may supervise the entry of all
harmful foreign articles, but it cannot deliberately exclude
those that are not in any waYi harmful. The exclusion of
opium or lottery tickets can be directly prohibited in foreign
commerce because injurious to public morals; and, again,
those foreign articles entering into unfair competition with
home industries can be controlled by prohibitory or restrictive duties, but Congress poss~es no power ~ither by
direct act or by a prohibitory duty to exclude ivory, diamonds, spices, and like articles because in no way injurious
to the health, morals, or industrial interests of the country,
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The regulations suggested that are legal are legal because
of their police character, and those that are not because of
the eontrary.
This committee, composed of many of the ablest members
of Congress, while it may have at times attempted to regulate
certain non-commercial intercourse-like quarantine, the
pollution of interstate streams, etc.-has, as a rule, adhered
to all those limits which a police jurisdiction over commerce
prescribes.
The Sherman Act-a Polfoe Refl'lJ;lation of Oommeree.

The trouble in construing the Sherman Act arises largely
from the continued failUJI'e of the courts to rec:ogmze and
declare that all the regulations of interstate commerce covered by this Act are police in character. Monopoly and combinations in restraint of trade were originally common-law
offenses in the States, although now largely regulated by
statutory pr0;visions. In its controlling effect the Sherman
Act must always be reasonable in its regulation of commerce
or commercial intercourse, or otherwise it- would be void.
Congress cannot legally enact, just as a State cannot, any
improper regulation of commerce, since police power must
be reasonably exercised. Any contention, therefore, that certain sections in the Sherman Act, when construed' literally,
would injure the commercial welfare of the country only
goes to show how prevalent is the no.tion that Congress possesses an arbitrary power in regulating commerce, to the exclusion even of judicial review.
If Congress possesses the power, as it admittedly does under
the Constitution, of preventing any unreasonable interference with the freedom or safety of interstate commerce, it is
certainly rather ludicrous to contend that the very legislative
body authorized) to protect eommerce can by any arbitrary
edict injure or destroy the same.
The Sherman Act was a police statute designed to meet
and regulate modern busine,ss conditions. And if at any
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time the selfishness or rapacity of concentrated wealth or the
cunning endeavor of unscrupulous men resulted in the
monopolizing or the corruption of commercial intercourse
between the States, Congress intended that such evil practices should be severely punished and the freedom of proper
commercial intercourse maintained. The construction of
this Act depends more on the application of the evidence
rather than of the law. In its restraints upon the freedom of
commercial intercourse it must be uiberally construed, and
in the infliction of penalties it must be strietly construed.
· Judicial Review of Police Regulation.~.

It would seem that a different rule should obtain with the
Federal courts in passing upon the reasonableness of a State
police statute than in the case of a Federal statute.
Local police regulations are often of an ethical character,
depending upon the moral standards of a particular section
or upon business conditions or racial characteristics, which
may justify one method of protecting the public welfare in
one State that would be unsuitable in another.
Again, each State is the guardian of its internal welfare,
and, unless trespassing upon the rights of non-residents or
acting in olear disregard of the rights of property or of the
inherent rights of citizenship, should be permitted to have
the kind of government that its people demand or are willing to endure, for in either case they are the beneficiaries or
the victims of their own rule.
In the ''Granger cases" the Federal court at first allowed
the Western States to determine absolutely the "reasonable"
character of railroad rates, and, consequently, what constituted, in their judgment, a "confiscatory" rate; but the court
later held, in effect, that it had wrongfully withdrawn all
control over the reasonableness of such police regulations and
accordingly reversed itself. In the "hours of labor" cases it
decided that certain State regulations, in so-called dangerous
occupations, were unreasonable, when perhaps it would have
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been better to have left the question of these social conditions
to the State; which, through its courts and its own people,
might settle the rights a~d wrongs of their domestic regulations without a resort to the Federal courts.
But in the case of police regulations, by Congress, it is the
duty of the Supreme Court to see that all such regulations, in
their effect upon public interests generally, or upon the individual in particular, should be reasonable. This court
should have the same right to review the commercial or noncommercial polioe regulations of Congress as the State courts
possess over such local regulations.
The protection of honest commerce between the States is
the duty of Congr~, and it has the power to pass any kind
of a law that would prohibit the fmudulent sale of oleomargarine in interstate commerce, but if it undertakes, by subterfuge, to discriminate in favor of butter as against oleomargarine as an article of eQITYltmerce it is as much the duty of the
Federal court to declare such a regulation illegal as it was
when it held that the ostensible use of the sanitary power of
certain States, requiring the inspection of imported cattle
"on hoof," were measures designed to protect local interests
from outside competition and, therefore, not a bona fide exercise of their police power.
Free trade exists between the States, and any police regulation by Congress or the States intended primarily to guard
the interests of any State from interstate competition is
illegal-just ·as precisely a similar regulation of Congress
discriminating in favor of the commerce of the United States
and against that of foreign competitors is legal-~use
Congress pob1:!esses the right to protect the industrial interests of the nation from foreign competition, where it has no
right to protect the interests of one State, or the products of
one class of people, from the competitive commerce of other
States, either in the same article or others of a kind tending
to disturb the value of such products.
In the instances cited the varying positions of the oourt
should indicate the importance of fixing upon a definit,e
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method of judicial review, or otherwise the conflicts between
the States themselves or between the States and the Federal
Government · in matters of police regulation become hope10S3ly involved.
Extract from Senate Report on the Migratory Bird Bill.
The report from the Senate committee, beginning at the •
bottom of page 2, argues the case for the birds in the following language:
"Anyone who has read recent estimates of the decrease in insectivorous birds and the increase of herbivorous insects can readily believe that as the mammals
succeeded reptiles insects will soon poo;ess the earth
unl~ some agency is discovered to check their increase.
"We are prone to bear the usual and slowly accumulating burdens with dull resignation and patience.
The life and property losses and taxes that are inherited! and constant we take for granted. It is the concentrated and unusual calamities that shock and excite the spirit of opposition and the desire to prevent
a recurrence. By the sinking of the Titanic 1,300
lives were lost, and the world was filled with fear and
sympathy. Tuberculosis claims 190,000 victims a
year in this country and pneumonia 160,000, yet we
bear this awful loss of life with the passing comment
that it is a great pity.
"The San Francisco earthquake destroyed property
to the value of $400,000,000. This loss was the superinducin~ cause of the panic of 1907, which reduced
values by the billions. If it were known today that
the country would suffer another such loss within its
borders in the year 1912, the wheels of progre~ the
world over would halt in sympathetic fear.
"A short time ago the farmers of the country, especially in the Northwe.st, were mu9h agitated because
of the proposed reciprocity agreement with Canada.
The loss which they, together with other farmers of
the country, will suffer this year and which will benefit
no one will e~d J;>y hundreds of millions of dollars
the total value of the entire wheat crop of the Nation.
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"As long ago as 1904 Dr. C. L. Marlatt, basing his
estimates on the crop reports of the United States Department of Agriculture,_ asserted that the loss to the
agricultural industries in that year caused by insects
alone could be conservatively placed at $795,100,000,
and this estimate does not include a dollar for the use
of insecticides.
"Mr. Forbush, in his most comprehensive book entitled 'Useful Birds,' maintains that the insect pest8
destroy agricultural products to the value of $800,000,000 a year. We -use large numbers so freely in
these days that hundreds of millions mean no more to
us than hund.Teds of thousands did a few years ago.
There are about 600 colleges in the United States today. Their buildings and endowments have been
centuries in accumulation. The value of the college
and university buildings is estimated at $260,000,000
and the endowments ·a t $219,000,000. If they should
be destroyed tomorrow-buildings and endowments-the insect tax of one year would replace them and
leave a balance sufficient to endow 32 new universities
in the sum of $10,000,000 each.
"We have in this country today a.bout 20,000,000
school children, and the cost of their education has
become by far the heaviest tax laid upon the surplus
of the country, yet it costs more by many millions to
feed our insects than it does to educate our children.
If there is any way in which this vast and destructive
tax upon the national income can be prevented or
stayed or resisted in any appreciable measure it would
seem to be the pa.rt of wisdom to act without delay.
"For many years individuals, at their own expense,
and voluntary societies and representatives of the civilized nations the world over have studied and estimated the value of birds to the human race. We call
attention at this time· to but a few of the estimates
made, and such as seem to be fair and reliable, but
enough, we think, to prove that in this country at
least we have ruthlessly disturbed, if not destroyed,
one of nature's wisest and most valuable balances be,.
tween the birds and their natural food, and it is clear
to those informed upon this subject that unles..~ radical and immediate measures are adopt,ed to restore
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a sure, safe, and natural equilibrium between insectivorous birds and their foods the time will soon come
when the annual loss caused by insects to agriculture
in this country -alone will be counted in billions instead of millions of dollars.
"Most insects, like the green lea.f louse, or aphis, so
destructive to the hop industry and many other of our
most valuable fruits and vegetables, reproduce their
kind at the rate of ten sextillion to the pair in one season. This number means 40,000 for. every square
inch of land that is above water. Placed in Indian
file, 10 to the inch, it would take light, traveling at
the rate of 180,000 miles per second, 2,500 years to
reach the file leader.
"The potato bug is less fecund. One pair will reproduce from fifty to sixty millions only in a season.
The natural increase of one pair of gypsy moths would
defoliage the United States in eight years.
These estimates I quote from Prof. Forbush, who in
turn gathered them from the United States Biological
Survey, and we may say that these cases are fair examples of the reproductive powers of the insec.tile
world. Locusts, army worm, and chinch bugs, unless
checked in procreation, soon beC'orne countless hordes,
devastating wide areas of the earth's surfact.
"It is to be remembered that insects live to eat. Some
of them increase their size at birth 10,000 times in 30
days. Dr. Lintner, of the New Jersey Board of Agriculture, reports 176 species of insects attacking the
-apple tree. (U. S. Biological Survey.) About the
same number attack the peach, plum, and cherry
trees. Dr. Packard finds 400 species feeding upon the
oak; 300 attack the conifera. The number feeding
upon cereals, grains, and garden crops is also very
large .
. "The reports of the Bureau of Entomology show that
destruction by some insects is widely spread and a.re
increasing. Dr. Marlatt estimates that the loss to the
wheat-growing States in 1904 occasioned by the Hessian fly was about $50,000,000. Dr. Shinar estimates
the damage done to crops in the Mississippi Valley
caused by the chinch bug in one year as high as $100,000, 000. The Rocky Mountain locusts, in years of
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their grea~ activity, caused the States of the. Northwest more than $150,000,000. Dr. Lintner estimates
the annual loss to farmers caused by cut-worms at
$100,000,000. The terrible loss of $800,000,000 a
year is fairly easy of proof.
"That the worm does not eat everything that grows
is due to several causes-weather, parasites, fungi, insect diseases, insectivorous birds, and mechanically
applied poisons, which are expensive, unnatural, and
dangerous. However large may be the share of parasites, fungi, and weather in checking the increase of
destructive insects, investigation shows that it is lamentably insufficient, and the briefs of the bird defenders pretty clearly indicate that the birds have
been, are, and will be without question one of the.most
important agencies in staying the inroads of insect
devastation. Mlen who have had this subject at heart
and in hand for many years assert that bird life is one
of the most indispensable balancing forces of nature.
"We cite a few instances in support of the foregoing. All birds eat, and most of them eat most of the
time, ·a nd they eat insects and little else. The old bird
has just as keen an appetite as the young bird, and he
is much larger and his daily ration is almost incredible.
"Mr. Treadwell, of the Boston Society of Natural
History, fed a young robin 68 angle or earth worms in
one day. Mr. Nash, of the Ontario Department of
Agriculture,fed a robin 70 cutworms a dayfor 15 days.
A young crow will eat twice its weight a da.y of almost
anything that happens to be brought before him. The
State ornithologist of Massachusetts, Mr. Forbush, by
careful and painstaking observation has collected
much reliable information on this subject. He has
seen two parent grosbeaks in 11 hours make 450 trips
to their nests carrying two or more larvre at a time.
Sparrows, ,chickadees, vireos, martins, and warblers
made from 40 to 60 trips an hour with their beaks
filled with all manner of insects. Under the supervision of the United States Biological Survey the crops
of 3·,500 birds were examined. Thirty grasshoppers
and 250 caterpillars were found in the crops of
cuckoos. In the crop of a nighthawk were found 60
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grasshoppers and in another 500 mosquitoes; 38 cutworms were found in the crop of a blackbird; 70
cankerworms were found in the crop of a cedar bird.
Prof. Tschudi estimates the diet of a song sparrow at
1,500 larvre a day.
"Mr. Forbush estimates that a single yellowthroated warbler will consume 10,000 aphids or tree
lice in a day. Scarlet tanagera have been seen to eat
35 gipsy moths a minute for 1'8 minutes at a time.
"To quote further from Mr. Forbush on Birds:
" 'More than 50 kinds of birds feed upon different
varieties of caterpillars; 38 varieties are known to feed
upon devastating plant lice.
"'Mr. McAtee, of the United States Biological Survey, reports that several of the most destructive species
of scale insects are the food of not less than 50 kinds
of birds. Beetles, cutworms, grubs, borers, locusts,
grasshoppers, crickets, in fact most all of the injurious
insects are food for a very great majority of the different kinds of birds.
" 'It is the general belief that the so-called game
birds are seed rather than insect eaters. The fact is
that the bulk of the food of most of this clru:B of birds
consists of insects when insects are to be had.
" 'The quail, though; not a migratory bird, and
therefore not within the scope of the pending bill,
should, however, be carefully protected by State legislation. It feeds upon locusts, chinchbugs, cotton
worms, cotton-boll weevils, army worms, Colorado potato beetles, striped cucumber beetles, grasshoppers,
ground beetles, and many others. The young feed
almost entirely upon insects. Such seeds as they eat
are }argely those of the harmful weeds, as ragweed:
smartweed, red sorrel, mercury, pigweed, and the like.
If the quail can be protected and become numerous
and fearless, they would become the most useful assistants and allies of the farmer.
" 'This is true in a great measure of the partridge
or ruffled grouse, snipe, plover, sandpiper, woodcock,
wood duck, and black duck, once so common all along
the shores of our streams and pools. They were formerly great insect eaters, but they have been so persecutied by the hunters that they hardly now ever live
1

there.'
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"Prairie chickens; like the grouse and wild turkey,
feed ,t heir gr,<;>wing young almost entirely upon insects, and ,t he mat1:1ife birds ,prefer this diet.
"We quote from Prof. Forbush -a few instances of
crops saved from destruction by birds:
" 'In Pomerania an immense forest was in danger
of being utterly ruined by ooterpillars and was unexpectedly saved by cuckoos, which though on the point
of migrating established themselves there for weeks
and s<i thoroughly .cleared the trees that next year
neither depredators nor depredations were seen.
" 'In Europe, in 1848, there was a great outbreak
of gypsy moths. The hand of man seemed powerless
to work off the affliction, but on the approach of the
winter titmice and wrens paid daily visits iio the infested trees, and before spring the eggs of the moths
were entirely destroyed.
" 'According to "Reaumer," the larvre of the gypsy
moth were at one time so numerous on the Limes at
Brussels that many of the great trees were nearly defoliated. The moths swarmed like bees in the summer. If one-half of the eggs had hatched the following spring scarcely a leaf would have remained in
these favorite places of public resort. Two months
later scarcely an egg cluster wo,uld be found. This
happy result was attributed to the titmice and creepers, which were seen buiSily ru~ning up and down the
tree trunks.
"'In 1892 Australia was affiicted with incursions of
immense clouds of locusts. In Glen Thompson district several large flocks of ibis were seen eating the
young locusts in a wholesome manner. Near Victoria
swarms of l®usts were seen in a paddock. Just as it
was f.eared that all the sheep would have to be sold
for want of grass, starlings, spoonbills, and cranes
m.ade their appearance, and in ,a few days made so
complete a destruction of the locusts that but a few
acres of grass were lost.
"'When Utah was settled the first year's crop was
almost utterly destroyed by myriads of crickets that
came down from the mountains·. The first crop having been almost destroyed, they had sowed seed for
the second year. The crop promised well, but when
the crickets appeared the ~ople were in danger of
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starvation. In describing the condition Mr. George
Q. Cannon said: "Black crickets came down by millions and destroyed our grain crops, promising fields
of wheat in the morning were by evening as smooth as
a man's hand-devoured by insects. At -this juncture
sea gulls came by thousands, and before the crops were
entirely destroyed these gulls devoured the crickets, so
that our fields were entirely free from them." Several
times afterwards the crops were attacked by the crickets and were saved by the gulls.
"'In 1865 locusts hatched out in countless numbers
in Nebraska. Some fields of corn and wheat were entirely destroyed by them. A large field of corn near
Dacotah City was literally covered with locusts, and
there were indications that not a stalk would escape.
About this time blackbirds appeared in large numbers and made this field their feeding ground. The
locusts gradually disappeared. Although the crop had
to be replanted, it was due to the birds that a crop was
raised at all. Many fields were saved with but slight
loss by the work of blackbirds, plover, quail, and
prairie chickens.
"'A severe outbreak of forest tent caterpillars occurred in New York and parts of New England in
· 1898. Thousands of acres of woodland were devastated, and great damage was done to the sugar-maple
orchards of New York and Vermont. Birds-warblers, orioles, sparrows, robins, cuckoos, cedar birds,
and many others-attacked the caterpillars vigorously,
and by 1900 the plague had been so reduced that the
injury was not seen.
"'Increase of insects and damage by them follows
destmction of birds. Frederick of Prussia, being particularly fond of cherries, was annoyed to see the sparrows destroying his favorite fruit. An edict was issued
ordering sparrow extermination. The campaign
against the birds was so succe~ful that not only were
the sparrows destroyed, but many other birds were
either killed or driven away. Within two years cherries and most other fruits were wanting. The trees
were defoliated by caterpillars and other insects, and
the king, seeing his error, imported sparrows to take
the place of those that had been killed.
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" 'A few years since the harvests of France began
to fail. A commission to investigate the cause of the
deficiency was appointed by the minister of agriculture. This commission took counsel with experienced
naturalists, and the deficiency was attributed to the
raviages of insects that it is the function of birds to
destroy. It seems that the French people had been
killing and eating not only the game birds but the
smaller birds as well. Birds' eggs had been taken in
immense numbers. A single child had been known to
come in at night with a hundred eggs. The number
of eggs of birds destroyed in the country annually
was estimated to be from eighty to one hundred millions. Before such persecution the birds were rapidly
disappearing. As an apparent result of the destruction of the birds the vines, fruit trees, forest trees,
grain and field crops were suffering much from destructive insects. It was concluded that bv no other
agency than the birds could the ravages of insects be
kept down, and the commission called for prompt and
energetic remedies to prevent the destruction of birds.
" 'The greatest l~es from the ravages of the Rocky
Mountain locust were coincident with or followed soon
after the destruction by the people of countless thousands of blackbirds, prairie chickens, quail, upland
plover, curlew, and other birds. This coincidence is
significant at least. Prof. Aughey tells how this
slaughter was accomplished. Vast numbers of them
were poisoned with strychnine in and around the cornfields. It was done under the belief that the blackbirds were damaging the corn crop, but a great number of birds of other species were destroyed as well as
the blackbirds.
"'In Dakota County, in Nebraska, in one autumn
not less than 30,000 birds must have been destroyed.
Prof. Aughey writes thus of this destruction: "Supposing that each of these 30,000 birds ate 150 insects
daily, we then have the enormous number of 135,000,000 insects saved in this one county in one month
t~at ~~ght ~to have bee~ destroyed by the agency of
birds.
When we consider that most of these birds
~ere migrat_ory, and that they ~oul_d have been busy
m other regions the rest of the time m helping to keep
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down the increase of insect.g, the harm that their destruction did is beyond computation. The killing of
such birds is not ,a local, it is a national, a continental
loss.'
"All of the foregoing evidence goes to demonstrate
the existence of a natural economic relation between
these three orders of life. There is a sort of interdependence, and the existence of each one is dependent
upon the exiistence of the others. But for the vegetation the inseci;.g would perish, and but for the inseci;.g
the birds would perish, and but for the birds the vegetation would be utterly destroyed by the unchecked
increase of insect destroyers.' "

( 9)
RIVER AND HARBOR APPROPRIATION BILLPOLLUTION OF PUBLIC WATERS AND
INJURIES RESULTING THEREFROM.
PRIMARY RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL,
FOR ALL PUBLIC PURPOSES, THE PUBLIC WATERS
OF THE UNITED ST ATES, INCLUDING:F1RsT. The promotion of navigation.
SECOND. The preservation of public health.
THIRD. The protection of fish in interstate
public waters.

Legislation suggested for the accomplishment of these results.

SPEECH
OF

HON. GEORGE SHIRAS, 3D,
OF PENNSYLVANIA,
IN THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Thursday, February 23, 1905.
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SPEECH
01!'

HON. GEORGE SHIRAS, 3d.
On the blll (H. R. 18809) making appropriations tor the construction,
repair, and preservation of certain public works on rivers and harbors, and for other purposes.

Mr. SHIRAS said:
.
Mr. CHAIRMAN : 1.~he present river and harbor bill ( H. R.
18809) appropriated $15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending .June
30, 1906, and the further sum of $17,000,000 to be expended
thereafter, or a total of $32,000,000 for " the construction, repair,
and preservation of certain public works on the rivers and
waters, and for other purposes."
The amount carried ls not excessive considering the importance of the work undertaken. On one occasion the total
exceeded $73,000,000 for river and harbor improvements.
GRADUAL CHANGE IN TlIFl SCOPE OF IMPROVEMENTS,

In connection with a brief review of the manner in which
the National Government expends such large sums of money
upon our national waterways it seems an appropriate -time
to call the attention of the Honse and the country , to the
peculiar and, to my mind, unfortunate limitations placed upon
such disbursements. Our seaboard and inland waters were
from the beginning one of the great elements of our commercial prosperity, and their gradual development, through the
liberallty of the Government, has made our water transportation unsurpassed by any other country. The original theory
on which the constitutional right to expend public money for
the improvement of navigation was based on rather narrow
grounds, viz, in the aid of inter tate and international commerce
on such public waters as were not only "navigable" in the ordinary sense of the word, but were of such magnitude as warranted governmental expenditures. '.rhe seeming legality of these
early appropriations, therefore, depended upon a preexisting navigability of the rivers, lakes, and harbors. Gradually this has
been changed, until now the test frequently is, Can the waterway be made navigable; and if so, will it be of sufficient commercial value to warrant the Government making the improvement? Streams that were navigable but one month in the year,
and then only during freshets, when transportation was most
hazardous, are now, by our system of slack-water dams and locks,
made great hi~hways of trade; other water courses that were
wide and so shallow as to be practically unnavigable had deep
channels excavated therein and thus adapted to the movement of
our largest steamships; and, finally, not to be confined to the
water courses provided by nature, in our etl'.orts to aid navigation
we have from time to time ( as in the pre ent bill) expended considerable sums in building canals and artificial channels tllrongh
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solid ground for miles, so as to connect streams with lakes and
lakes with tidal waters. We have even gone so far in some of
our river and harbor bills as to grant franchises to private corporations to construct locks and dams on certain rivers and collect toll thereon-a practice that should be abandoned.
Thus it must be apparent at the present day that we exercise the most complete and exclusive dominion over our public
waters in so far as navigation is concerned, and, further, that
this right is wholly based upon the principle that the public
waters belong to the nation and should be so protected and improved as to be a source of common benefit to all.
SHOULD THE

GOVERNME~T PRIDVENT THE UNNECESSARY
PUBLIC W ATEllS?

POLLUTION

OF

It must therefore be plain that our Government has assumed

the right to so control our public waters as will best conserve
the needs of commerce, quite irrespective of• the original nnvigability of the waterway or route to be improved. .At this point
it seems proper to aslc, Why is it, with such complete and exclusive control of our Government over the public waters, in so
far as navigation is concerned, that no practical steps have been
taken to extend national supervision over the same ·waters for
the benefit of the country in two essential pariculars, viz,
the protection of public health and the valuable food fishes
that are indigenous to such waters?
While the improvement of navigation is essentially and fundamentally right, the protection of public health is equally essential, whether it be gauged by morals or in a purely commercial
sense. Though this bill carries the sum of $32,000,000, not one
cent is to be expended in the investigation or control of the
many sources of contamination and pollution which are gradually converting our great rivers and harbors into open sewers,
killing thousands of citizens each year, and imperiling the health
of millions. If the time bas now come when the mere driving of a stake in some petty creek rencters the offender subject
to fine and imprisonment, as an alleged interference with :µavigation, it would seem as though our Government should be given
authority in the present bill or by other statutes to prevent all
such injurious pollution of public waters as must inevitably
render unfit for domestic use many streams and lakes owned
by the public at large and needed for other vital purposes than
the transportation of freight or passengers. Were the sickness and death arising from the corruption of our water courses
valued according to the " tables of expectancy " employed in
uch cases, and were we to add to this the untold millions
expended by municipalities in the construction and maintenance
of filtration plants, reservoirs, and distant conduit connections
with uncontaminated waters, the sum total would be appalling.
If, in the future, some of the money carried by the river and
harbor bills can be appropriated for the preservation of public
health, it would do very much in furthering the popularity of
·uch me~sures.
That we possess the constitutional power to protect public
health under the regulatory rights the Government bas over
public waters must be unquestioned when the matter is given
due consideration, for it is manifestly impossible for the
States bordering upon the same waters to enac.t either efficient
or uniform legislation or make the Rflme enforcible against
0
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an offending State which may with impunity so contaminate
the public waters passing beyond its borders as to utterly destroy the purity and usefulness of the same.
The Congre sional district which I have the honor to represent lies within what is commonly designated as "Greater Pittsburg," a great indu trial center, at the headwaters of the Ohio
and penetrated by the converging waters or the Allegheny and
the Monongahela. 'l'his community pos esses a number of
modern municipal waterworks upplied from the several rivers
ancl is about to adopt sand filtration on a large scale, costing
over $10,000,000 when extended to meet the requirements of the
entire district.
·
The great size of indu._ trial Pittsburg and its many sources
of water supply makes accurate deduction of the sickness and
death due to impure water omewhat difficult, but the increased
frequency of typhoid fever, amounting to thousands of cases
annually, compel costly experiments in the effort to save the
lives and health of its citizens. 'l'he fact that in the little town
of Butler, but a few mile distant, 1,000 cases of typhoid fever
were traced to a single source of contaminated sewage passing
into the small stream supplying the town, is an example of cause
and effect too significant to be forgotten.
In this connection I submit an extract from an address delivered by Surgeon-General Wyman some seven or eight years
ago, when the data -00 water pollution fir t began to receive the
more serious consideration of our national health authorities:
WATER POLLUTION.

Among other matters now engaging the attention of the Bureau may be ruentioned the subject of the pollution of water
supplies, when snch pollution affects or threatens to affect the
sanitary condition of tile people of more than one State. A bill
providing for a commi ion for an inve tigation of this character
has been introduced in Congres , and the following are extracts
from an official report showing its nece ity:
OFFICIAL REPOR'.l'.

The importance of investigating the pollution of the water
courses and other water supplie which are of necessity utilized
for drinking purposes can not be questioned when we consider
the enormous number of cases of illness and deatll which are
annually cuu ed by ·water which are polluted with sewage and
garbage. As time goes on the situation becomes more and more
complex, and is fraught with greater danger by reason of the
increase in population and the dependence upon streams as the
ource of water supply.
·
The di eases which are carried by water are cholera, typhoid
fever, dysentery, diarrheal diseases, malarial fever, and, exceptionally, diphtheria, glander , und anthrax.
With r gard to cllolera, its frequent spread through the infection of rivers furnishing the water supply of cities has been
demonstrated in nearly all European countries. With regard
to the other di eases mentioned, the literature upon the subject
shows that they were carried by treams conveying the specific
infection of each di ease, but' the exact distance to which the
specific infection of each disease may be carried bas not been
determined, nor the exact relation that the sewage bears to the
spread of the di e,1se. 'l'he quantity of sewage wllich may ren6359
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der the water of any particular stream unhealthful ; the amount
of dilution of the sewage or other treatment thereof necessary
to prevent the lethal contamination of a particular stream, and
the effect of sewage pollution upon the seasonal prevalence of
disease are ,as yet undetermined problems in the United States.
It can not be questioned at this day that sewage pollution of a
water supply is responsible for the majority of the diseases
above mentioned.
With regard to typhoid fever, no subject is attracting the attention of the sanitarians of the United States more widely at
present than its spread through polluted water supply. The
prevalenre of typhoid fever throughout the United States during
the past year has been very marked. During the calendar year
1895 the reports received at the Marine Hospital Bureau show
that of the cities and towns making report to the Bureau, located on the Mississippi River. ,vith a total population of 1,2G0,l43 (census, 1890), there were 490 deaths from typhoid fever,
and an estimated number of 4.900 cases; that of similar cities
and towns on the Ohio River, aggregating a population of
1,141,527, there were 1,980 deaths reported, with an estimated
number of 19,800 cases, or in a total population of 2,401,670, of
cities reporting on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, there were
2,470 deaths and an estimated number of 24,700 rases.
On the Great Lakes the cities of the United States reporting
to the Marine-Hospital Bureau in 1895, aggregating a population of 2,625,775, reported 188 deaths, with an estimated number
of 1,880 cases. It should be remarked that two of the great
cities of the Lakes ( Chicago and Buffalo), aggregating a population of 1,420,000, are not included in the above statistics. These
e:ities failed to send in 1895 the weekly reports from which
these statistics are compiled, but in the annunl reports for the
previous year there were 592 deaths reported, indicating 5,920
cases. Adding these cases and deaths to the totals above, it
would give an annual total of 780 deaths and 7,800 cases of
typhoid fever in the cities of the United States on the Great
Lakes, aggregating a population of 4,043,755.
From the above statistics it is estimated that every year there
are no fewer than 45,000 deaths caused by typhoid fever alone
throughout the United States, not to speak of diarrheal diseases,
which latter will augment the above munber by half, and, based
upon an estimated mortality of 10 per cent, it is within reason
to assume a yearly prevalence of 450,000 cases of this disease.
To what extent the prevalence of typhoid fever is due to the infection of the rivers and lakes from which rities take their
water supply will be one of the subjects for the investigation.
The carrying of this disease from one city or town to another
by means of water courses has been definitely proved both
abroad and in the United States, and the presumption is strong
that in the Ohio River, taken as an example, which is the sewer
and at the same time the source of water supply for nearly all
the cities lorated upon its banks, this and other diseases are
annually disseminated thereby, and it is one of the prime objects of this bill to determine this point accurately.
There are a number of other streams, such as the Mississippi,
Merrimac, Connecticut, Potomac, Missouri, the Red River, the
Red River of the North, the Columbia, and Wabash rivers,
6359

.f

7
the cities on which in different States show a marked prevalence of typhoid fever.
In the event of cholera obtaining a lodgment In the United
States this accurate knowledge would be of the utmost importance, for while the conveyance of this disease by water courses
ltas been demonstrated In European countries, the conditions
relating to the amount of sewage, the length of the water
courses, etc., are so different in the United States as to absoiutely require specific Investigation. In other words, the conc:lusions to be drawn from experiments in foreign countries are
not , utficient for the needs of this country.
This subject has long been one of inquiry in England, and the
investigations made and conclusions reached have been of mestimable value to a great majority of the cities and towns which
were compelled to depend upon streams for their water supply.
The same action has also been taken by the sanitary authorities
of France and Germany, with equal benefit to their peoJ)le.
In the United States it is impossible for one State bordering
upon a river, even by most stringent laws, to protect the health
ot its citizens, because it has no jurisdiction over others. As
our urban populations are rapidly increasing and the question of
supplying this great number of people with a suffirient supply
of potable water is becoming more important, it behooves our
Government to give aid to this by at least pointing out some
efficient reruedy for this great disturber ot tbe life and happiness of our people. I am informed that fourteen State boards
of health, tbe National Conference ot State Boards of Health,
and the American Public Health Association have passed resolutions urging M investigation of this character.
PROT>:CTION OB' FOOD FISHES IN CERT.A.IN PUBLIC W.ATEUS.

While not of equal importance with the question of public
health, the failure of our Government to properly protect our
valuable food fishes, which at one time fairly swarmed in the
bays, rivers, and lakes ot our country, is of suflicient magnitude
to justify some reference to the same in connection with the discussion bearing upon the intrinsic value of our public waters to
the nation over and above the question of navigation. It is the
opinion of well-qualified persons that Federal supervision over
the fish within our public waters would advance the murketable
product $15,000,000 or more a year. As showing the interest
of Government experts in the question of protecting our food
fl.shes by national legislation, I submit a letter addressed to the
United States Commissioner of Fisheries and his reply thereto:
HOUSE OF REPRESENTaTIV~S,
Hon. GEOltGE

:M:.

Washington, D. 0., February !4, 1905.
BOWERS,

Oommissione1', Bureau of Fisheries, City.

Srn: The Federal Government ln exercising control over the
public waters o! the United States has heretofore practically limited
lts action to the protection and promotion o! navigation thereon. Atter
considerable Investigation o! the subject I have reaclled the conclusion
that the National Government should so extend its supervision over the
publlc waters as to prevent the unnecessary pollu tlon o! the same, not
only !or the purpose o! conserving the public health, but with the
view o! preserving !rom injury or destrudlon the valuable !ood fishes
that are indigenous to our navigable streams. It likewise seems important that the Government In spending mllllons o! dollars annnally
on such streams and public waters- whether !or navigation or irrlgatlon purposes-should so construct Its dams and canals as to provide
not only proper ftshways for the free movement of the fish in their
6359
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annual migrations to and from the spawning beds, but should so con. struct said Improvements as to avoid the unnecessary accumulation of
sewage and other deleterioµs substauces In the slack-water pools (so
menacing to the public health) by p1·ovldlng means for flushing the
same.
While some of these subjects are n'o t within your province to pass
upon, I am anxious to obtnln your views on the possible advantages
that would acc rne to your Bureau were additional Federnl legislatl0n
enacted glvlug the Government authority to regulate fishing 1n those
public wate1·s where the fish are either of a migratory character or belong to waters which ar·e not wholly within the control of :my one
State.
Under the acts of Congress providing the1·efor the President of the
United States appoints a Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries, who!le
duty it is to investigate · the subject with a view to ascertaining what
diminution, if any, in the number or food fishes of the coast and lakes
of the United States bas taken place and from what cause the same ls
due, and whether any protective, prohibltory, or precautionary measures should be adopted m the premises, und report upon the same to
Congress.
It ls also provided that the heads of the several F.lxecutlve Departments shall cause to be rendered all necessary and practical aid to
the Commissioner In the prosecntlon of his investigations and inquiries,
and section 4::S98 of the Ilevi1:1ed Statutes . provides that " the Commissioner may take or cause to be taken at all times in the waters of
the seacoast of the United States, where the tide ebbs and flows, and
also in the waters of the lakes, such fish or specimens thereof as may
in his judgment from time to time be needfu or proper for the conduct of his duties, any law, custom, or usage of any State notwithstanding."
From the above last recited act it ls clear that Congress has
asse1·ted its authol'lty over fish in certain public waters and bas,
besides, in,lted >1uch additional legislation as might be hereafter suggested for the pl'Oper protection or the food fishes of the United States.
I understand that by the placing of nets, weirs, and similar devices
In 01· at the entl'anre of streams many valuable migratory fishes, such
11s the salmon and shad, are in many ioralities entirely prevented from
reaching the fresh-water spawning beds, and in other localities such
limited numbers sueceed in passing such barriers. that were It not
!or artificial propagation carried on by the Government the supply of
these valuablt> fi sh would soon be exhausted.
It would seem, also, that some provision should be made for regulating the season and tbe manne1· in which such migratory fish
should be taken, In view of tlle fact that our Government spends
annually lai-ge amounts of the public money fo1· the protection and
propagation of the fish .
I would be pleased, tbertfore, if you would Indicate in a general way
"what r,rotectlve, p1·ohibltory, or precautionary measures should be
adopted ' !or fostel'lng our fishing interests in the public waters of
the United States, aud, further, that you detail snch special instances
of the insufficiency of existing legislation as will best lllustrate the
urgency and pl'Opriety of Congressional action.
In Alaska I understand that yom· Bureau possesses ample authority
to insure the permanency of the salmon Industry in such watersi both
tidal and Inland. H this ls correct, may I ask if the passage of s mllar
laws, so fa1· as applicable to the United States, would be sufllcient; and
if so, to what extent in your judgment would the commercial fisheries
of the country be benefited?
Yours, ve1·y truly,
GEO. SnIRAS, 3d.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR,
BUREAU OF FISIIFJRIES,

Hon.

GEORGE

SHIRAS,

Washington, Mar·ch 1, 1905.

III,

House of R epres entativ es, Washinf}ton, D. 0.

Sm: In response to your request for an expression of opinion as to
the advantages that would accrue to this Bureau were the Government
in position to regulate tbe fishing for migratory fishes In public wate1·s
or the fishing In waters not wholly within the control of any one
State, I have the hono1· to make tbe following statements :
The operations of this Bureau so far as they relate to legal matters
alrectlng the States, are In gen<'tal quite satisfactory· and, In Its
own Interests, the Bureau would not care to see existing conditions
changed or dlstrubed. The State ofllclais appreciate the beneficent
and unselfish etrorts of the Bureau to prese1·ve and Increase the supply
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of food fl, hes, and are wllllng to cooperate to the fullest possible
extent. But from the standpoint of tbe fisheries I can see that in
many, perhaps all, cases affecting migratory fishes and interstate
waters great advantage would accrne from the ability of the General
Government to prescribe uniform regulations and to impose necessary
restrictions in the interest of the entire country.
'.rhe States would doubtless be greatly adverse to relinquishing
their contl'ol over such matters, and this Bureau would be equally
adverse to assuming jurisdiction; but if the welfare of certain industries and the preservation of certain fishes are the vital considerations,
there ls no doubt that these would be best secured through governmental control.
Attention may be drawn to the case of the fisheries of the Great
Lakes. For fifteen years the States bordering thereon have been
striving to secure uniform leg-l!..latlon, and many joint confet·ences
have been held· but the desired end ls not yet attained, and the fisheries have suffered lo consequence. Other International waters in
which the condition of affairs ls most unsatisfactory are Puget Sound
and Lake of the Woods.
With regard to the Columbia River, the tates of Washington,
Oregon, and Idaho have never teen able to agree on uniform legislation and regulations tot· the best interests of the salmon fisheries,
and during tbe past season two of those States went so far as to
ignore the law providing for a close season, with the result that the
run of fish on which the Government hatchet·ies chiefly depended for
their supply of eggs was practically annlhllated and the season at the
hatcheries was a failure.
Various other instances might be cited in which the States fall to
give to the migratory fishes that protection which ls clearly indicated
or In which protection is one-sided ot· Inadequate because of the lack
of unl:t'ormity In the regulations. In all such cases governmental
jurisdiction would easily accomplish the desired end.
1
1
wo~i~e~ed i:ri~g~18ai1nt:~ic: N~;:rr1er:e~J~ ~~Re~lsi~n ti~ pib~~itl6~te~i
this Bureau ase in the prevention of the polfution of publfc or interstate waters by mill, factory, and ctty refuse, and in the prohibition
of the construction or maintenance of dams, dikes, or other obstructions to the movements of fish unless such obstructions are provided
with duly approv<'d fish ladders.
Very reRpectfully,
GEO. W. BowF.Rs,
Commissioner.

I herewith submit an extract from a communication of mine
addre sed to a publication devoted to the interest of sportsmen:
In Albemarle Sound the national shad fisheries, owing to the almost
entire catch of the shad before they reach the fresh-water spawning
beds by the intervening nets further down the sound, bad obtained
spa\vn amounting only to 10,000,000, while the hatcheries had the capacity for 100,000,000. If a fnlr proportion of the shad ~ould reach the
spawning beds, perhnps one thousand ruilllon additional spawn would
be deposited and the shad industry overwhelmingly benefited. As it is,
I have been informed that the shad industry of the Atlantic coast
Is nlmost wholly dependent upon the artificial propagation conducted
by the Government ; and yet while out· nation spends the people's money
for this worthy purpote, it has no power to pt·otect this migratory
fish from practical nnnlhilatlon by certain States, except through its
rerslst<'nt efforts In obtaining annually enough spawn to provide for a
Bruited catch each season. Can it be doubted that the shad and salmon, living far ont at sea and migrating annually to out· waters for
the purpose of reprodu<'tion, do not belong to any State, and yet a
State, by reason of the public waters pa1:1slng through its domain, may
so net the streams and inlets as to exterminate a fish which surely
belongs to the people at large, and for which so much of the public
money ls expended 'l
All ornithologists and fish culturlsts recognize a wonderful similarity
In the migratorr habits of certain fish and birds, each coming anually to
the same locahty, over the same general course, for the purpose of
reproduction, and then returning to some distant locality on water or
land, respectively. Destroy cet·taln shore birds of the Atlantic coast
and they are gone forever, so completely are some varieties confined
to this narrow avenue of migration; destroy all the salmon which at·e
accustomed to spawn ln a particular stream or estuary and these waters
are forever barren, so wondel'.t:ul ls the prerlilectlon of this fish for the
same spawning bed. The State of Maine Improvidently wiped out the
vast salmon schools which once visited Its streams; the State of Con0859
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necttcut has largely Jost Its shad, and at present the great Paclfl.c coast
States of Washington and Oregon are tempornrlly fl.lling the pockets of
their commercial fisherman, who are unrestrained by a Federal law so
regulating the catch as to correspond with the maintenance of a permanent supply, and soon the Columbia River will be like those of Maine.

'l'herefore, in conclusion, Jet me ask if the time has not arrived
when thi-e nation, in the protection of general health and in
the preservation of its great commercial fisheries, should asEiume its rightful control over those public waters, not wholly
within the dominion of one State, now but partially exercised in the promotion of navigation? Let us have Federal
statutes expressly recognizing public ownership in public waters,
and the outcome will be the saving of countless lives and the protection of our material interests without a single substantial
objection to negative such beneficial results.

N

A BILL TO ESTABLISH A DEPARTMENT OF SANITARY SCIENCE,

arch 1, 1905, Mr. SHIRAS introduced the following bill ; which
referred to the Committee on Interstate and )foreign Commerce and ordered to be printed :
A bill (H. R. 19181) creating a commission to consider and recommend legislation for the establishment of an Executive Department of the Government to be known as the Department
of Sanitary Science.
Whereas the health and physical welfare of the inhabitants of
every country depend largely uppn proper sanitary laws and the
liberal maintenance of efficient departments, ve·s ted not only with
the power to enforce necessary legislation but to investigate
completely all questions relating to public health and tbe advancement of medical science ; and
Whereas the Government of the United States has heretofore
successfully undertaken, through the establishment of the Department of Agriculture, to aid in the most efficient manner the
several States in all matters relating to the protection and improvement of the plant and animal life within said States; and
Whereas the duties and burdens of conserving the public
health have devolved almost wholly upon each State, irrespective
of its resources or methods of action; and
Whereas the experience of recent years has shown that with
the rapid growth and concentration in population, together with
the constant intermingling of its citizens throughout the country, that States acting separately are unable to enact and enforce suitable and uniform legislation for the protection of public health, in so far as the same relates to the investigation and
the suppression or control of thoS«-! infectious, contagious, or
c-ommunicable diseases which threaten or impair the general
bealth of the nation ; and
Whereas it is the manifest duty of the General Government
to preYent the injurious pollution of the public waters, so productive of sickness and death; to regulate the interstate traffic
in adulterated foods and drugs, and to enforce proper sanitary
and quarantine legislation between said States and with other
nations, and generally to so safeguard the public health and the
personal safety of its citizens as lies in its power, but in nowise
interfering with the said States in tbe exercise of those rights
of local self-government incident to tbe maintenance of local
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boards ot health and tbe enforcement of regulations suitable to
local conditions and welfare of its citizens : Therefore,
Be it enacted, etc., That a commission is hereby created, to be
called the Sanitary Science Commission, to be composed as follows: Five members of tbe Senate of the United States and five
members of the House of Representatives of the United States,
to be appointed by the presiding otticer of encb House of Congress, respectively: Prnvilled, That at least two of the said members of the Senate and two of the said members of the House
of Representatives shall be members ot the minority party.
SEc. 2. That it shall be the uuty of the commission to investigate and report to the Congress, on the first day of its next session, a bill for the creation of an Executive Department of the
GoYernment out of the United States Public Health and MarineHospital Service, to be known hereafter as the Departlnent of
Sanitary Science, and vesting therein all and such other authority as may be necessary for the full exercise of the powers incident to the preservation of the public health of the citizens of
the United States. Where such authority has already been conferred upon any other bureau, office, department, or branch of
the public service, said bureau, office, department, or branch of
the public service shall be transferred and become a part of the
Department of Sanitary Science in the manner and form provided by said commission.
SEC. 3. That said commission, in recommending legislation for
the e tablishment of a Department of Sanitary Science, is authorized and empowered to consider as within the scope of said
legislation the schedule hereto annexed, containing the bureaus,
division , and classes of which said Department may be composed: Provided, however, 'rhat said commission may alter or
enlarge said schedule as it may determine.
SEC. 4. That there shall be at the head of the Department of
Snnitary Science a Secretary, who shall be learned in sanitary
science and a graduate, of not less than ten years' standing, of
a reputable medical college, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, who shall receive a
salary of $8,000 per annum, and whose term and tenure of office
shall be like the beads of the other Executive Departments, and
there shall be in said Department such other assistant secretaries and clerical assistants as may be authorized by said commission or otherwise provided for.
SEc. 5. '.rhat the commission shall give reasonable time for
hearings, if deemed neces ary, and, if necessary, it may appoint
a subcommission or subcommissions of its own members to make
investigation in any part of the United States, and it shall be
allowed actual nece sary expenses for the same. It shall have
the authotity to send for persons and papers and to administer
oaths ond affirmations. All necessary expense , including clerks,
stenographers, messengers, rent for place of meeting, and printing and stationery, shall be paid from any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated ; however, not to exceed $10,000
for expenditure under this section, to be paid upon vouchers to
be approved by the chairman of the commission.
SEc. o. That any vacnncies occurring in the commission, by
reason of death, disability, or from any other cause, shall be
filled by appointment in the same manner as was the member
whose retirement from the commission creates the vacancy.
6359
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SCHEDULE,

First. Bureau of administration.
Second. Bureau of scientific research and sanitation.
(a) National medical academy.
( b) National hygienic laboratory, to be located at the seat of
government. Covering original investigation in bacteriology,
pathology, medical zoology, pharmacology, ehemistry, and examination of drugs. Branch laboratories as may be required.
(c) Hospitals.
Bureau of vital statistics and medical conferences. Bureau
of epidemics and 1nfectious diseases. Bureau of hygienic engineering and public waters, including, first, hygi<'nic architecture; E:econd, water SUPl>ly, storage, and systerus of purification; tbirGl, systems of sewerage and disposal of waste ;
fourth. pollution of waters and control thereof; fifth, diversion
of public streams and lakes for irrigation, water po"·er, and
drainage canals, under regulations by the Secretary of the
Department.
Bureau of pure foods.
First. establishment of commercial standards.
Second, testing laboratories.
'l'llird, inspection service.
Bureau of publications. Providing for the publiration of annual reports, public henlth documents, and special bulletins for
distribution among the Stntes.
A BILL TO PROTECT MTORATORY FISlI,

!'ebruary 28, 1905, Mr. SHIRAS introduced the following bi~l;
which was referred to the Committee on the Merchant l\Iarine
and Fisheries, and ordered to be printed.
A bill (H. R. 19164) to protect certain migratory fish in the
public waters of the United Stntes.
Whereas experience bas shown that laws passed by tbe State
and 'l'erritories of the United States to protect fish within th1~ir
respeetive limits have proved insufficient to protect those kinds
and classes of fish which are migratory in their habits, and
which for the g1:eater part of each ye~lr remain in the lligb seas
beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, or any Stute
thereof : Therefore,
Be it enacted, etc., That all migratory fish of commercial value
which frequent the bays, sounds, estuaries, rivers, and lakes of
the United States only during the spawning period, shall, during
such periods, be under the control and protection of the United
States, and shall only be taken or destroyed in the manner ftud
at the time specified under the regulations established by the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Fisheries of the United States,
and any person or persons convicted of violating any of the said
regulations shall for each offem;p be liable to a fine not exceeding $200, or imprisonment, or both.
SEC. 2. Tbat the spawning period referred to in section 1
shall be understood and construed to mean that period commencing with the migration of said fish from the ocean into said
bays, sounds, estuaries, rivers, and lakes of the United State
and terminating upon the completion of the act of spawning.
A BILL TO PROTECT FOOD FISHES IN CERTAIN PUBLIC WATERS.

February 28, 1905, Mr. SHIRAS introduced the following bill;
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which was referred to the Committee on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries and ordered to be printed:
A bill (H. R. 19165) to protect the food fishes in certain public
waters of the United States.
Whereas the public waters of the United States, tidal and
inland, are subject to the control of Congress for the use and
benefit of the people of tbe United State ; and
·
Whereas the Cornmi sioner of the Bureau of Fisheries of the
United States is authorized to promote and protect the fishery
interests of the country, and to ascertain what diminution, if
any, in the number of food fishes of the coast and the lakes of
the United States bas taken place and from what cause the .
ame is due, and whether any protective, prohibitory, or precautionary measures should be adopted; and
Whereas the Bureau of Fisheries is spending annually large
um of mouey in the propagation of the valuable food fishes and
in stocking the public. waters of the United States therewith,
but aid Bureau is lacking in express authority to regulate exce ive fishing in . uch public waters, or in the prevention of the
unneces ary pollution thereof, or in the regulation of barriers
erected in said water , so that many stream· and lakes are
entirely depleted of said fish. and in other waters a limited sup-·
ply is maintained with o-rea.t difficulty and expense: Therefore,
Be 'it enacted, etc., That all varieties of food fishes which in
their migrations either pass through or do not remain permanently each year within the waters of any one State are hereby
declared to be the property of the United States for the benefit
and u, of the people thereof, and shall not be taken or destroyed during the time or in the manner hereinafter prohibited
and proscri b d.
SEC. 2. 'rhat the Commi ioner of the Bureau of Fisheries of
the United tate is hereby authorized and empowered to regulate or entir ly prohibit the catching or destruction of fl.DY varietie. of said food fl hes during their spawning period, and at
all times to pos. ess the power to regulate the means and devices by which said fish are captured or destroyed.
SEC. 3. That the Commi sioner of the said Bureau of Fisheries is further authorized to have fishways provided in said
public waters wheneYer there are erected dams, locks, or other
barriers therein which prevent said fish from ascending or
descending said public waters.
SEC. 4. 'That the said Commissioner of the Bureau of Fisheries
of the United States is authorized to investigate all cases where
it is alleged that the said public waters are being so unnecessarily and unrea onably polluted as to injure or destroy said
fl h and to prescribe proper regulations therefor.
SEC. 5. That any person or persons violating any regulations
hereinbefore nuthorlzed to be prepared by the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Fi herie hall be liable to a fine not exceeding
$200 for each offen e, or impri!::onment, or both; any law, custom, or u age, of any State to the contrary notwithstanding:
Prov,idea, however, That none of the said regulations shall apply
to any ln.ke, stream, or other water lying and being wholly within
any one tate and having no connection by public navigable
streams with the public waters of other States.
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